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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1.1 Markets, auctions and the Internet 
Markets are social institutions that facilitate exchange by means of competition 
(Coase, 1988; Weber, 1978 [1922]; Swedberg, 1994). The primary goal of a 
market is to solve the problems of resource allocation (who gets what) and price 
determination (at which price). Explicit resource allocation is necessary when at a 
certain price, there is more demand than supply and therefore not all potential 
buyers can be satisfied. In a hierarchical setting, resource allocation occurs by 
command from higher levels in a hierarchy; in a market, it occurs through 
competition among traders. Price determination is necessary to solve the 
fundamental problem that the seller faces: how much is this product or service 
worth? The answer to this question determines how much the buyer pays and how 
much the seller receives. To solve these problems of resource allocation and price 
determination, thereby achieving the goal of a market, potential buyers and sellers 
compete for transaction opportunities by exchanging information. They exchange 
information about what they want to buy or sell, how much they are willing to pay 
or accept and other terms of the trade until a transaction is made or a party decides 
to leave the market. These processes of information exchange will be the common 
thread throughout this dissertation.  
 
The information exchange in markets differs in how structured the process is. 
Most bargaining situations are highly unstructured, whereas auctions are highly 
structured. See for instance the following definition of an auction that is adopted 
here: “An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining 
resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from participants.” (McAfee and 
McMillan, 1987).  
Information exchange in an auction occurs through the bids of the participants. 
Bids state their current willingness-to-pay for the object that is being auctioned
1
. 
The explicit rule of the auction mechanism determines who wins the auction at 
                                                           
1 This is for the case of a forward auction where bidders are buyers. In a reverse auction, 
the bidders are sellers and their bids state their current willingness-to-accept a certain price 
for their goods or services. 
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what price, based on the bids submitted. Four basic auction mechanisms, described 
here in the case of the sale of a single object are (Vickrey, 1961; McAfee and 
McMillan, 1987): 
• English auction: The auctioneer starts at a low price and bidders keep 
submitting bids that are higher than the current highest bid until no one is 
willing to bid any higher and at that point the current highest bidder wins 
the auction at that price. 
• Dutch auction: The auctioneer starts at a very high price and continuously 
lowers the price (quite often through the clock-based mechanism used in 
the Dutch flower auctions where this auction derives its name from) until 
one bidder accepts that price, who then wins the auction and pays that 
price, i.e. his bid. 
• First price sealed bid auction: All bidders independently submit one bid to 
the auctioneer. The highest bidder wins and pays his bid. 
• Second price sealed bid auction (or Vickrey auction): Like in the first 
price sealed bid auction, all bidders independently submit one bid to the 
auctioneer and the highest bidder wins. However, he does not pay the 
price of his own bid, but the price of the highest rejected bid, i.e. the 
second-highest bid. 
 
Each of these auction mechanisms solves the problems of resource allocation and 
price determination in its own way with its own information exchange processes, 
which can result in different auction outcomes, thereby making the choice for a 
specific auction mechanism non-trivial (McAfee and McMillan, 1987).  
One aspect that all auctions have in common though, is that they are particularly 
suited to instances where the price determination problem is difficult; i.e. there is 
significant uncertainty over the actual value of the object to be transacted. For the 
seller, a pragmatic solution to this problem would be to simply set an arbitrary 
fixed price for whomever is willing to pay that price. However, this does not really 
answer the question of how much the object is worth and it is quite likely that the 
seller could have been better off transacting at a different price. Perhaps another 
buyer was willing to pay a lot more, but did not find out that it was for sale until 
the first buyer had bought it. In that case, both the seller and this new buyer would 
have liked to transact at a higher price if that meant that the new buyer would get 
what he was looking for. Or in a different situation there might be another buyer 
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who would like to buy the object as well, but at a lower price than the seller 
initially set. If that buyer’s willingness-to-pay is above the price that the seller 
would be willing to accept, both parties would have been better off if that 
transaction had taken place. To find out more precisely what something is worth, it 
is necessary to get all potential buyers together and let them compete for it. This is 
by no means trivial: buyers and seller(s) have to assemble in one place. 
Furthermore, they have to spend time figuring out who is going to get what at 
which price and this time may be constrained. In other words, there are costs 
associated with operating such a market mechanism, i.e. transaction costs (Coase, 
1937). 
This means that another necessary condition for an auction to be practical (other 
than uncertainty over the value) is that the transaction costs for buyer and seller 
are small enough compared to the additional benefit they get from holding an 
auction instead of setting a fixed price. Traditionally, this meant that auctions were 
used primarily for unique, high-value items such as paintings and construction 
projects, or collectibles or when there are commodities with large fluctuations in 
supply and/or demand, such as flowers, fish and other agricultural products 
(Smith, 1989). In the high-value-items case, the potential extra gains for the seller 
of finding a bidder who is willing to pay a high price outweigh the seller’s 
transaction costs and the high value to the buyer outweighs his transaction costs. 
In the supply/demand-fluctuations case, the transaction costs for a single, isolated 
auction would be too large compared to the modest value of agricultural products, 
but holding many auctions in a short period of time lowers the transaction costs for 
buyers enough to make participation feasible. 
 
This is where the Internet offers great benefits. With its open standards, relatively 
low entry barriers and low cost of communication, the Internet makes gathering 
people in one place a lot cheaper. Instead of having to physically gather in one 
place to bid, bidders can now gather electronically via newsgroups, email lists and 
webpages. Electronic bidding removes a large part of the transaction costs 
associated with traditional auctions. As a consequence, auctions have sprung up 
everywhere. The posterchild of electronic auctions is eBay. Having started in 
1995, eBay now hosts over 4 million auctions each day (eBay, 2002) and is one of 
the few structurally profitable Internet startups. One reason why eBay has grown 
so large is that they have tapped into two markets that previously were not there or 
operating only on a very small scale. One is the market for second-hand goods and 
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collectibles. This was a market originally confined to local newspapers, garage 
sales and fairs, but eBay has broadened the reach of this market to in principle 
anyone in the world with an Internet connection. Of course many practical 
obstacles to trading globally such as physical shipping costs and import taxes 
remain largely unaffected by the Internet (Mol and Koppius, forthcoming). The 
second major new market is the market for surplus inventory. Products for which 
there is little demand locally at a certain price can now be auctioned to people in 
other places where there still is demand for that product at that price. Both these 
markets could not have operated on this scale without the cheap, global 
communication that the Internet provides. 
Although eBay focuses particularly on the consumer-to-consumer (C2C) market 
and the business-to-consumer (B2C) market, in the last two years the business-to-
business (B2B) market has grown significantly. Companies such as FreeMarkets 
(www.freemarkets.com), ChemConnect (www.chemconnect.com), VerticalNet 
(www.vertical.net), FastParts (www.fastparts.com), e-Steel (www.e-steel.com) 
and numerous others have set up auctions aimed at improving the purchasing 
processes in the supply chain. Although such ventures are receiving a lot of 
enthusiasm in the business press (and for a while on the stock market as well), it is 
an open question what auction models will be successful in the long run, because 
the consequences for the various stakeholders involved of using electronic 
auctions are unclear. This is particularly important in the B2B context where there 
is repeated interaction between the participants and also the stakes are much 
higher than in the consumer market. As an example of the unclear consequences, 
one could say that a lower price may benefit the buyer initially, but it may also 
reduce the supplier’s willingness to invest in a relationship with the buyer, which 
in turn may offset the lower price in the long run (Jap, 2000; Kern, Willcocks, and 
van Heck, 2002).  
Another example deals with the almost global nature of the Internet. Because of 
this, using an electronic market may increase the chance of dealing with an 
international buyer or seller. This in turn may give rise to a number of other issues 
such as problems and risks associated with international payments, transportation, 
communication as well as regulatory constraints (Mol and Koppius, forthcoming). 
How these effects balance out in practice is still unclear. 
 
There is an emerging body of literature on electronic markets and auctions that is 
beginning to address these and other issues. An electronic market is defined as a 
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market that uses electronic information and communication technology (ICT) to 
support exchange processes, where ICT is defined as “the infrastructure that 
makes it possible to store, search, retrieve, copy, filter, manipulate, view, transmit 
and receive information.” (Shapiro and Varian, 1999, p.8). Thus, any market has a 
type of ICT associated with it, but electronic markets theory (EMT) focuses 
specifically on the role of electronic ICTs. Three central questions of electronic 
market theory are: 
• How does ICT influence the choice of coordination mechanism? Will 
markets become more common or will hierarchies prevail or networks? 
(Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987; Clemons, Reddi and Row, 1993; 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1993; Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and 
Kambil, 1994; Holland and Lockett, 1997) 
• How do electronic markets differ from traditional markets? Will prices 
increase or decrease? Will buyers become more or less price-sensitive? 
Will electronic markets exhibit more or less price dispersion? How much 
does reputation matter in an electronic market? (Bakos, 1991, 1997; Lee, 
1998; Klein and O’Keefe, 1999; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Degeratu, 
Rangaswamy and Wu, 2000) 
• What new market institutions can be created using ICT? Who benefits? 
What motives are there for adoption? (Clemons and Weber, 1996, 1998; 
Kambil and van Heck, 1998, 2002; Klein, 1997, 2000; Teich, Walllenius 
and Wallenius, 1999; Milgrom, 2000; Grewal, Comer and Mehta, 2001) 
As with any emerging area of research, the questions far outnumber the answers, 
so there is significant scope for new contributions. This dissertation aims to 
contribute to the last two categories of that emerging body of knowledge through 
three independent studies investigating electronic auctions and using multiple 
methods. The common thread linking these studies is a focus on the processes of 
information exchange described in the beginning of the section. This leads to the 
introduction of the concept information architecture of the market: the 
information architecture describes what type of information (that is relevant to 
trader’s decision processes) is available to whom, or when and how it becomes 
available to whom during the market process. It thus accommodates both 
information that characterizes the market as a whole (for instance how products 
are described to the traders) as well as information that is specific to a particular 
market process (such as the revelation of bids during an auction). The concept of 
 6
information architecture, although independently developed here and specifically 
for the context of markets, has a long history in the literature on information 
systems development. For example, in the ISP method (Martin, 1982), the 
information architecture describes the relationship between business activities 
(functions and processes) and data (entity types) and how different departments 
are involved (Bots et al., 1999, p. 748). A common way to operationalize such an 
information architecture is via a C-U-matrix (Martin, 1982, p.65) that describes 
which business processes create (C) which data and which business processes use 
(U) which data. That approach is conceptually similar to the definition of 
information architecture employed here, as both concepts deal with the 
availability of data to the various parties or processes involved, but there are some 
differences. In the IS development approach, there is a single information 
architecture based on the underlying business model, which is assumed to be 
relatively stable (Martin, 1982, p.18). It is a blueprint that the information system 
has to conform to: the information that business processes need to use, has to be 
available to them, so the information system has to ensure that the information 
flows from the place it is created to the place(s) it is used.  
Information architecture, the way it is employed in this thesis, allows the market 
designer to determine who will get to use certain information. This makes the 
information architecture open to design considerations, based on the goals of the 
market designer. In this thesis it is investigated how different information 
architectures affect the designer’s goals; in this case various market performance 
measures. 
 
1.2 Research questions and objective 
When investigating electronic markets, a distinction can be made between the 
concepts of market process, market outcome, market performance and market 
success (see fig. 1.1 for how they are related). Market process is defined as the 
processes of information exchange that occur in the market (for instance the bids 
in an auction).  
Market outcome is the set of transactions that arises as a result of this market 
process. Note that both the definitions for market process and market outcome are 
purely descriptive, without the normative implications that the concept of market 
performance entails. Market performance is based on a set of performance criteria 
by which the market process and market outcome are judged. Many performance 
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criteria exist, such as allocative efficiency, informational efficiency, market 
volume or speed of convergence of the market process (O’Hara, 1995). Some of 
these may be conflicting, which makes an unambiguous interpretation of ‘better’ 
market performance difficult.  
Furthermore, different stakeholders in a market may have different goals and 
therefore use different performance criteria (Kambil and van Heck, 1998). So in 
addition to a direct relationship between market performance and market success, 
an important indirect relationship exists that depends on how the various 
stakeholders perceive market performance relative to their interests. It is the 
confluence of these stakeholder interests that eventually determines whether or not 
the market is viable in the long term, i.e. its success or failure (Kambil and van 
Heck, 1998). 
There are a number of factors that influence market processes (i.e. the market 
process determinants), such as for instance the (in)balance between supply and 
demand, the numbers of buyers and sellers in the market, the willingness-to-pay 
and willingness-to-accept of each of these buyers and sellers, but also factors that 
are not purely economic, such as the degree to which buyers and sellers know and 
trust each other and the regulatory framework of the market.  
ICT is another relevant factor for the analysis of markets and it can affect market 
processes in two general ways. The direct effect occurs because ICT has a direct 
impact on the information exchange processes, for instance the cheaper and faster 
communication that email allows compared to a fax. The indirect effect occurs 
when a factor that has a direct effect on the market processes is affected by ICT, 
Figure 1.1 Relationship between market process, outcome, performance and success 
Market
Process
Market  
Performance
Market 
Success 
(Failure) 
Stakeholder 
Perception 
Performance
Criteria 
Market 
Process 
Determinants 
Market 
Outcome
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i.e. that factor is a mediating variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986) for the effects of 
ICT. Information architecture is an example of such a mediating variable: different 
ICTs can cause changes in what types of information are available to be 
exchanged. For instance email does not allow for intonation to be communicated 
as well as over the phone, which will affect the information exchange processes 
because now certain information is lacking that could be relevant to interpreting 
the message. In this case, the immediately preceding cause is not the different ICT, 
but the different information architecture, which in turn is caused by the different 
ICT.  
 
Several studies exist that start at the right hand side of figure 1.1 and try to distill 
success or failure factors for electronic markets (e.g. Kambil and van Heck, 1998; 
Pisanias and Willcocks, 1999). This dissertation takes a complementary approach 
by starting at the left hand side of figure 1.1. As literature review in the second 
chapter shows, most research on electronic market to date has been done with a 
focus on the reduced transaction and search costs, caused by a change in ICT. This 
is an example of the direct effects of changing ICT. Indirect effects have received 
relatively less research attention thus far, largely because the intermediate 
variables, through which ICT would have its indirect effect, have been left 
unspecified. This thesis contends that the information architecture of the market is 
such an intermediate variable. A change in ICT affects the information 
architecture of the market and this will affect market process, outcome and 
performance. This leads to the following overall research question (ORQ): 
 
(ORQ) How does ICT influence the information architecture of the market and 
how does this affect electronic market process, electronic market outcome and 
electronic market performance? 
 
This dissertation answers this question in two complementary ways. The first way 
is to investigate a particular empirical setting and answer the research question for 
that specific market and ICT. This is done in three separate empirical studies. The 
second way to answer the research question is by synthesizing and generalizing 
the empirical findings at the end of the dissertation into a conceptual model of 
electronic markets that relates the constructs from the ORQ. 
The main objective here is to show that focusing on the information exchange 
processes in the market, and in particular the concept of information architecture, 
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is a fruitful way to analyze markets, especially when dealing with the effects that 
ICT has on markets. The thesis will attempt to achieve this goal by conducting 
three separate studies, each investigating a specific form of ICT in a specific 
market (in each case a type of auction, an important subset of markets). Although 
each study has its own specific research question, they all will be investigated 
using this particular lens. A secondary objective is to make an analytical 
generalization of the findings (Yin, 1994) as the first step towards an integrative 
model of electronic markets.  
 
As seen from the definition, the information architecture governs the set of 
information that is relevant to the trader’s decision processes. Within that 
information set, three categories of information can be distinguished: 
1. Product quality information: information about the properties of the object 
that is to be traded that allows traders to infer product quality. 
2. Market process information: transaction-specific information, such as the 
highest bid or trader identity. 
3. Market state information: public, non-transaction, market-related 
information, such as the number of traders or the sound level in the market 
(Coval and Shumway, 2000). 
 
Each separate study deals with one or more of the information categories above 
and the research questions of these studies are described in more detail below. One 
of the things that an electronic market entails is that products now have to be 
represented digitally instead of physically. This can mean that potential buyers 
have less information available to them to ascertain product quality and thus to 
determine whether or not the product fits their needs. The consequences of this 
change in product quality information will be investigated in the first study at a 
large Dutch flower auction, which leads to the first detailed research question 
(DRQ): 
 
(DRQ1): How does reduced product quality information affect market process, 
market outcome and market performance in an auction? 
 
Another change in an electronic market compared to a traditional market is that 
buyers no longer physically need to gather in one place and instead they 
participate electronically using a computer at their home or office. This represents 
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a reduction of search and switching costs for buyers and sellers (an example of the 
direct effects of ICT). However, this reduction potentially comes at a cost: not 
only may there be reduced quality information due to digital product 
representation like in the case described above, but because traders no longer see 
or hear each other, they may lack information about the current state of the market 
(market state information). For instance, they may not know how many traders 
there are in the market, which affects their bidding (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 2001; 
see in particular footnote 2: “…the ‘different information flows’ make it easier for 
bidders to figure things out in one auction than the other.”). Another type of 
missing market state information may be the sensory cues that could otherwise 
give traders valuable information about the state of the market, such as the sound 
level (Coval and Shumway, 2000). This missing market state information is an 
example of the indirect effects of ICT on market processes. The consequences of 
this will be investigated in a second, separate study at the same Dutch flower 
auction as the first study, leading to second detailed research question: 
 
(DRQ2): How do reduced search and switching costs and reduced market state 
information affect market process, market outcome and market performance in an 
auction? 
 
These first two studies were designed to analyze the impact of a change in ICT on 
an existing auction. The general question in those studies is: what happens when a 
traditional auction moves towards an electronic auction? A potential effect of ICT 
on markets is that ICT allows the creation of new types of markets that were 
previously hard to implement. The third study designs such a new type of market, 
a multidimensional auction. Buyers generally take much more information into 
account in their buying decision than just price (the first two studies confirm this 
point as well). Price is a reflection of the underlying value drivers (Lancaster, 
1966) as the buyer makes tradeoffs among such dimensions as various quality 
attributes, quantity, delivery time, warranty policy, in addition to price. In the vast 
majority of auctions currently in use, bidders only bid on price. In a 
multidimensional auction, bidders bid on multiple dimensions, for instance a 
three-dimensional auction on price, quality and delivery time. This is particularly 
useful in a procurement setting, where a buyer stages a reverse auction among 
multiple suppliers (bidders) for a contract to deliver certain goods. A specific 
application area is capacity auctions for commodities such as bandwidth, container 
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space or electricity, where the underlying dimensions are relatively easy to specify 
and quantify. 
In a multidimensional auction, the buyer announces which dimensions are relevant 
to him and then lets the suppliers bid on these dimensions, instead of specifying 
the product exhaustively in advance. Because the buyer probably has incomplete 
information about what suppliers can potentially offer him on the various 
dimensions, fixing these in advance may result in money being ‘left on the table’. 
This means that there are improvements possible that represent a win-win-
situation for all parties involved (Bazerman, Magliozzi and Neale, 1985; 
Rangaswamy and Shell 1997). Making the relevant dimensions an integral part of 
the market process through a multidimensional auction is one way of trying to 
capture the potential extra value hidden in the different comparative valuations of 
buyers and sellers (Koppius, 1998). Preliminary empirical evidence supports this 
view (Bichler, 2000). 
 
The first two studies explore the various aspects of the concept of information 
architecture as they highlight the importance of specific types of information for 
explaining market outcomes. The third study formally tests the influence of 
information architecture. In particular, it tests aspects of the information 
architecture that deal with information about the bids in the auction, a type of 
market process information. This leads to the third detailed research question: 
 
(DRQ3): What is the influence of a change in the information architecture of 
market process information on market process, outcome and performance in an 
electronic multidimensional auction? 
 
The answers to these questions should yield evidence in support of the view that is 
advanced here, which is that information architecture is an important determinant 
of market processes and that the information exchange processes in a market are a 
useful lens through which to study (electronic) markets.  
 
The last part of the dissertation theorizes about the findings of the three studies 
and their generalization using additional literature, in an attempt to arrive at a 
conceptual model of electronic markets. Each link among the constructs has been 
empirically validated independently in one or more of the three separate studies, 
but the model as a whole is not empirically tested. The model is intended to 
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provide the first step for further development and testing of electronic market 
theory, which should eventually explain electronic market success and failure. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
The overall methodology of this dissertation is that of multi-method research 
(Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Mingers, 2001). The basic idea behind multi-method 
research is that each research method has its strengths and weaknesses. For 
instance, case studies rank high on external validity (in a properly defined 
domain), but it is often difficult to draw causal inferences (low internal validity), 
whereas lab experiments rank high on internal validity, but the results may not 
generalize to domains outside the lab (low external validity). Multi-method 
research aims to strengthen the validity of the research by triangulation of 
methods, whereby the methods are chosen to complement each other’s strengths 
and weaknesses.  
This triangulation can take the form of simultaneous or sequential triangulation 
(Brewer and Hunter, 1989). In simultaneous triangulation, the researcher uses 
multiple methods in the same study to measure the same phenomenon (Jick, 1979; 
Yin, 1994). An example is to combine qualitative ethnographic evidence with 
quantitative social network measures in the study of technology adoption (Barley, 
1986). In sequential triangulation, the results of one method are the basis for a new 
study of the same concept with a different method. An example is to start with an 
exploratory case study to develop a conceptual model of modularity that is then 
tested on a large sample using survey methods, such as done by Wolters (2002). 
Sequential triangulation best describes the approach of this dissertation. 
The first two studies are primarily quantitative case studies. They were set up to 
investigate the effects of two new ICT-based forms of auctioning at a Dutch 
flower auction, using the transaction database of the flower auction. Through the 
course of the first study, it became apparent that the information available to the 
traders (or more accurately: the change in information that the new ICT-based 
auction form entailed) played a central role in explaining the observed effects. 
Therefore in the second study, which was originally intended as a test of the 
effects of reduced transaction costs only, information-based explanations were 
explicitly incorporated to explain the observed effects. Both of these case studies 
have the advantage of studying a real-life phenomenon in detail (Yin, 1994). The 
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drawback is that causal inferences can only be made plausible, not proven, 
because it is impossible to control for all potentially relevant external factors.  
This is where the third study comes in. The first two studies suggested the 
importance of what in the third study is more formally incorporated as the 
information architecture of the market. This study was a laboratory experiment 
explicitly designed to test information architecture as a determinant of market 
performance. What the laboratory setting lacks in realism, it makes up for it in 
internal validity, i.e. the establishment of a causal relationship, because the 
external factors are controlled for to a very large extent (Friedman and Sunder, 
1993). The combination of these two methods means that the concept of 
information architecture has both high external validity -being developed from the 
case studies- and high internal validity -established through the experiments- 
(Brewer and Hunter, 1989). The methodological aspects of the individual studies 
will be dealt with in their respective chapters. 
 
1.4 Scientific relevance 
The first contribution of this dissertation is the identification of information 
architecture as an important determinant of electronic market processes, -outcome, 
-performance and eventually -success (although the latter is not explicitly dealt 
with in this dissertation). Information architecture is new in this particular form, 
but several aspects of it have seen significant research in the market microstructure 
literature and the literature on the economics of information.  
On one hand, certain aspects of information architecture have been investigated in 
the finance literature under the heading of market transparency (see for instance 
O’Hara (1995), Ch.9.1), particularly the issues of publishing prices and order flow 
in financial markets. The concept of information architecture is more general than 
that however, because it also takes into account other information that is relevant 
to the trader’s decision processes, particularly information about the traded object 
itself2. It can therefore not only apply to financial markets, but to other markets 
such as auctions as well.  
                                                           
2 See also the following quote: “From the perspective of non-financial markets…the 
exchange of non-transaction signals is critical. In other markets, participants constantly 
obtain signals to determine the nature of the supply and demand curves against which they 
trade or compete to trade.” (Coval and Shumway, 2000, p.1, emphasis added) 
 14
On the other hand, information about the traded object and particularly 
asymmetries thereof among buyers and sellers, is a central concept in the 
economics of information (see Stiglitz (2001) for an overview). This stream of 
literature usually conceptualizes information as an exogenous factor that then 
determines the phenomenon under investigation. What information architecture 
adds to this is endogenizing the information by explicitly recognizing the 
dynamics of information exchange. Information architecture also emphasizes the 
fact that information is a multidimensional construct in itself, because different 
types of information can have qualitatively different effects and conceiving of 
information as a single-dimensional type may not fully do justice to that fact 
(recent research on multidimensional screening is going in a similar direction, see 
for instance Rochet and Chone (1998)). 
A second contribution is the development of the multidimensional auction. A 
handful of articles in the economic literature analytically analyzed this type of 
auction (Che, 1993; Cripps and Ireland, 1994; Branco, 1997), but together with the 
papers by Teich, Wallenius and Wallenius (1999), Bichler (2000) and Cho (2001), 
this is one of the first studies to empirically analyze a multidimensional auction. 
The software developed for the experiment is flexible enough to allow a wide 
variety of multidimensional auction mechanisms to be studied empirically. 
This dissertation also makes a third contribution of a methodological nature. As 
Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski (1998) argued, case studies of individual 
electronic markets are necessary to get a detailed understanding of the factors that 
are relevant to the way an electronic market functions. At the same time however, 
one would like to establish a clear causality between the suggested determinant 
and the observed outcome. Laboratory experiments are particularly suited for this 
purpose (Friedman and Sunder, 1993). A multi-method research study in which 
the methods have complementary strengths and weaknesses is potentially stronger 
than a single-method study (Brewer and Hunter, 1989).  
 
However, despite the benefits of this type of research, in the IS field (and 
elsewhere) such studies have been rare (Mingers, 2001). This dissertation, using a 
combination of case study research and laboratory experiments each with their 
particular, non-overlapping strengths, can be seen as an example of a multi-
method research study, which will hopefully stimulate other researchers to use 
multi-method approaches as well. 
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1.5 Managerial relevance 
As doing business over the Internet becomes more and more common practice, it 
is vital for market designers, traders and executives to have a good understanding 
of the issues involved (van Heck and Vervest, 1998). One set of issues revolves 
around the usage of electronic markets and auctions to do business between 
organizations. Using electronic auctions can have a variety of seemingly 
contradictory consequences, such as reduced prices (Bakos 1991, 1997) or 
increased prices (Lee, 1998). Empirical studies are necessary to not only identify 
antecedents and outcomes, but also to lay a foundation for testing the robustness of 
such results to contextual factors. Such studies will sensitize market designers to 
the large set of factors involved in designing a market and how those factors can 
affect market performance. The research in this dissertation highlights one such 
factor, namely the information architecture of the market. It shows that the 
information architecture has a significant influence on market outcome and 
performance. This means that explicit attention should be given to how to design 
the information exchange processes in a market and that information architecture 
becomes an integral part of a market designer’s toolkit. 
For individuals and organizations that are trading in electronic markets, this 
research shows three things. First, it emphasizes the basic point that information is 
a crucial part of trading in a market. Second, it highlights three different categories 
of information that are relevant for trading processes: product quality information, 
market process information and market state information. Third, and most 
importantly, it shows how these different types of information each affect trading 
processes and market outcome. Being fully aware of this will stimulate more 
informed decision-making in markets, leading to win-win improvements for all 
involved.  
Another point of practical relevance is the development of a new type of auction, 
the multidimensional auction. A complaint often heard about conventional 
auctions is that they focus on price only, whereas in reality there is much more to 
value than just price and bidders often feel that this is not taken into account 
properly (Jap, 2001). Using a multidimensional auction in such cases can 
transform the win-lose nature of the buyer-seller relation in conventional price 
auctions into a win-win situation, leading to gains for all parties involved. 
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1.6 Structure of this dissertation 
The next chapter surveys the existing literature on electronic markets to lay the 
theoretical background for the later chapters. Chapter 3 investigates the first 
research question, namely the influence of reduced quality information on bidding 
behavior. The empirical setting is a large Dutch flower auction that introduced 
screen auctioning, which replaced showing the actual flower to the bidders by 
showing a generic picture. This meant a loss of product quality information for the 
bidders. A statistical analysis of the flower auction’s transaction database before 
and after screen auctioning shows several changes in bidding behavior, such as 
lower prices and increased importance of product attributes and seller reputation in 
determining price.  
Chapter 4 investigates the second research question, namely the influence of 
reduced transaction costs and reduced market state information. At the same Dutch 
flower auction as in chapter 3, bidders had the option of bidding electronically 
from their home or office instead of physically being in the auction hall. This 
greatly reduced their transaction costs, but it also implied a loss of market state 
information. As those online buyers bid in the exact same auctions as the buyers in 
the auction hall, this provides a direct test for bidding behavior differences 
between online and nonline bidders. Some differences were lower prices and 
lower purchasing variety for online bidders. 
Chapter 5 discusses problems with auctions in which bidders bid only on price. 
This provides the rationale for developing a multidimensional auction, in which 
bidders bid not only on price, but also on the value drivers such as quality, 
delivery time and warranty. It describes the software prototype that was built to 
conduct the laboratory experiments. It also introduces the concept of information 
architecture more formally. The relevance of this concept for market performance 
is tested using a series of laboratory experiments in which students bid under 
different information architectures. We show that the information architecture has 
a significant effect on two auction performance parameters, winner efficiency and 
Pareto optimality, thus answering the third research question. 
Chapter 6 looks at the theoretical implications of the results in the previous 
chapters for a theory of electronic markets that builds on the empirical studies in 
this dissertation to create a conceptual model of electronic markets.  
Chapter 7 discusses the results and limitations of the research, offers conclusions 
and suggests directions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter surveys the existing literature on electronic markets. It focuses in 
particular on the papers that have studied electronic markets empirically in order 
to get a clear picture of which issues have been debated with what result and to 
identify gaps in the literature. This provides part of the theoretical background for 
the studies in the subsequent chapters. 
The literature on electronic markets is roughly divided into three streams, based on 
their level of analysis. The first stream analyzes electronic markets compared to 
other electronic coordination mechanisms. Its focus is on how ICT influences the 
choice of coordination mechanism, for instance the electronic markets vs. 
electronic hierarchies debate (Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987). The second 
stream analyzes electronic markets compared to non-electronic markets. Its focus 
is on how market processes in electronic markets differ from traditional markets, 
for instance the reduced price hypothesis (Bakos, 1991). The third stream looks at 
electronic markets from an institutional point of view, sometimes studied in 
isolation, sometimes studied in comparison to other electronic markets. Its focus is 
how electronic markets differ from each other (e.g. Kaplan and Sawhney, 2000) 
and how these differences can explain the success or failure of a new institution 
such as an electronic market (Alba, Lynch, Weitz, Janisziewski, Lutz, Sawyer and 
Wood, 1997). These three streams will be analyzed in the sections below. 
 
2.2 ICT and the choice of coordination mechanism 
The first stream of electronic markets literature investigates how ICT affect the 
choice of coordination mechanism. It started with the seminal work of Malone, 
Yates and Benjamin (1987). They offer three arguments that increased ICT use 
will lead to electronic markets being favored relatively more than electronic 
hierarchies. Their first argument is that on a general level, ICT reduces the cost of 
communicating and processing information, i.e. the cost of coordination. As these 
costs are higher in markets than in hierarchies, the absolute cost reduction will be 
larger in markets, thus leading to a relative shift towards electronic markets. Butler 
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et al. (1997) make a similar point in their discussion of interaction costs, which 
they estimate to be reduced by 60% on average, through use of the Web.  
On a more detailed level, Malone, Yates and Benjamin observe that these 
coordination costs are determined in part by the asset specificity of the product 
(the degree to which the product can be employed outside the specifics of the 
current transaction (Williamson, 1985) and the complexity of product description. 
When both factors are high, the product is likely to be obtained through 
hierarchical coordination and when both factors are low through market 
coordination (when one factor is high and the other is low is not dealt with in their 
paper). They then argue that ICT-enabled flexible manufacturing systems 
essentially reduce the asset specificity of the product; lower asset specificity favors 
market-based coordination over hierarchical coordination (Williamson, 1985). 
Their third argument is that databases and high-bandwidth electronic 
communication enable markets to communicate effectively more complex product 
descriptions than before, thus again favoring markets over hierarchies.  
Although seemingly compelling, empirical tests of this hypothesis have not 
yielded very supportive results. Rosenthal, Shah and Xiao (1993) investigated the 
chemical industry, but their evidence suggests a move towards electronic 
hierarchies. They explain their results by pointing to the sourcing literature, which 
shows an increased use of single sourcing, geared towards developing long-term 
relationships with a sole supplier. They argue that this development is more 
important than the possible consequences of ICT, which therefore leads to use of 
more hierarchical coordination instead of markets. Hess and Kemerer (1994) 
studied five electronic coordination mechanisms in the home mortgage industry 
and found that the ones that survived in the long term were electronic hierarchies, 
not electronic markets, again contradicting the Malone, Yates and Benjamin-
hypothesis. They suggest that the failed marketplaces may not have aligned the 
incentives in the marketplace properly, which leads to reduced adoption and 
eventually failure. Other relevant factors in this respect are the relative market 
power of buyers and suppliers, as well as which party owns the market. 
 
Other researchers have refined the original theoretical arguments and arrived at 
similar conclusions regarding the importance of market participants’ sourcing 
strategy. Clemons, Reddi and Row (1993) pointed to the neglected variable of 
transaction risk and posed the “move to the middle hypothesis”. This said that 
although there will be an increase in outsourcing of activities caused by ICT 
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(which was validated by Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil (1994)), 
this increased outsourcing will be from a relatively small number of suppliers, 
with which the firm has long-term cooperative relationships. This network-like 
structure is chosen in order to reduce the risks of opportunistic behavior and the 
loss of critical resources, while also providing higher incentives for investments in 
IT, organizational adaptations and learning processes. Bakos and Brynjolfsson 
(1993) arrived at a similar conclusion reasoning from the economic literature on 
incomplete contracts, when they argued that ICT increases the importance of 
“non-contractibles” such as quality, innovation, responsiveness and information 
sharing in buyer-supplier relationships. Both these articles show that there are 
more factors than asset specificity and complexity of product description at play 
when determining the choice of coordination mechanism. 
Steinfield, Kraut and Plummer (1995) highlighted the importance of the openness 
of the technical infrastructure and the locus of control of the infrastructure. 
Particularly the locus-of-control variable influences the resulting coordination 
structure, because unless the infrastructure is controlled by a neutral third party, 
entry barriers and lock-in are likely to arise (not unlike the results found by Hess 
and Kemerer (1994)). This would result again in network-like configurations. 
Holland and Lockett (1997) took a slightly different approach when they proposed 
the “mixed-mode hypothesis”. They argue that, instead of a single preferred 
coordination mode, firms use combinations of market and hierarchy-type 
relationships with their suppliers. Furthermore, instead of causing a shift one way 
or the other, ICT allows firms to maintain such relationships simultaneously. The 
specific organizational context will determine which type of electronic relationship 
will arise, although they do not offer any predictions as to how the organizational 
context will determine electronic coordination mechanism choice. 
 
Other than the proposed shift from electronic hierarchies to electronic markets, 
Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) also identified an electronic brokerage effect. 
Electronic markets can connect many different buyers and suppliers through a 
central database, which theoretically could reduce the need for brokers and other 
intermediaries. This ‘disintermediation hypothesis’ has often been repeated in the 
popular press (Champy 1999) as well as the academic literature (Benjamin and 
Wigand, 1995). However, the work of Steinfield and colleagues shows that 
empirical evidence does not support such disintermediation (Sarkar, Butler and 
Steinfield, 1995, 1998; Steinfield, Chan and Kraut, 2000). They give two reasons 
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for this: the first is that the transaction costs for intermediaries also drop because 
of ICT and this reduction may offset the reduction in transaction costs of a direct 
buyer-supplier link. The second reason is that an exchange process consists of 
many more phases than just brokering -the matching buyers and suppliers- 
(Kambil and van Heck, 1998; Bakos, 1998) and some of these additional functions 
are not easy to replicate without using an intermediary. For example, how do 
electronic markets deal with processes such as the legitimization of transactions 
and the resolution of disputes between buyer and seller? (Kambil and van Heck, 
1998) Although in principle the trading parties themselves could fulfill these roles, 
it is more likely that an intermediary will do that. Having an external party that is 
perceived as independent by the trading parties will increase the trust that they 
have in the effective functioning of those processes, thus making markets more 
viable. As the cost of intermediation drops because of ICT, Steinfield and 
colleagues predict that there will actually be more intermediaries, as now 
specialized intermediation for certain phases of the exchange process becomes 
feasible (Sarkar, Butler and Steinfield, 1995, 1998). Vervest and Dunn (2000) note 
that the increasing importance of customer information gives rise to new parties 
skilled in infomediation. Such infomediaries focus on collecting customer 
information from various parties and organizing it for other businesses to use to 
deliver customer value. 
Bailey and Bakos (1997) and Bakos (1998) arrived at similar conclusions 
regarding re-intermedation and new roles for intermediaries, using several case 
studies of successful electronic markets as did Jin and Robey (1999), who drew on 
literature from sociology and marketing to support the re-intermediation case. 
 
2.3 ICT and market processes 
A second stream within the electronic markets literature assumes the choice for 
market-based coordination has been made and subsequently investigates the 
differences between electronic markets and traditional markets. It has its roots in 
Bakos (1991), who emphasized the reduced search costs for buyers in an 
electronic market. The most important implications of this search cost reduction 
were an improved allocative efficiency as buyers now can find sellers that better 
match their needs and a reduction in prices paid, due to increased competition 
between sellers. This ‘reduced price hypothesis’ has found mixed empirical 
support. Lee (1998) investigated the case of Aucnet, an electronic auction for 
 21
second-hand cars in Japan and found that prices in the Aucnet auction were 
significantly higher than the traditional car auctions and offered several 
explanations for this phenomenon. The most important explanation is that because 
Aucnet screened out the low-quality cars (i.e. the ‘lemons’, Akerlof (1970)) 
through their quality rating system, their cars were on average of higher quality 
than the traditional car auctions. Subsequent analysis (Lee, Westland and Hong, 
1999) showed that correcting for the quality difference did decrease the price 
difference, but did not eliminate it.  Thus, other factors have to be taken into 
account to explain the price difference. One of these is again related to Aucnet’s 
quality rating system: besides screening out the lemons, the general thoroughness 
of Aucnet’s car inspection process increased the trust that bidders had in the 
quality of the cars being auctioned, which leads to higher prices (see also Lee and 
Clark (1997)). Another factor is that the electronic representation of the cars made 
it attractive for sellers to sell their cars through Aucnet so they could avoid the 
high transportation and parking costs of physical auctions. This wider assortment 
attracted more buyers and this buyer externality leads to higher prices, which in 
turn again attracts more sellers and so on. A final factor may be that it is the 
premium that buyers are willing to pay for not having to physically travel to an 
auction and for having a higher chance of finding a vehicle that best matches their 
preferences.  
 
Bailey (1998) also found higher prices online when he compared prices for books, 
CDs and software online and offline, as well as larger price dispersion online. 
These findings were particularly surprising as these categories are considered to be 
homogeneous goods, for which the reduced price effects theoretically should be 
most forceful (Bakos, 1997). A likely explanation for this was the immature state 
of electronic commerce at the time of data collection (early 1997). Around that 
time, competition among Internet retailers was not very strong because few 
retailers were active on the Internet and the average Internet user had an above-
average income and therefore may have been less price-sensitive (Bailey, 1998), 
which would enable retailers to sustain higher prices. Other potential explanations 
are high search costs on the Internet due to information overload and the 
possibility of price discrimination by retailers.  
In a follow-up study on books and CDs, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) 
significantly improved Bailey’s data collection methodology in order to arrive at a 
more accurate price comparison. They do find the predicted lower prices on the 
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Internet (8-15% difference) and also much smaller price adjustments by Internet 
retailers, both of which are indications of a more efficiently functioning market. 
However, they still replicate Bailey’s (1998) finding of substantial price dispersion 
online, even larger price dispersion online than among conventional retailers, 
which again runs counter to the hypothesis of an efficient market (in the case of 
homogeneous goods). They note that models of search costs or asymmetric 
information cannot explain this finding and suggest that heterogeneity among 
retailers, particularly on issues related to trust and branding, could account for the 
observed price dispersion (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000). Other possible 
explanations are price discrimination (Clemons, Hann and Hitt, 2000), switching 
costs (Chen and Hitt, 2000) and convenience and awareness (Smith, Bailey and 
Brynjolfsson, 1999). 
 
Degeratu, Rangaswamy and Wu (2000) took a different approach when they 
compared shopping behavior in a traditional supermarket with shopping behavior 
at Peapod, an online supermarket. They distinguished four categories of search 
attributes of a product: brand name, price, sensory attributes (product attributes 
that can be determined through the senses), and non-sensory attributes (product 
attributes that can be described accurately in words). Focusing on consumer choice 
behavior and using information integration theory, they found that sensory 
attributes have lower impact on choices online, whereas non-sensory attributes 
have higher impact. Brand name also has a higher impact on online choice, but 
only if there is less attribute information available online than offline. With 
regards to price sensitivity of consumers, they distinguish between two effects: 
that of the price discount itself and that of the product being featured or not (a 
reasonable, but not perfect indicator of a good deal). Online consumers are more 
sensitive to price discounts when choosing a brand. Traditional supermarket 
shoppers are much more affected by the product being featured or not. The 
combined effect of price discount and featuring is smaller for online consumers, 
which they interpret as online consumers being less price-sensitive overall than 
offline consumers.  
Lynch and Ariely (2000) also investigated the price-sensitivity of online 
consumers in relation to the search process. In an experimental environment of 
two competing online wine stores, they manipulated the search costs for price 
information and for quality information, as well as the ease of cross-store 
comparison. Easier cross-store comparison increased price-sensitivity (but only if 
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both stores carried the wine that was searched for), but the search costs for price 
information had no consistent effect. They also found that a lower cost of 
obtaining quality information led to a decrease in price-sensitivity. Although the 
relationship between price-sensitivity and the magnitude of the search costs is 
dependent on the product being sold, their results do suggest that all three types of 
search costs need to be taken into account, as there is a tradeoff between them. 
More generally, this implies that comparison-shopping (as enabled by software 
agents or other intermediaries) does not inevitably lead to an all-out price war as 
predicted by some (Sinha 2000) when the quality information of differentiated 
products is readily available. 
 
2.4 New electronic market institutions  
The third stream of the electronic markets literature adopts a more institutional 
perspective, looking at the new market institutions ICT enables and investigating 
factors that drive or hinder their adoption. Kambil and van Heck (1998) analyzed 
the success and failure of four ICT-based new trading mechanisms in the Dutch 
flower auctions. Using a detailed model of exchange processes, they highlighted 
the intended and unintended changes that occurred and how the key stakeholders 
(growers, buyers and the auction intermediary) perceived these changes. Their 
analysis suggests that no key stakeholder must be worse off in the electronic 
auction if the new market institution is to succeed. They also note that a change in 
market ownership or new sources of competitive pressure can be a catalyst for 
creation and adoption of new market institutions.  
Clemons and Weber (1996, 1998) have highlighted the potential of ICT to not just 
automate existing markets, but also to devise new electronic trading systems that 
can improve the quality of the market. Electronic trading systems can have lower 
transaction costs and despite the liquidity advantages of established markets, it is 
possible for such new market institutions to attract a healthy amount of trading 
volume (Clemons and Weber, 1996). Other than cost advantages, new ICT-
enabled trading mechanisms also offer the opportunity to solve shortcomings in 
traditional markets. A prime example is the Optimark system, which allows more 
effective trading of large block orders (Clemons and Weber, 1998) as well as an 
improved way of dealing with traders’ preferences (Teich, Wallenius and 
Wallenius, 1999). Combinatorial auctions (Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad, 1998), in 
which bidders can bid on combinations of goods, and the multidimensional 
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auctions (Koppius, 1998; Bichler 2000) mentioned earlier both represent other 
innovative new market mechanisms that become more feasible as ICT reduces the 
costs of computation and information processing that these auctions require. 
On a more general level, Kambil, Nunes and Wilson (1999) argue that ICT enables 
the creation of all-in-one marketplaces that combine multiple trading mechanisms. 
This allows stakeholders to select dynamically the trading mechanism that best 
suits their needs in that particular situation, instead of relying on one single way of 
trading.  
 
Although new electronic markets may objectively provide benefits to stakeholders, 
the social relationships among stakeholders underlying the traditional market may 
affect the subjective perception of those potential benefits, which in turn can affect 
adoption. For instance, traders may not see the need for efficient communication if 
they have a strong social relationship with other traders (Pisanias and Willcocks, 
1999).  
Grewal, Comer and Mehta (2001) further investigated the antecedents of 
participation in electronic markets. They distinguish between three states of 
participation depending on a firm’s level of activity in the electronic market: 
exploration, expert and passive state.  They find that learning ability, legitimacy 
motives, efficiency motives and IT capabilities are determinants of a firm’s state 
of participation in the electronic market. Higher ability of a firm to learn, more 
perceived need of the firm to be seen as technologically innovative (legitimacy 
motives), more focus on achieving efficiency and higher IT capabilities all 
improve the chance that a firm will be active in the electronic market (either 
exploratory or as expert). In particular, efficiency motives and IT capabilities are 
key factors for a firm to attain the expert state. 
 
Several of the findings mentioned in this and the previous paragraphs are echoed 
by Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski (1998) in their study of an electronic 
market in the aircraft parts industry. They find that buyers do indeed use the 
electronic market differently depending on the actual nature of the purchase and 
they also point to the continuing role for intermediaries, particularly for 
verification purposes. With regards to the nature of competition, they find that 
because the electronic market in their study only gave product information but not 
price information, this leads to more effective matching of supply and demand 
without creating price wars. This implies that the scope of the market, i.e. the 
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phases in a transaction it supports (e.g. search only or also support for valuation 
processes), is a relevant variable for the analysis of electronic markets. 
 
2.5 Summary  
The field of electronic markets is slowly maturing: whereas the first published 
studies were largely conceptual and agenda-setting in nature, now empirical 
studies are becoming more common. Particularly the proliferation of electronic 
markets and auctions on the Internet makes access to empirical data much easier. 
A common thread through these empirical studies so far is the complexity of the 
phenomenon: most studies identify new determinants of market processes, 
outcome, performance and success or show that context factors qualify existing 
relationships. This implies that not only further empirical studies are necessary to 
identify more such factors, but also that theorizing becomes necessary (Weick, 
1995) to link these factors together and further mature the field. That is what is 
attempted in chapter 6 in order to provide an answer to the overall research 
question. 
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CHAPTER 3 : PRODUCT QUALITY INFORMATION IN ELECTRONIC 
AUCTIONS3 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature on ICT and market processes reviewed in section 2.3 has focused 
mainly on the presumed lower search costs of electronic markets. However, there 
are several more aspects on which traditional markets and electronic markets 
differ, based on the nature of the technology used for the electronic market. As 
traders in a market are continuously exchanging information about products, prices 
and other aspects of the transaction, one relevant aspect is how much information 
and what types of information the communication channel can carry. For instance, 
face-to-face communication allows for much richer communication than a simple 
email. This can have consequences for how well a seller can communicate 
information about the quality of his products. 
This chapter shows how a change in ICT resulted in reduced product quality 
information available to traders and the consequences this had for the prices of 
goods in a market. The empirical setting is a large Dutch flower auction that 
introduced a new ICT-based auction form called screen auctioning. In screen 
auctioning, flowers are not shown physically anymore to the buyers, who are 
shown a generic picture instead. Discussions with flower auction employees 
revealed that in screen auctioning some important cues for product quality (such as 
the stiffness of the flower stem and flower color) were not available to the bidders, 
who therefore had less product quality information available to base their bid on. 
This study uses a multiple regression model to compare flower prices before and 
after the introduction of screen auctioning. The results indicate that prices dropped 
significantly, particularly for more expensive flowers. The next paragraph will 
describe the theoretical background of product quality information in electronic 
markets. Paragraph 3 describes the empirical setting of the Dutch flower industry 
and its auction system as well as a process-stakeholder analysis of the screen 
auctioning initiative. The fourth paragraph provides the data, model and 
                                                           
3 This chapter is largely based on Koppius, van Heck and Wolters (1998) 
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methodology of the study. Paragraph 5 describes the results of the statistical 
analysis, which are discussed in paragraph 6, and paragraph 7 concludes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical background 
The fact that product quality information is important for the way markets function 
is not a new point. In his seminal article on the market for lemons, Akerlof (1970) 
showed that unless accurate product quality information is available to buyers 
before they make their purchase, the low quality products will eventually drive out 
the high quality product. If the high quality sellers have no way of signaling this 
quality to potential buyers, buyers will not be willing to pay the premium for this 
unobserved higher quality. This results in only the low quality sellers remaining 
profitable. Subsequent research in economic theory has focused mainly on the 
impact on market performance of varying degrees of signaling accuracy, but how 
to signal product quality accurately is less well investigated. And while advertising 
research has investigated this particular question intensively, i.e. which types of 
advertisements generate more consumer confidence in product quality (Vakratsas 
and Ambler, 1999), it remains unclear how much of these results translate to an 
online environment (Gallagher, Foster and Parsons, 2001).  
 
There are three empirical studies in which information about product quality plays 
a central role in comparing traditional and electronic market: Bailey, Peterson and 
Brorsen’s (1991) study of video cattle auctions, Lee’s (1998) Aucnet study and 
Degeratu, Rangaswamy and Wu’s (2000) study of traditional and online shopping 
behavior at grocery stores (see also paragraph 2.3). Bailey, Peterson and Brorsen 
(1991) compared satellite video cattle auctions with regional market prices. Prices 
for both the regional and video auctions were adjusted for quality differences, 
transportation costs, commissions, and days to delivery and they find that net 
prices paid by buyers and received by sellers in video auctions exceeded the prices 
for the three major regional auction markets. Although they offer no explanation 
for this finding, presumably the different way the buyer ascertains cattle quality 
over video compared to traditional market is a likely explanation.  
Lee (1998) pointed to the importance of product representation in combination 
with Aucnet’s quality rating system as an explanation for the higher prices paid in 
the electronic auction (although lower transportation costs played a role as well). 
Aucnet attempted to utilize the electronic communication channel to the fullest by 
 29
exhaustively showing and describing the car to potential bidders. This increase in 
the richness of the actual communication did decrease bidder’s quality uncertainty, 
resulting in higher prices. Degeratu, Rangaswamy and Wu (2000) analyze the 
decision process of a consumer trying to evaluate a product and they distinguish 
four categories of search attributes, namely brand name, price, sensory attributes 
(such as touch, smell and sound) and non-sensory attributes, which are product 
quality attributes that can be conveyed reasonably well through words (such as 
nutritional information). They show that the differences in the four categories can 
explain the differences they observe between shopping in an online supermarket 
compared to a traditional supermarket. In short, these three studies highlight that 
product quality information is important for the way markets function, as these 
electronic markets communicate different product information and product 
information differently. 
 
Specific for the role of product information in auctions, independent private value 
auctions and common value auctions have to be distinguished (McAfee and 
McMillan, 1987). In an independent private value auction, each bidder has his 
private valuation of the object for sale, which is assumed to be independent of the 
valuation that other bidders have for the same object. An example is the auctioning 
of a painting intended for personal use (not resale): each bidder will bid purely 
based on his personal tastes of the painting4. In a common value auction, the 
object has the same value to all bidders, but bidders differ in their estimate of this 
value. An example is the auctioning of oil drilling rights, where the amount of oil 
in the tracts remains the same regardless of who wins. Therefore, it is worth the 
same to each bidder (assuming identical technology among bidders) and the only 
difference is how accurately each bidder estimates this common value. Milgrom 
and Weber (1982) showed that for auctions that include a common value 
component, revealing accurate information about the product being auctioned will 
increase the winning bid.  
 
                                                           
4 Note however that even in this case, the independence of the valuation is doubtful 
(Smith, 1989). 
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3.3 The screen auctioning initiative 
The Netherlands is the world's leading producer and distributor of cut flowers. The 
world’s two biggest flower auctions are in Aalsmeer (Flower Auction Aalsmeer) 
and Naaldwijk (FloraHolland); every day on average 30 million flowers - 
originating not only from the Netherlands but also from countries such as Israel, 
Kenya and Zimbabwe - are traded in 100,000 transactions. In total, there are seven 
Dutch flower auctions, namely in the villages of Aalsmeer, Naaldwijk/Bleiswijk, 
Rijnsburg, Grubbenvorst, Eelde, Bemmel, and Vleuten. The Dutch flower auctions 
play a vital role in Holland's leadership of this industry, by providing efficient 
centers for price discovery and transactions of flowers between buyers and sellers. 
These auctions traditionally use the 'Dutch auction' as the mechanism for price 
discovery. They are established as cooperatives by the Dutch growers. 
 
The auction rules of the Dutch flower auctions are described using some empirical 
data to illustrate its characteristics and results, taken from van Heck and Ribbers 
Figure 3.1 Auction hall 
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(1998). There are approximately 3500 varieties of cut flowers. These varieties are 
classified into 120 auction groups, according to the variety, size of the lot, and 
quality of the flowers. Dutch flower auctions use a clock for price discovery as 
follows. The computerized auction clock in the room provides the buyers with 
product characteristics such as stemlength or diameter or number of leaves 
(dependent on the particular flower type), as well as information on the producer, 
unit of currency, quality and minimum purchase quantity. The flowers are 
transported using an automated chain system through the front of the auction 
room, where there is a person (the ‘raiser’) who shows the flower to the more than 
one hundred buyers in the stand. Figure 3.1 illustrates this with a photo of a typical 
flower auction hall: the flower carts enter on the mid-left, pass underneath the 
auction clock (upper left corner) where the raiser is and after they are sold exit 
through the top end to be packaged and shipped. The clock hand starts at a high 
price determined by the auctioneer, and drops until a buyer stops the clock by 
pushing a button. The auctioneer asks the buyer by intercom, how many units of 
the lot he or she will buy. The buyer provides the number of units. The clock is 
then reset, and the process begins for the remaining flowers, sometimes 
introducing a new minimum purchase quantity, until all units of the lot are sold. 
Table 3.1 illustrates the auction process by an example with some actual auction 
data. The first rows deal with producer 1234 (column 2), who is responsible for 
transactions 408 to 420 (column 1). On January 4, 1996 this producer delivered 
roses (product group 52), or more specifically the brown rose 'Leonidas' (product 
number 10288). He delivered four lots of that type of rose (column 4). These lots 
had the same type of quality (A1), but were different in length (70, 60, 50, and 80 
centimeters respectively) and in amounts of 9, 5, 3, and 12 units respectively. The 
first lot was auctioned, and buyer 3782 took 1 unit (out of 9) for a price of 93 cents 
per stem. The rest of the lot was auctioned again, and buyer 1854 bought 2 units 
for 95 cents. The remainder of the lot (6 units) was auctioned, and buyer 727 
bought 3 units for 96 cents. Finally, buyer 42 bought the rest of the lot for 97 
cents. The table shows that the price may increase during the auctioning of a lot 
(see, for example, transactions 408 through 411) or may decrease within a lot (see, 
for example, transactions 729 through 731). So the price is very volatile, 
considering different lots of the same producer or different lots of different 
producers. 
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Table 3.1: Illustration of flower auction process and data (adapted from Van 
Heck and Ribbers (1998)) 
 
Trans-
action nr. 
Producer Product 
group 
Product Quality Length
in cm.
Total #
of units
Stems 
per unit
Buyer # units Price in 
cts./stem 
408 1234 52 10288 A1 70 9 100 3782 1 93 
409        1854 2 95 
410        727 3 96 
411        42 3 97 
412 1234 52 10288 A1 60 5 100 727 4 89 
413        1824 1 91 
414 1234 52 10288 A1 50 3 100 3090 1 67 
415        2528 2 68 
416 1234 52 10288 A1 80 12 100 3282 4 109 
417        4157 1 115 
418        134 3 115 
419        3462 2 116 
420        3042 2 117 
727 12 52 11087 A1 80 3 100 2893 2 91 
728        752 1 87 
729 12 52 11087 A1 70 6 100 727 1 79 
730        1768 2 77 
731        3004 3 77 
732 12 52 11087 A1 60 8 100 3219 1 56 
733        2669 3 56 
734        727 4 54 
735 12 52 11087 A1 50 3 100 727 3 46 
 
 
Buyers must be physically present in the auction room. In practice, it turns out that 
the Dutch flower auction is an extremely time-efficient auction mechanism: it can 
handle a transaction every four seconds. It also reduces the amount of time that 
growers must spend on price discovery and bidding; hence they can focus on 
production.  
The auction provides a central location for the meeting of buyers, creating efficient 
quality control and efficient handling of the logistics of product redistribution 
between the thousands of growers and buyers involved. This auction has 
"backtracking" possibilities: though the price movements are decreasing per sub-
lot, the price can be multidirectional (up or down) within the whole lot. Buyers can 
withdraw their willingness to buy: they can indicate to the auctioneer fewer or 
more units then they originally intended to at the time they pushed the button. 
 33
Thus, during the auctioning of the lot, buyers produce information on the value of 
the lot; this information is available to all buyers. 
 
As mentioned previously, all flowers that are put up for auction pass through the 
auction hall in order to be shown to the buyers just before the bidding starts. Given 
the large daily turnover and the very fast auctioning process, this process entails 
tremendous logistical complexities for the auction and any malfunction in the 
automated chain system causes significant delays in the auction process. To 
alleviate such problems, the flower auction introduced screen auctioning for the 
flower type Anthurium in February 1996 (fig 3.2 shows a picture of most common 
Anthurium variety, the Tropical). In screen auctioning, the buyers are still present 
in the auction hall, but they are no longer shown the flowers as in the traditional 
auction method. Instead, the flowers remain in the warehouse and buyers are 
shown a picture for that type of flower. This is a generic picture, irrespective of lot 
differences within the same type, but they still see the specific product 
characteristics of that particular lot below the auction clock (see fig. 3.3 for an 
illustration).  
Figure 3.2 Anthurium Tropical 
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When screen auctioning was introduced, two other aspects of the trading process 
changed as well. The time of auctioning Anthuriums was rescheduled to an earlier 
time (6am) and screen auctioning was introduced as a third clock in one of the 
auction halls, so now three concurrent auctions take place in that hall. In February 
1998, screen auctioning was expanded to cover the flower type Gerbera as well. 
The research in this article deals with Anthuriums only.  
 
Kambil and Van Heck (1998) specify a generalizable model of exchange processes 
and develop a process-stakeholder analysis framework to evaluate alternative 
market designs. They identify five basic trade processes: search, valuation, 
logistics, payments and settlements, and authentication. The basic trade processes 
are distinct processes required in all transactions of goods and services. The trade 
context processes facilitate and enable or reduce the costs or “frictions” in the 
basic processes. The five trade context processes are communications and 
computing, product representation, legitimization, influence, and dispute 
resolution. 
Table 3.2 presents the results of the analysis of screen auctioning with the help of 
the process-stakeholder framework. For each of the stakeholders, the actual 
changes or expectations related to screen auctioning are described. As can be seen, 
sellers, intermediary and buyers differed in their expectations of the effects of 
screen auctioning, particularly the expectations about the accuracy of product 
representation and its consequences for price.  
 
Figure 3.1 Screen auctioning 
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Table 3.2 Process stakeholder analysis of screen auctioning 
 
Exchange 
Process 
Growers Auction Buyers 
 
Search 
 
No change No change No change 
Valuation 
 
Expected: possible 
higher prices because 
of earlier auctioning 
time 
Expected: no 
expectation with 
regard to impact on 
prices 
Expected: no 
expectation with 
regard to impact on 
prices 
Logistics Expected: more 
trading capacity at 
auction hall 
Expected: Auction hall 
logistics would be 
eliminated allowing 
for cheaper and more 
frequent transactions 
and new space for 
clocks 
Expected: faster 
delivery of flowers 
due to by-passing 
auction hall 
  
Payments and 
Settlements 
 
No change No change No change 
Authentication 
 
No change No change in quality 
grading process 
No change 
Communication and 
Computing 
No change Major change: digital 
representation of 
product with standard 
image next to clock 
No change 
Product 
Representation 
No change Expected: digital 
representation of each 
lot; representation 
would represent the 
actual flower 
accurately enough to 
have no effect on 
prices 
Expected:  digital 
representation of 
each lot; 
representation could 
lead to less 
information on 
quality of flowers  
Legitimization No change No change No change 
Influence No change No change No change 
Dispute Resolution No change No change No change 
Net Benefits Positive Positive Neutral 
 
3.4 Data and methodology 
To investigate quantitatively the impact of screen auctioning, a regression model is 
constructed that predicts the price of an Anthurium before and after the 
introduction of screen auctioning. This model is tested on the auction transaction 
database using transactions from January 1995 until December 1997 (screen 
auctioning was introduced on Feb. 13th, 1996). In this database, for every 
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transaction various data are kept, including data related to the seller, the buyer, the 
product (flower type, quality, stemlength, diameter and other flower characteristics 
(depending on the particular flower type)), and the transaction itself (price, 
quantity, date).  
Discussions with flower auction employees revealed several factors that influence 
the Anthurium price that were use as control variables in the model. For 
Anthuriums, diameter of the flower (DIAM) is an important descriptive 
characteristic. The day of the week (WKDAY) influences price as well because 
different days of the week have structurally different supply and demand 
characteristics. For instance, demand tends to be highest at the beginning and end 
of the week. Similarly, the trade of Anthuriums (and flowers in general) is highly 
seasonally dependent. Therefore, this seasonal effect in the regression is corrected 
for by including the average Anthurium price at all other flower auctions in 
Holland (VBN) as an extra variable. The quantity of the transaction (QUANT) is 
taken into account because bidders are expected to bid differently for large or 
small quantities. For each of the 9 flower subtypes in the database, a dummy 
variable FLWTYPEi is added to account for the different prices that different 
subtypes fetch. The effect of screen auctioning in the model is a dummy variable 
SCRAUC: 0 (without screen auctioning) for transactions before February 13, 
1996; or 1 (with screen auctioning) for transactions on or after February 13, 1996. 
This results in the following model: 
 
PRICE = α + β1DIAM + β2WKDAY + β3VBN + β4QUANT + β5,iFLWTYPEi + 
β6SCRAUC + ε.   (Eq. 3.1) 
 
Under screen auctioning, buyers lack several product characteristics compared to 
the physical representation: the color and shape of the flower, differences between 
flower leaves, signs of possible flower diseases and the stiffness of the flower. In 
particular the absence of the stiffness cue is problematic, because stiffness is an 
important indicator of flower freshness, which in turn is an important determinant 
of a buyer’s willingness-to-pay for that flower. Given the common value aspects 
of the auction (because the flowers are purchased for resale, not for personal 
consumption), this lack of freshness information will lead buyers to expect a lower 
quality on average for fear of purchasing a ‘lemon’ (Akerlof 1970, Milgrom and 
Weber 1982). This leads to the following main hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3.1: β6<0, i.e. screen auctioning will lead to lower prices. 
 
The dataset contained the nine most traded types of Anthuriums. Although the 
flower auction had a quality grading system in place, approximately 98% of all 
Anthurium flowers traded were of the highest quality (quality grade A1), so the 
analysis focused only on this quality grade and removed quality grades A2, B1 and 
B2 from the analysis. The remaining database consisted of 372,856 transactions 
(cases with missing values excluded). One data transformation was used, namely 
the natural log of the quantity. Quantity was very skewed to the right and taking 
the natural log restores the validity of the normality assumption necessary for 
regression. The model was estimated using OLS regression. Although there is a 
time element present, regression analysis was used instead of time series analysis, 
because running a time series analysis would require aggregation of the data to at 
least the daily level. This would throw away much of the level of detail that is 
present at the individual transaction level. This does mean however that there is 
significant autocorrelation present in the data, as evidenced by the Durbin-Watson 
statistic of 0.491. In principle, this results in a loss of power for the test, but given 
the very large number of cases, this power loss is expected to be unimportant 
(Baroudi and Orlikowski, 1989; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). 
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3.5 Results 
Descriptives can be found in Table 3.3, cross-correlations in Table 3.4 (dummy 
variables excluded) and the results of the regression model in Table 3.5. The 
overall model had an adjusted R2 of 0.577, so the model explains 57.7% of the 
variance in Anthurium prices. The main result can be found in Table 3.5, where 
the coefficient for the SCRAUC dummy is significantly less than zero, thus 
yielding support for the main hypothesis. 
  
Table 3.3 Descriptive  statistics 
372856 1 99 11.86 2.54
376130 5 2304 94.54 132.87
376130 80.40 239.90 143.0326 42.8683
376130 30.00 600.00 151.8054 77.9451
DIAM
QUANT
VBN
PRICE
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Cross-correlations 
1.000
-.073** 1.000
.024** -.055** 1.000
.397** -.157** .596** 1.000
DIAM
QUANT
VBN
PRICE
DIAM QUANT VBN PRICE
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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Table 3.5: Regression model coefficients
-135.513 .534 -253.888 .000
10.666 .034 .347 317.323 .000
-2.91E-02 .001 -.050 -44.866 .000
1.076 .002 .592 553.179 .000
23.309 .310 .085 75.180 .000
30.280 .371 .092 81.560 .000
20.792 .272 .090 76.514 .000
60.456 .383 .176 157.974 .000
10.525 .275 .044 38.292 .000
16.095 .973 .018 16.541 .000
54.056 .315 .196 171.337 .000
44.164 .435 .112 101.573 .000
-5.066 .231 -.028 -21.911 .000
-10.377 .249 -.052 -41.714 .000
-4.127 .353 -.014 -11.676 .000
-3.520 .239 -.019 -14.732 .000
-5.942 .174 -.037 -34.182 .000
Variables
Constant
DIAM
QUANT
VBN
ART_381
ART_1430
ART_1903
ART_2362
ART_2837
ART_5578
ART_7445
ART_7759
TUESDAY
WEDNESDAY
THURSDAY
FRIDAY
SCRAUC
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
 
 
3.6 Discussion  
The results indicate that the main hypothesis is supported. This implies that the 
reduced product quality information available to bidders led them to bid lower on 
average. The electronic product representation lacked cues such as color and 
stiffness of the stem that bidders use (among other factors) to determine product 
quality and subsequently their willingness-to-pay. In particular, stem stiffness is an 
important indicator of flower freshness and thus very relevant to bidder’s 
decisions. Since these cues were lacking in screen auctioning, bidders faced 
greater uncertainty over product quality. They accounted for this increased product 
quality uncertainty by lowering their bids. 
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However, there are some other factors, which are not in the model that may also 
influence bidding behavior and price setting. The auction is modeled as a common 
value auction, but it is possible that there are private value elements. For instance, 
different buyers may face different demand from their customers. Most buyers are 
agents who buy ‘on order’, which means that they have to get a certain amount of 
flowers that day because of pre-orders from their customers. This will most likely 
cause them to bid higher on average. Similarly there are some speculative buyers 
in the market that are only likely to bid for flowers if they can get them at a low 
price. This will most likely cause them to bid lower on average. If different buyers 
bid structurally different, that would imply that dummy variables for the buyers 
should be incorporated in the model as well. This extension of the model was 
considered, and tested on a subset of transactions with only the 20 largest buyers, 
who accounted for almost 28% of all transactions. Introduction of buyer dummy 
variables in this case only marginally raised the adjusted R2, but more importantly, 
it did not significantly alter any of the coefficients of the variables compared to the 
original model without the buyer dummy variables. So in the interest of 
parsimony, the buyer variable was left out of the model. Similarly, one could 
argue that different sellers (i.e. the growers) might receive different prices on 
average for their flowers because of their reputation for producing high (low) 
quality flowers. An extended model with a subset of dummy variables for the 
larger growers was tested and it yielded similar results: a marginal increase in 
adjusted R2 without any significant changes in the other coefficients compared to 
the original model. Therefore, although there is a small, but significant reputation 
effect, it was left out of the model. 
 
The discussion above is about modeling decisions that could have explained an 
effect attributed to screen auctioning. However, there are also rival explanations 
that could not be modeled, yet may account for the screen auctioning effect. When 
screen auctioning was introduced, three aspects changed: the product 
representation, the introduction of a third auction clock in the auction hall and the 
earlier auctioning time. The latter two changes are discussed below, as they could 
represent rival explanations. 
When the third clock was introduced, several buyers complained about how 
difficult it was to keep track of three clocks at the same time. Most buyers at the 
flower auction buy ‘on order’. Hence, they have a contractual obligation to deliver 
the flowers to their customer and presumably they do not want to risk not getting 
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the flowers their customers ordered. This implies that the increased cognitive 
complexity of the bidding process and the accompanying increase in uncertainty 
(in this case uncertainty over being able to obtain the flowers or not, not 
uncertainty over product quality) would lead to buyers bidding sooner and hence 
their paying higher prices. With respect to the influence of an earlier auctioning 
time on bidding behavior5, there is no empirical evidence but flower auctioneers 
said that in their experience, earlier auctioning times lead to higher prices. As 
these two potentially confounding factors both would have led to higher prices, the 
conclusion is that the lesser product quality information available in screen 
auctioning is the most likely explanation for the observed drop in prices. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter presents the results of empirical research on the price impact of a new 
method of auctioning, using transaction data obtained at a large Dutch flower 
auction. In February 1996, this auction introduced screen auctioning to separate 
the logistical processes from the price discovery process, thus decreasing the costs 
and complexity of the total distribution process. In screen auctioning, the buyers 
are still present in the auction hall, but they are no longer shown the actual 
flowers. Instead, a generic picture is displayed on a monitor next to the auction 
clock. This meant that several cues for product quality such as the color and shape 
of the flower, differences between flower leaves, signs of possible flower diseases 
and the stiffness of the flower stem were now absent.  
The conclusion is that less product quality information leads to a reduction in 
prices in electronic market, as seen in a significant price drop of nearly 6 cents 
(Table 3.5) after the introduction of screen auctioning. This represents about 2.1% 
of the average flower price. Despite this price reduction, the flower auction 
organization still considered screen auctioning a success (although not as big a 
success as originally expected). As the auction receives a percentage of the value 
of each transaction as fee, lower prices did mean a loss of transaction fees, but 
according to auction personnel, this loss was negligible compared to the avoided 
cost of dealing with the increased logistical complexities. 
                                                           
5 Note that this is a different question than the ‘declining price anomaly’ observed in other 
multi-unit auctions (Ashenfelter, 1989; McAfee and Vincent. 1993). This anomaly will 
occur regardless of whether the exact same lots are auctioned at 6am (as in the screen 
auction schedule) or at 9am (as in the original auction schedule). 
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Screen auctioning can be seen as an intermediate step towards a full electronic 
market, since they both involve a shift from live product representation to image-
based product representation. The difference is that in screen auctioning, contrary 
to an electronic market, the buyers still assemble physically in the auction hall. So 
although screen auctioning is not a pure electronic market, the results indicate that 
a decrease in price level should be expected when goods are traded and sold 
electronically, unless ways are found to counter the information-quality problem. 
For example, one factor that may have aggravated the negative results of screen 
auctioning is the lack of a good quality rating system. The auction operates a 
quality system with four categories where growers self-report the quality of the 
flowers. Partly because of opportunism, partly because of the few categories, 98% 
of the flowers are in the highest quality category. This effectively renders the 
quality rating system useless. Note that this is also in accordance with the results 
in Lee (1998), which identify Aucnet’s quality rating system as a key success 
factor of the auction. A good quality assurance process is an important key to a 
successful electronic market. 
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CHAPTER 4 : MARKET STATE INFORMATION IN ELECTRONIC 
AUCTIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a move from a traditional auction to an 
electronic auction entails several changes. One such change is in the product 
representation, in other words how product quality information is made available 
through ICT, as investigated in chapter 3. This chapter deals with a second change, 
namely the fact that buyers no longer have to physically gather in one place to bid 
as in a traditional auction. This physical gathering can be very cumbersome and 
leads to high transaction costs because the buyers have to incur extra time and 
travel costs to get to the auction hall.  
In practice, auction houses use several strategies to offset these high transaction 
costs. One strategy is bundling: only conduct an auction if you have a bundle of 
items up for auction that are likely to attract a similar audience. That way, 
potential buyers face less transaction costs than in the situation where each item 
would be auctioned as soon as it became available to the auctioneer. Another 
strategy is to allow mail-in bids or phone bids: bidders can privately announce 
their highest bid (i.e. their willingness-to-pay) to the auctioneer before the auction, 
who then conducts the auction, as if the bidder were present in the room. In the 
case of phone bids, bidders can also stay on the phone with the auction hall during 
the auction. That way they can bid just as if they were physically there, except for 
the fact that they cannot see the actual product and the other bidders. Both mail-in 
and phone bidding reduce the transaction costs of the auction for such bidders.  
 
Essentially, electronic bidding through new ICT forms such as the Web and email 
are new variants on the phone bidding principle. However, an added advantage of 
electronic bidding is that it is cheaper than phone bidding and perhaps more 
importantly, the information disadvantage of phone bidding can be countered to 
some extent through electronic product representation, although the previous 
chapter showed that nullifying this information disadvantage is by no means easy. 
One aspect of phone, mail or electronic bidders remains though: they do have an 
information disadvantage compared to the bidders in the auction hall. For instance, 
they cannot see how many bidders there are, they cannot see if specific bidders are 
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present or not and they cannot hear the level of excitement or ‘buzz’ (Coval and 
Shumway, 2000) of the auction. These types of information belong to what more 
generally can be called market state information, which can be defined as public, 
non-transaction signals that influence trader behavior (adapted from Coval and 
Shumway (2000)). As such information can have a significant impact on market 
processes (Coval and Shumway, 2000; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 2001), the changes 
in market state information available to traders in electronic markets compared to 
traditional markets are a subject worthy of investigation. 
This chapter will investigate an ICT initiative called KOA (‘Kopen Op Afstand’, 
which means ‘Buying From A Distance’) at the same Dutch flower auction at 
which the study in chapter 3 was conducted. In this case, bidders had the option to 
bid from their offices, using special software and an ISDN linkup to the computer 
in the auction hall. These electronic bidders, or KOA-bidders, participated in the 
exact same auctions that the bidders in the auction hall itself were bidding on, so 
electronic bidders and auction hall bidders were competing against each other. 
This allows a direct comparison between electronic bidding behavior and 
traditional auction hall bidding behavior. The focus is on the same type of flower 
that was used to study screen auctioning, the Anthurium. Because the KOA 
initiative occurred about a year after the introduction of screen auctioning, the only 
change for KOA-buyers was a reduction in transaction costs and market state 
information as the change in product quality information had already taken place 
(see also the discussion in section 3.7). This is an important methodological point, 
because previous studies of electronic markets could not distinguish between these 
two effects, since the effect of reduced product quality information occurred at the 
same time as the effect of lower transaction costs and reduced market state 
information.  
The next paragraph describes the theoretical background regarding the differences 
between traditional and electronic bidding behavior caused by lower transaction 
costs. Paragraph 3 describes the KOA initiative (background on the Dutch flower 
industry and general information about the flower auction investigated here can be 
found in the previous chapter). Paragraph 4 provides the data, model and 
methodology. Paragraph 5 describes the results of the statistical analysis, which 
are discussed in paragraph 6 and paragraph 7 concludes. 
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4.2 Theoretical background 
One of the main arguments for the reduced price hypothesis (Bakos, 1991, 1997) 
in electronic markets is the lower transaction costs that buyers face, particularly 
lower search costs. Buyers in electronic markets can much more easily search for 
price information among competing buyers in the same market or in other markets. 
This intensifies price competition, resulting in erosion of seller’s margins and 
therefore lower prices for buyers. Another fairly straightforward implication of 
lower transaction costs is that the average transaction size for electronic bidders 
will be smaller than for traditional bidders, as there are less gains to be had from 
conducting only a few large transactions as opposed to a set of small transactions.  
This in turn has implications for the variety of products that buyers buy and the 
amount of suppliers that they deal with. Because transaction costs are lower, there 
are fewer costs associated with purchasing new types of products or dealing with 
new suppliers. Although the risk associated with trying out something new (either 
a product or a supplier) is just as large in an electronic market as in a traditional 
market, the cost of trying out something new is lower. Electronic bidders are 
therefore more likely to purchase a wider variety of products and deal with a larger 
set of suppliers than traditional bidders (Lynch and Ariely, 2000). 
There is an important caveat to the analysis above however: it rests on the 
assumption that there are no switching costs from market to market for bidders 
(Grover and Ramanlal, 1999). If switching costs arise, buyers risk being locked 
into a certain market because although there may be benefits from obtaining a 
lower price or better product in a different market, these benefits may be 
outweighed by the costs of switching to that market. Switching costs can arise for 
a number of reasons, many of which occur on the Internet nowadays. Market 
owners can erect entry barriers, such as certification processes for potential new 
entrants. There may be technological switching costs such as having to buy and 
install new software to participate in a new market. A type of cognitive switching 
costs can arise if a new market uses a different auction mechanism. As ICT allows 
more sophisticated auction mechanisms to be used, it can take quite some time 
before bidders are accustomed to them and know which bidding strategies to use 
and not to use. Finally, sellers or market owners may follow a personalization 
strategy based on the buyer’s profile, which tailors the market and website 
specifically to that buyer’s needs. As building up an accurate profile takes time 
and effort, this can keep buyers locked in a certain market. 
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4.3 The Buying-At-A-Distance initiative 
The Buying-At-A-Distance initiative (further to be referred to by its Dutch 
acronym, KOA, ‘Kopen Op Afstand’) started as a pilot-project with electronic 
bidding. Initially, it was offered to a few large buyers, who were expected to be 
the most likely early adopters for two reasons. One reason was that the KOA 
system required a significant investment in hardware and software: a dedicated 
computer, a double ISDN line for communication with the auction hall (one line 
for the connection with the auction computer, one for verbal communication with 
the auctioneer) as well as monthly fees of approx. € 400 to use the system. The 
other reason was that the auction expected that larger buyers would be able to save 
on purchasing personnel costs, as the KOA system allowed buyers to efficiently 
monitor all the 10 auction clocks that run in parallel. Traditionally, large buyers 
needed to have several buyers present, one or more in each of the four auction 
halls to be able to do this monitoring efficiently. One of the expectations of the 
KOA system was that buyers would be able to do with one or two fewer 
purchasing personnel, which would offset the costs of the system.  
In the KOA system, buyers did not see the actual flower (or a generic picture), but 
otherwise they did see the same information they would see if they were in the 
auction hall, i.e. information about upcoming auctions, minimum lot size, the 
supplier and various lot characteristics. They had a picture of the auction clock on 
their screen that was synchronized with the auction clock in the auction hall. 
Bidding was done by pressing the space bar. 
The KOA system quickly became a success as the benefits became obvious (see 
Mulder (1999) for more background on the KOA initiative).  Interviews with 
buyers revealed that several of them saved significantly on personnel costs and all 
buyers were enthusiastic about the fact that they did not need to travel to the 
auction early in the morning. The most frequently mentioned benefit was the 
increased market monitoring capabilities that the system offered, both within the 
auction (switching auction clocks) as across flower auction organizations. 
Practically all KOA-buyers used the system in conjunction with similar electronic 
systems from two or three rival flower auction organizations. Often they would 
follow the same type of flower at three different auctions simultaneously and buy 
where the current price and quality are most favorable. This implies that the lower 
search and switching costs are particularly salient to the bidders. It also implies 
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that despite the varying geographical distances, transportation costs are not 
sufficiently different across auction sites to be taken into account in bidding 
decisions about individual transactions. This makes sense, given the fact that most 
KOA bidders buy from all major auctions each day (either electronically or 
physically), so the additional transportation costs of an extra transaction are 
relatively small as long as no extra truck is needed.  
The rollout of the system was subsequently expanded to mid-size buyers as well. 
In late 2001, the KOA system had 118 subscribers and had generated over € 50 
million in turnover. 
 
Not all KOA-buyers were alike though: several buyers (particularly the larger 
ones) had an office on the auction complex itself, in addition to their regular 
office. These internal buyers could also use the KOA system from those offices. 
This meant that they had the option to walk through the flower warehouse in the 
morning and judge the quality of the flowers and then return to their (internal) 
office to bid through KOA. In those internal offices, they also had access to the 
security camera system, which enabled them to monitor activity in the auction 
hall. The external KOA buyers did not have these options as they did not have an 
office on the auction complex. To account for this informational difference, the 
model will distinguish between internal and external KOA buyers in the analysis 
in the next paragraph. Summarizing the differences among the three groups of 
buyers: 
• Internal KOA-buyers vs. auction hall-buyers: internal KOA-buyers have 
lower search costs and lower switching costs. 
• External KOA-buyers vs. auction hall-buyers: external KOA-buyers have 
lower search costs and lower switching costs, but they have less 
information about product quality and also less market state information. 
• Internal KOA-buyers vs. external KOA-buyers: internal KOA-buyers have 
more information about product quality and market state. 
Table 4.1 presents the results of the analysis of KOA with the help of the process-
stakeholder framework (Kambil and van Heck, 1998). For each of the stakeholders 
the changes and expectations related to KOA are described.  
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Table 4.1 Process –stakeholder analysis for KOA 
 
Exchange 
Process 
Growers Auction Buyers 
 
Search 
 
No change No change  Online database that 
is much more 
transparent and up-
to-date. Also, 
buyers can ‘flag’ 
auctions and then 
be notified when 
those start 
Valuation 
 
Expected: no changes 
 
Expected: higher 
prices because KOA 
would attract new 
buyers and hence more 
competition 
Expected: lower 
prices through 
better comparison 
of auctions 
Logistics Earlier delivery of 
products for KOA 
compared to 
traditional auctions 
Earlier delivery of 
products for KOA 
compared to 
traditional auctions 
No change 
  
Payments and 
Settlements 
 
No change No change No change 
Authentication 
 
No change No change in quality 
grading process 
No change 
Communication and 
Computing 
No change Double ISDN line to 
the buyers offices.  
The auction has to 
enter the supply data 
in the KOA database 
at night. 
Double ISDN line 
to the auction 
computer 
Product 
Representation 
No change Expected: the loss of 
image information 
would have no effect 
on prices 
Expected:  digital 
representation of 
each lot; 
representation could 
lead to less 
information on 
quality of flowers  
Legitimization No change No change No change 
Influence No change No change No change 
Dispute Resolution No change No change No change 
Net Benefits Neutral  Positive  Positive  
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4.4 Data and methodology 
A dataset with the same data format as the one used in chapter 3 was obtained for 
this study, in this case the years 1997 and 1998. KOA was introduced in early 
1997, with a second rollout phase in the summer of 1997. A model similar to the 
one constructed in paragraph 3.4 for the screen auctioning case, with this model 
having a dummy KOA to indicate whether or not the buyer was a KOA buyer 
(KOA=1) or an auction hall buyer.  
 
PRICE = α + β1*DIAM + β2*WKDAY + β3*VBN + β4*QUANT + 
β5,I*FLWTYPEi + β6*KOA + ε.  (Eq. 4.1) 
 
Based on the theoretical discussion in paragraph 4.2, the following hypothesis will 
be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 4.1: Because of lower search costs and lower switching costs, KOA-
buyers will bid less than hall-buyers, i.e. β6<0. 
 
In this hypothesis, the effect of reduced market state information for KOA-buyers 
is not taken into account. This effect is expected to be much smaller than the effect 
of reduced search and switching costs and would therefore not show up as a 
separate factor in the analysis. 
Because internal KOA buyers suffer less from the information asymmetry of not 
being able to see the flower that plagues external KOA buyers, they will discount 
less for quality uncertainty (analogous to the previous chapter). A second model 
(Eq. 4.2) was constructed in which the KOA dummy was replaced by two 
dummies KOAEXT and KOAINT, to indicate if the buyer was an external KOA 
buyer or an internal KOA buyer. If both dummies were zero, the buyer was an 
auction hall buyer. So in this analysis there were three groups of buyers. 
 
PRICE = α + β1*DIAM + β2*WKDAY + β3*VBN + β4*QUANT + 
β5,I*FLWTYPEi + β6*KOAINT  + β7*KOAEXT + ε.  (Eq. 4.2) 
 
The following hypotheses will be tested: 
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Hypothesis 4.2a: Because of lower search costs and lower switching costs, both 
internal and external KOA buyers will bid less than auction hall buyers, i.e. β6<0 
and β7<0. 
Hypothesis 4.2b: Because of more product quality information being available to 
them, internal KOA buyers will bid more than external KOA buyers, i.e. β6>β7. 
 
Again in these hypotheses, the effects of reduced market state information is not 
taken into account, because it is expected that the effect of product quality 
information (which is presumably more salient to the buyers’ bidding decisions) 
will be much larger. 
Data transformation and methodology were similar to paragraph 3.4 
 
 
4.5 Results 
The two models above were tested on 81,370 transactions for Anthuriums using 
sequential OLS regression with two blocks of variables. The first block contained 
all the control variables: VBN-price, diameter, length, quantity and dummies for 
flowertype and day of the week. The second block contained the variable(s) of 
interest, KOA in the first model, KOAINT and KOAEXT in the second model.  
The reason for choosing this sequential regression approach is a theoretical one. 
The order in which variables are entered into the regression equation can 
drastically affect the interpretation of the results for individual independent 
variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001, p.131-139), which can affect the correct 
testing of hypothesis. If the goal of this model were to simply construct the best 
possible model for explaining the price of flowers, a stepwise regression approach 
could have sufficed. In that case, the individual contributions of independent 
variables are of less importance than when hypothesis testing is the goal of the 
model. Therefore, although the model could have been estimated in a single 
regression step, it is more appropriate to use a two-step approach with the main 
variable entering after all control variables are entered. This ensures that the added 
effect is uniquely due to that variable and not captured by the control variables. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptives KOA model 4.1 
81791 30.00 715.00 173.1530 87.7783
81803 73.60 279.40 142.2774 41.6919
81381 5.00 29.00 13.2099 2.7345
81803 5.00 2304.00 70.8860 104.4122
81370
PRICE
VBN
DIAM
QUANT
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std.
Deviation
 
 
 
Table 4.3 Crosscorrelations KOA model 4.1 
1.00
.52** 1.00
.53** .03** 1.00
-.23** -.04** -.23** 1.00
.04** .00 .02** .00 1.00
.02** -.02** .04** -.01** -.35** 1.00
-.06** -.02** -.02** .00 -.31** -.24** 1.00
-.04** .02** -.04** .02** -.17** -.13** -.12** 1.00
.00 .02** -.01** -.01 -.37** -.29** -.26** -.14** 1.00
-.05** .02** -.04** .27** -.01* .00 .00 .01* .00 1.00
PRICE
VBN
DIAM
QUANT
MON
TUE
WED
THU
FRI
KOA
PRICE VBN DIAM QUANT MON TUE WED THU FRI KOA
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Table 4.4 Regression coefficients KOA model 4.1 
-162.887 3.311 -49.198 .000
-4.555 .458 -.021 -9.948 .000
-7.423 .488 -.032 -15.210 .000
-6.255 .739 -.017 -8.463 .000
-2.124 .447 -.010 -4.751 .000
13.089 .080 .408 162.980 .000
1.061 .004 .504 271.329 .000
-3.739E-02 .002 -.045 -21.850 .000
-2.795 .360 -.015 -7.754 .000
(Constant)
TUE
WED
THU
FRI
DIAM
VBN
QUANT
KOA
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
 
 
 
Table 4.2 contains the descriptives for the first model, table 4.3 its cross-
correlations. Table 4.4 shows the regression coefficient of the final model. This 
model had an adjusted R2 of 0.726 after the control variables, which changed to 
0.727 (Sig. < 0.001) when the KOA variable was added in the second block. This 
implies that the contribution of KOA to the overall price model is negligible. 
However, the tolerance statistic of 0.911 shows that the KOA variable is 
practically orthogonal to the other variables, which implies that its contribution is 
unique and not captured by all the other variables. The main goal of adding the 
KOA variable to the model is not so much raising the R2 of an econometric model 
of flower prices, but rather it is establishing the existence of a theoretical effect. 
As can be seen in table 4.4, the coefficient for KOA is negative and significant, 
yielding support for hypothesis 4.1. 
 
Table 4.5 contains cross-correlations and table 4.6 contains the results for the 
regression of the second model, with the KOA buyers split in internal KOA buyers 
(KOAINT) and external KOA buyers (KOAEXT). This model also had an 
adjusted R2 of 0.726 after the control variables, which changed to 0.727 (Sig. < 
0.001) when the KOAINT and KOAEXT variables were added in the second 
block. As in the previous model, the contribution to the overall price model is 
negligible, but the tolerance statistics of 0.971 and 0.931 respectively, indicate that 
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both variables are practically orthogonal to the other variables, thus capturing a 
unique contribution. Similarly, the main goal of adding the KOAINT and 
KOAEXT variables to the model is not so much raising the R2 of an econometric 
model of flower prices, but rather it is establishing the existence of a theoretical 
effect. 
 
Table 4.5 Cross-correlations KOA model 4.2 
1.000
.524 * 1.000
.530 * .026 * 1.000
-.232 * -.044 * -.231 * 1.000
.043 * .004 .016 * -.002 1.000
.023 * -.016 * .042 * -.009 * -.353* 1.000
-.058 * -.022 * -.024 * .003 -.312* -.245* 1.000
-.037 * .015 * -.042 * .025 * -.167* -.131* -.116* 1.000
.003 .022 * -.014 * -.005 -.373* -.293* -.259* -.138* 1.000
-.061 * -.005 -.019 * .110 * -.010* -.019* .038 * -.002 -.003 1.000
.001 .027 * -.029 * .234 * .000 .025 * -.036* .013 * .001 -.191 *1.000
PRICE
VBN
DIAM
QUANT
MON
TUE
WED
THU
FRI
KOAINT
KOAEXT
PRICE VBN DIAM QUANT MON TUE WED THU FRI
KOA
INT
KOA
EXT
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. 
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Table 4.6 Regression coefficients KOA model 4.2 
-162.582 3.309 -49.129 .000
-4.627 .458 -.022 -10.109 .000
-7.263 .488 -.032 -14.881 .000
-6.302 .739 -.017 -8.531 .000
-2.127 .447 -.010 -4.761 .000
13.092 .080 .408 163.106 .000
1.060 .004 .504 271.094 .000
-3.906E-02 .002 -.046 -22.714 .000
-5.094 .436 -.022 -11.680 .000
.301 .489 .001 .614 .539
(Constant)
TUE
WED
THU
FRI
DIAM
VBN
QUANT
KOAINT
KOAEXT
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
 
 
 
The two important coefficients are those for KOAINT and KOAEXT. The first 
was negative as expected: -5.094. However, the KOAEXT coefficient was 
marginally positive and not significant, indicating that external KOA buyers paid 
the same prices as did auction hall buyers. This means that the hypothesis 4.2a is 
only partially validated, namely only for the internal KOA buyers. Additionally, 
this means that hypothesis 4.2b has to be rejected, as the internal KOA buyers 
actually paid less than the external KOA buyers. 
 
4.6 Discussion  
The results indicate that the first hypothesis is supported, implying that KOA-
buyers do indeed pay lower prices than auction hall buyers. However, when KOA-
buyers are split into internal and external KOA-buyers, a somewhat different 
picture emerges. Although the reduced price hypothesis is supported for internal 
KOA buyers, the situation for external KOA buyers is rather more complicated. 
First of all, there is the fact that they do not differ significantly from buyers in the 
auction hall (the rejection of hypothesis 4.2a). A possible explanation could be that 
the external KOA buyers simply cannot risk trying to pay a lower price. A setting 
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in which this would make sense is if they have an orderbook to fill, i.e. they buy 
mainly based on orders from their customers. In that case they do not want to run 
the risk of not being able to deliver the flowers to their customers, so they compete 
with the auction hall buyers and end up paying the same prices. This may be 
particularly so if their customers are relatively price-insensitive. This type of 
selection bias with respect to purchasing strategy cannot be excluded with the 
current data available. 
The second surprising finding is the reversal of the expected price difference 
between internal and external KOA buyers. External KOA buyers have an 
informational disadvantage compared to internal KOA buyers, since they are not 
able to physically inspect the flowers in the morning before the auction. It was 
expected that this would lead external KOA buyers to bid lower on average, 
analogous to the reasoning in Chapter 3. The fact that they actually pay higher 
prices than internal buyers is hard to explain. Internal KOA-buyers tend to be 
much larger (in terms of overall purchasing volume) than external KOA-buyers. 
This means that there could again be a selection bias involved, if larger buyers are 
more shrewd bidders and therefore pay lower prices or if overall size is correlated 
with the general purchasing strategy (transaction size itself is controlled for via the 
QUANT variable). To elaborate a little on the latter: if internal KOA-buyers tend 
to buy less ‘on order’ than external KOA buyers, and more for speculative reasons 
(‘cherry picking’) they are likely to pay lower prices on average since they will 
only bid if market conditions are particularly favorable.  
An explanation other than unobserved bidder heterogeneity may have to do with 
the concept of market state information described earlier. As mentioned in 
paragraph 4.3, internal KOA-buyers had access to the video security system. This 
gave them information that external KOA-buyers lacked. For instance if there was 
an interruption in the auctioning process, internal KOA-buyers could see whether 
this was due to a mechanical defect or other reasons. Or, information more 
relevant to their bidding behavior: internal KOA-buyers could see how many 
people were in the auction hall. This would allow them to more accurately assess 
the total demand and competition than external KOA-buyers, who only had 
information about the total supply. Essentially, external KOA-buyers have to pay a 
premium to cover the increased uncertainty about the market state if they still want 
to win the auction, because they have to make a conservative (i.e. high) estimate of 
the number of bidders they are competing against, which biases their bids 
upwards. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter investigated empirically the differences in bidding behavior between 
traditional bidders in flowers auctions and bidders who bid from their offices using 
an ISDN linkup (KOA bidders). As both types of bidders participated in the exact 
same auctions, this allows for a detailed, direct comparison between these two 
categories of bidders.  
The only a priori established differences between the bidders are reduced search 
and switching costs and reduced availability of market state information for the 
electronic bidders. This is hypothesized to lead to lower prices (Bakos, 1991, 
1997). The effect of the reduction in market state information was initially 
expected to be negligible compared to the search and switching cost effect. The 
resulting reduced price hypothesis was tested using the transaction database of the 
same flower auction as investigated in chapter 3. The results from a regression 
model yield support for this hypothesis as electronic bidders do indeed pay lower 
prices.  
The electronic bidders could be split in bidders who had an office on the auction 
complex itself and bid from there (internal KOA buyers) and bidders who did not 
have such an office and therefore bid from their offices outside the auction 
complex (external KOA buyers). The internal KOA buyers had an information 
advantage on product quality, because they could inspect the flowers in the auction 
warehouse before the auction started and they had access to the security camera 
system, which in particular gave them some extra information about the number of 
bidders present. External KOA buyers lacked this extra market state information. 
A second model was constructed to investigate the differences between these two 
categories, where external KOA-buyers were expected to pay a lower price (as in 
the first model, the effects of reduced market state information were expected to 
be negligible to the main effect of product quality information). Results from this 
second regression model indicate that the reduced price effects found in the first 
model are due only to the internal KOA buyers. In the model, external KOA 
buyers turn out to pay the same prices as buyers in the auction hall. This implies 
that the benefits of lower search and switching costs for external KOA buyers do 
not show up in the prices they pay and the information disadvantage they have 
compared to internal KOA buyers is of no consequence either. This runs counter 
to initial theoretical predictions. Two main explanations for this are suggested. The 
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first is that there is a selection bias among the KOA-bidders that the current data 
cannot control for: for example, external KOA-buyers may tend to buy ‘on order’, 
whereas internal KOA-buyers may tend to buy only if market conditions are 
particularly favorable (cherry-picking). If buyers have an orderbook to fill for their 
customers and they do not want to run the risk of having to sell ‘no’, they can be 
expected to be less price-sensitive, particularly if their customers are not very 
price-sensitive either. This could result in higher prices being paid by orderbook 
buyers, in this case the external KOA buyers. 
The second explanation is that the market state information mattered much more 
than expected: because external KOA-buyers cannot see the number of bidders in 
the auction hall, they cannot assess total demand as accurately as internal KOA-
buyers and therefore they have to pay a bid premium to account for this increased 
uncertainty of being able to win the auction. 
Further research is obviously needed, and particularly more detailed data needs to 
be collected about bidders and their general purchasing strategies (orderbook vs. 
cherry-picking) to at least partially control for bidder heterogeneity. In any case, it 
seems safe to say that the effects of reduced search and switching costs are not as 
straightforward as current theory suggests, particularly when the effects of product 
quality information and market state information are taken into account. This 
chapter also suggests information itself is a multidimensional construct: different 
types of information have different effects. Aggregating those into a single 
dimension of information (like in the hypotheses 4.2a and 4.2b for instance) may 
obscure important underlying regularities. In particular the role of market state 
information looks to be more important than initially assumed. The results suggest 
that a reduction in market state information may lead to bidders paying higher 
prices in electronic markets, but this hypothesis needs further testing. 
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CHAPTER 5 : INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE AND ELECTRONIC 
MARKET PERFORMANCE IN MULTIDIMENSIONAL AUCTIONS6 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The two previous chapters dealt with electronic markets in which ICT was ‘added’ 
to existing market processes. However, automating existing market processes is 
only one side of the ICT coin.  The other side is that ICT offers the potential for 
redesigning markets to achieve gains for all stakeholders involved. One such 
potentially promising new market is the multidimensional auction (Koppius, 1998; 
Teich, Wallenius and Wallenius, 1999; Bichler 2000). In a multidimensional 
auction, bidders bid not just on price, but on the underlying value drivers such as 
quality, delivery time and warranty as well, so these value drivers are the 
dimensions in a multidimensional auction. The reasoning behind this is that 
(unless budgets are very limited) price is not so much a decision criterion in itself, 
but rather a means to summarize and compare differences in the value drivers. 
Value to the buyer is derived from the underlying value drivers, not from the price 
itself (Lancaster, 1966). For instance, when buying a car, the actual value to the 
buyer is derived from a variety of aspects such as comfort, speed, safety, size, 
color, brand, having a reputable dealer nearby, gas mileage, engine quality, 
automatic gearbox vs. stick-shift, power steering, et cetera. These value drivers 
determine what the car is worth to the buyer, in other words: what he would be 
willing to pay, assuming that he has the necessary budget. The multidimensional 
auction turns this process upside down: instead of offering a fixed constellation of 
features (i.e. a particular car) and leaving the buyer only to decide on the price he 
is willing to pay for that car, the potential buyer ‘auctions his budget’ (so to speak) 
to potential suppliers. These suppliers then can modify the features they offer to 
the buyer (for instance by adding power steering at no extra cost or offering a 
slightly slower car, but at a substantial price reduction) as each supplier tries to 
maximize the value to the buyer to increase their chance of winning the auction, 
while maintaining their profit margin. 
 
                                                           
6 This chapter is based partially on Koppius (1998) and Koppius, Kumar and van Heck (2000). 
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By summarizing the multiple dimensions of value in a single value of price, 
traditional one-dimensional auctions ignore the fact that some bidders may have 
different preferences (or costs) regarding certain dimensions. Such bidder 
heterogeneity leads to comparative differences between buyer and seller on the 
weight of some dimensions. This may lead to a situation where there was potential 
for improvements for all parties involved, yet this potential was not realized. A 
simple example will illustrate this. Suppose the buyer holds a single-dimensional 
procurement auction with quality fixed at ‘A’ and delivery time at 2 weeks, 
resulting in a price of 100. Although the buyer may be content with this bid, he 
might have been willing to pay an extra 10 for a faster delivery of 1 week instead 
of 2 weeks. If the extra cost of this faster delivery to the winning bidder is only 5, 
both parties would be prefer still having quality ‘A’, but now with delivery time 1 
week and a price of 107. In this case, the buyer was willing to pay 10 extra for 
faster delivery but only pays 7 extra, whereas the extra cost of faster delivery to 
that supplier is 5, but he receives 7 extra, so both parties are better off compared to 
the original winning bid. Similarly, suppose the buyer was willing to accept a 
lower quality ‘B’ if the price would drop by at least 5 and the winning bidder 
could deliver quality ‘B’ at a price 10 cheaper than quality ‘A’, again opportunities 
exist for Pareto improvements.  However, in a one-dimensional auction on price 
(so all the other dimensions are fixed), bidders are unlikely to find out about such 
mutually beneficial tradeoffs.  
Although a reverse (procurement) auction is the most natural candidate for a 
multidimensional auction, the principle can be applied to a standard forward 
auction as well. In that case, the specification of the product itself is fixed, but 
there are still several accompanying services such as delivery, terms of payment or 
in some cases maintenance and warranty policies that have to be agreed upon 
between buyer and seller. Instead of fixing these in advance, these could be made 
part of the buyer’s bid as well. 
In short, a multidimensional auction moves beyond the purely distributive aspects 
of traditional auctions where a bidder’s loss is the bid taker’s gain, to incorporate 
integrative aspects that can capture the “money left on the table” (Bazerman, 
Magliozzi and Neale, 1985; Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997). It is this new, ICT-
enabled market that this chapter will investigate.  
 
The two previous chapters showed that the various types of information flows in a 
market are important determinants of market processes. This chapter formalizes 
 61
that intuition in the concept of the information architecture of the market. The 
information architecture describes what type of information is available to whom, 
or when and how it becomes available to whom during the market process. This 
will be the main independent variable of interest as this study will test the 
consequences of different information architectures for market performance in a 
multidimensional auction, using laboratory experiments. 
The next paragraph will give the theoretical background on the role of information 
architecture in a market and review the existing literature on multidimensional 
auctions. Paragraph 3 outlines a general model of multidimensional auctions that, 
after the to-be-tested hypotheses are introduced in paragraph 4, will form the basis 
for the experimental design described in paragraph 5. The results are described in 
paragraph 6, with the discussion and conclusions in paragraph 7. The last 
paragraph contains an appendix with the statistical output. 
 
5.2 Theoretical background 
In a market, it is not so much supply and demand itself that is exchanged, but 
information regarding supply and demand, which eventually leads to exchange 
(Hayek, 1945). Furthermore, a market does not trade, its traders do and they 
exchange information in order to do this. The competition process, as facilitated 
by the market, allows traders to discover information about potential competitors 
and exchange opportunities. Competition does not exist in a vacuum however. 
Competitive behavior is influenced by law (for instance antitrust law), social 
norms (for instance regarding fairness, see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986)) 
and the formal rules of the market itself, for instance regarding eligibility of bids 
and offers or the disclosure of information in the market (O’Hara, 1995). The 
focus of this chapter is on the third category, the formal market rules (which form 
a part of the information architecture as defined earlier) and what their impact is 
on market performance. 
Although information architecture plays a role in any type of market (O’Hara, 
1995), because of the increased cognitive complexity of bidding over multiple 
attributes instead of just price (Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997), information is 
expected to play an even more crucial role in a multidimensional auction, 
compared to one-dimensional (price) auctions.  
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Stark (1974) made one of the earliest contributions to multidimensional auctions 
when he investigated unit price bidding for highway building contracts. In unit 
price bidding, bidders are bidding for a contract that consists of multiple, distinct 
items, each with the bid taker’s estimate of the necessary quantity (for instance, 
the amount of asphalt needed). Bidders then submit a multidimensional bid, 
consisting of unit prices for each of the individual items (such as price per unit of 
asphalt). These are then multiplied with the estimates to calculate the total 
proposal value and the lowest bidder usually wins the auction. However, the 
bidders are not paid according to the estimated quantities, but according to the 
realized quantities. This means that bidders, who have different estimates of 
quantities for certain items than the bid taker, may manipulate their unit prices. For 
instance, suppose a bidder estimates that he needs 10% more asphalt for the road 
than the bid taker estimated (perhaps because he has better knowledge of local 
conditions). He will then submit a unit price higher than the price he would have 
bid if his quantity estimate and bid taker’s concurred. To keep the total cost of the 
contract constant (to not reduce his chance of winning the auction), he will lower 
his unit prices for one or more of the other items. Because the bidder is paid 
according to the actual quantities used, the extra profit from a higher unit price on 
an underestimated quantity may outweigh the profit loss from the units with a 
reduced unit price. This manipulation of unit prices by bidders is called 
unbalanced bidding. Stark (1974) developed a decision model to help bidders 
maximize their net profit using such unbalanced bidding. In their analysis of 
mineral leasing, Rothkopf and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1992) point to the potential 
benefits of bidding on multiple dimensions instead of the usual price or royalty 
schemes and they suggest a bid scoring system that avoids unbalanced bidding. In 
a related analysis, Samuelson (1986) looked at contract bidding in general and 
emphasized the fundamental tradeoff between efficient firm selection and sharing 
the risk of costs misestimates. If no risk is shared on the part of the bid taker (a 
fixed-price contract), bidders will submit balanced bids, but require a higher profit 
margin. On the other extreme, if the bid taker assumes all risk (a cost-plus 
contract, so bidders only submit profit margins as bids), the lower profit margin 
will win the auction, but possibly at higher total cost. He shows that there is some 
optimal incentive contract in between these extremes. He notes that this analysis 
extends to contracts where multiple dimensions are involved, although he does not 
provide an analysis of optimal contract design for the multidimensional case.  
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Thiel (1988) analytically investigated an isolated, multidimensional procurement 
auction in which the bid taker has a fixed budget that is known in advance and 
furthermore does not value any savings (no repeat business). In that particular 
setting, the multidimensional case reduced to the one-dimensional case of a 
normal auction without loss of generality, so there would be no need to investigate 
multidimensional auctions separately. Unfortunately, the assumptions under which 
his result holds are not entirely realistic from a practical point of view: for 
instance, the bid taker will certainly value any savings. 
Che (1993) looked at three different auction mechanisms for two-dimensional 
auctions (on price and quality), based on actual practices at the US Department of 
Defense. The three mechanisms were first-score, second-score and second-offer. 
In all mechanisms, bidders are ranked based on the bid taker’s scoring rule and the 
winner is the bidder with the highest score. In a first-score auction, the winner 
simply fulfills his bid. In a second-offer auction, he fulfills the bid of the second-
highest bidder, whereas in the second-score auction he can choose his own bid as 
long as he matches the score of the second-highest bidder. Che showed that under 
certain circumstances the three investigated mechanisms yield the same expected 
revenue and that in all circumstances, quality is either undervalued or overvalued 
from the buyer’s point of view. In his analysis, he assumed that the costs of the 
bidding firms were independent. Branco (1997) extended Che’s analysis by 
deriving an optimal auction mechanism for the more realistic case when the 
bidding firms’ costs are correlated, although both still assume that the buyer has 
perfect knowledge of the bidders’ cost structures. Cripps and Ireland (1994) 
approached the problem from a slightly different point of view when they 
investigated auctions in which the bid taker sets threshold levels for the various 
characteristics that are not known to the bidders. They analyzed three different bid 
evaluation schemes, partially based on the tendering of UK television licenses. 
The difference between the schemes was the order in which each bid was 
evaluated (price first, quality second; quality first, price second; price and quality 
simultaneously) and they found that the three schemes produced the same results. 
Milgrom (2000) showed that a multidimensional version of the Vickrey auction 
achieves the efficient auction outcome if the auctioneer announces his true utility 
function as the scoring rule by which bids are evaluated. 
 
These are all analytical results, but as electronic multidimensional auctions are 
slowly becoming more used in practice (some examples are Ebreviate.com, 
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Perfect.com and Frictionless.com), recently also papers have started to appear that 
have empirical evidence. Teich and colleagues (Teich, Wallenius and Wallenius, 
1999) provide a critical analysis of Optimark’s (www.optimark.com) price-
quantity market mechanism. Although technically speaking it is a multi-unit 
auction, because price and quantity of traders are jointly evaluated (as opposed to 
price only in most multi-unit auctions), it takes on a multidimensional flavor. They 
point to the important issue of preference elicitation and argue that the procedure 
Optimark uses is too complicated and suggest a simpler procedure. They also 
suggest some improvements to Optimark’s matching algorithm. Later, they 
developed a novel combination of multidimensional negotiations and auctions in a 
single mechanism, the Negotiauction (Teich, Wallenius, Wallenius and Zaitsev, 
2001). Bichler (2000) used laboratory experimentsto confirm the logically 
intuitive suggestion that multidimensional auctions yield a higher utility outcome 
than single-dimensional auctions, a result that was later also confirmed in 
simulations (Bichler and Klimesch, 2000).  
 
In general, there are two different basic bidding mechanisms the bid 
taker/auctioneer could employ for a multidimensional auction: a sealed-bid 
mechanism (such as a first-price or second-price sealed bid auction) or an open 
outcry mechanism (such as the English auction)7. In particular, the first-price 
sealed-bid case is common in practice, with many procurement or tendering 
situations requiring potential suppliers to submit a bid on various dimensions. A 
traditional open outcry version of a multidimensional auction is rare. One of the 
reasons for this is that the open outcry model would be very costly in terms of 
communication compared to submitting a single bid, unless the bidders all 
congregate in one place, which is rather cumbersome, particularly when dealing 
with a geographically dispersed set of suppliers. However, one of the 
disadvantages of a single-shot auction is that there is no opportunity for the 
bidders to react to other bids, but instead estimates of other bidders strategies have 
to be used. For instance, FreeMarkets claims on their website 
(www.freemarkets.com) that they achieve savings of up to 25% when using a 
reverse English auction instead of a single-shot auction. Since most procurement 
                                                           
7 Although bidding a one-dimensional score is of course possible in a Dutch auction 
setting if the scoring rule is published, it is not obvious how a Dutch auction can be 
generalized to allow multidimensional bidding on more than two dimensions. 
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auctions contain common value elements, this claim is in line with Milgrom and 
Weber (1982). But even if they were modeled as independent private value 
auctions, perhaps because of the idiosyncratic nature of the product, an 
explanation for this difference between open outcry and sealed-bid auctions can be 
given, as done by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2001). He argues that because bidders 
face uncertainty regarding a number of factors such as the exact value of the object 
(except in the case of fully independent private values), details of the auction rules, 
the number of bidders participating and their expected valuations, bidders will 
acquire information to resolve this uncertainty to a satisfying degree. The need for 
or cost of acquiring this information is lower in oral (open outcry) auctions than in 
sealed-bid auctions, which implies greater entry in oral auctions, leading to more 
competition and therefore higher prices (or lower prices in the reverse auctions of 
FreeMarkets). He shows that this result holds even in the case of independent 
private values. 
 
The complexity of a multidimensional setting means that the potential benefits of 
being able to react to your competitor’s bid are even more important. Therefore we 
focus on an open outcry setting. This line of reasoning is similar to one of the 
rationales for the FCC auction design (Cramton, 1995) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
(1988) showed that a multi-stage setting might be beneficial for the auctioneer as 
well. An open outcry version of the multidimensional auction not only gives the 
bidders the opportunity to react to other bidders, but more importantly they have 
more options to explore the highly complex bid space of multidimensional 
auctions with all its potential tradeoffs.  
This does lead however to the question of what information feedback should be 
given to the bidders about their competitors’ bids (and other aspects of the 
bidding) so that they can react in an appropriate way. This is precisely what is 
determined by the information architecture of the market.  
For instance, the feedback given to the bidders may include the scoring rule that 
the auctioneer uses to evaluate the bids, information on their own bid, such as their 
bid score or bid ranking, but also information on other bidders’ bids. The 
information feedback may be public or private or a mixture of the two. Finally, if 
bidding occurs synchronously, meaning that the auction becomes a multi-round 
auction, all bidders have to submit a bid before feedback is given as determined by 
the information architecture and the next bidding round commences. Bidding may 
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also occur asynchronously and feedback is given after each newly submitted bid, 
again based on the information architecture.  
 
To show that information architecture is relevant in a multidimensional auction, 
we will first describe a very simple deterministic situation. Assume a procurement 
setting where there are two dimensions, namely price and delivery time. There are 
two bidders competing for the order through an English auction. Bidder 1 can 
deliver d1 = ”on time” at a price of p1 = 900. Bidder 2 on the other hand can deliver 
d2 = ”early” at a price of p2 = 1000. Suppose the bid taker values earlier delivery at 
the price equivalent of 10. If the bid taker truthfully reveals this information, the 
end result will be that bidder 1 will win with a winning bid of 989. However, 
suppose the bid taker would tell the bidders he values earlier delivery by 90. 
Bidder 1 would still win, but now with a winning bid of 909 instead of 989.  
Although the example is not particularly realistic since it assumes complete 
information on the bid taker’s side for instance, it does show that different 
information architectures do have an impact on the outcome of the auction. As an 
aside, it also shows that sometimes the bid taker can profit from misrepresenting 
his private information. Generally, misrepresentation is profitable for the bid taker 
when used to push the most efficient bidder to the limit, effectively by 
‘subsidizing’ the second-most efficient bidder (Rothkopf, Harstad and Fu, 1997). 
 
For a more general case that illustrates the importance of information, see figure 
5.1 for a two-dimensional auction with a bid being made on price and delivery 
time. A particular bidder makes a certain two-dimensional bid B. Two iso-utility 
curves are drawn, one for the bidder, one for the bid taker. The bid corresponds an 
intersection point of the two curves and the curves correspond to the utility of the 
bid being made by that particular bidder. The arrows indicate the direction of 
utility improvement for each party. The bid taker (i.e. buyer) prefers a lower price 
and a faster delivery time, the bidder (i.e. seller) prefers a higher price and a later 
delivery time. Note that for simplicity’s sake we have assumed no further 
restrictions on the attributes, such as a maximum price the bid taker is willing to 
pay or a minimum delivery time the bidder can meet for instance. These might 
prevent certain areas in figure 5.1 from being feasible bids for both parties.  
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So in this case, with the bid B corresponding to one of the intersections of the two 
iso-utility curves, areas I and III are areas in which any revised bid would yield 
increased utility for both parties. A revised bid in area II would yield decreased 
utility for both parties. A revised bid in the remaining areas would yield a utility 
increase for one party and a decrease for the other party. The important question 
now is: how does the bidder know to revise his bid in direction of area I or III and 
not in any other direction? For that, he has to has some information available for 
him to know that, which illustrates the relevance of information architecture. 
 
Another reason to investigate the effects of different information architectures is 
that using a publicly announced utility function as scoring rule of the bids 
sometimes is not possible or desirable. For instance, announcing a utility function 
may give monopoly power to one or more bidders, yet it may be illegal for the bid 
taker to misrepresent it (for instance in government procurement) if he wants to 
avoid this monopoly effect. In some cases, the bid taker may want to discriminate 
against or for particular bidders for certain reasons (legal or not), but does not 
want this to become known. Or the bid taker may have only an approximate utility 
function, instead of a precise one, which could lead to a sub-optimal outcome 
g (bidder’s iso-utility curve) 
f (bid taker’s iso-utility curve)
 
I 
III 
Price
Delivery time
II 
Bid B 
Figure 5.1 Tradeoffs in a two-dimensional auction 
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because bidders now optimize against the ‘wrong’ scoring rule. Or the bid taker 
may not even have an explicit utility function to begin with, and instead only be 
able to do pairwise comparisons8. Given such potential problems with publicly 
announcing a scoring rule, alternative information architectures in which the 
scoring rule can remain secret, are worth investigating to see if satisfactory 
outcomes can still be attained.  
A final reason is that, particularly for auctions, it is an area that has received little 
attention thus far, both from theorists and experimentalists (Kagel, 1995, p.520-
521). Yet with the increasing popularity of auctions and in particular the more 
complex electronic auction mechanisms enabled by ICT, the information 
architecture becomes an increasingly useful design parameter. 
 
Different market types have different types of information that is (potentially) 
available, so the particulars of an information architecture vary from market to 
market. Specifically, a multidimensional auction has five categories of information 
elements: 
1. Bid elements 
2. Bid scores 
3. Bid rankings 
4. Bid taker’s utility function 
5. Bidder identities 
 
The first category gives information regarding the bids themselves. This could be 
the actual bids that were submitted, but an interesting policy would be to not 
reveal information about the bids received and instead give each bidder a number 
of alternatives that would top the current highest bid (or perhaps merely improve 
on their current bid). Revealing bids is usually done in conjunction with elements 
of categories 2 and 3, such as revealing the highest bid, i.e. the highest-ranked bid.  
The second category refers to the revelation of the scores of a bid, with score 
being the bid taker’s utility. Note that (bearing in mind the information 
manipulation example given earlier) the utility revealed need not necessarily 
correspond to the actual utility of the bid taker, since misrepresentation may be 
                                                           
8 Note that using pairwise comparisons will only be equivalent to using a utility function 
when an unlimited amount of pairwise comparisons can be done accurately at zero cost. 
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profitable. Also note that revealing a utility is only meaningful if the scale of the 
utility is (partially) known to the bidders.  
The third category reveals information about the relative ranking of the bid among 
all bids received, based on the bid taker’s (possibly misrepresented) utility. This 
information can be enhanced if the total number of bids received is revealed as 
well.  
The information from the second and third categories in principle allows bidders 
to make partial inferences about the bid taker’s utility function after a number of 
rounds. However, the bid taker can also choose to reveal some information about 
his utility function directly and that is the fourth category. He may choose to 
reveal the utility function entirely, but another option might be to reveal the 
direction of fastest improvement upon the current bid. This corresponds to the 
normal vector of the utility curve at the bid point (see also the arrows in figure 
5.1).  
The fifth category constitutes the revelation of the identity of the bidders. The 
identity of the highest bidder will generally be revealed only at the end of the 
auction, but it is of course possible to reveal the identity of the current high bidder 
during the auction. In other cases, one may want to have a completely public 
auction in which the identity of each bidder is known at all times. 
 
To analyze the effects of different information architectures on the performance of 
the auction mechanism, we need criteria by which to judge market performance, as 
this can be measured in different ways (O’Hara, 1995). Two measures that are 
particularly relevant in this case are Pareto optimality and winner efficiency. 
Pareto optimality in a multidimensional auction is measured at the dyad level of 
(winning) bidder-bid taker. A (winning) bid is Pareto optimal if no feasible bid can 
be made which is a Pareto improvement, i.e. no mutually beneficial bids exist for 
the bid taker and that particular bidder. This does not necessarily mean that the bid 
taker’s utility is maximized. Winner efficiency is achieved when the most efficient 
bidder makes the actual winning bid. In standard one-dimensional auctions, 
winner efficiency is achieved when the bidder with the highest valuation wins the 
auction. In the reverse case under consideration here, it means that the bidder with 
the lowest cost structure wins the auction. So a multidimensional auction is 
efficient if, given a winning bid, there does not exist a different bidder who could 
make a feasible bid (feasible for both parties) that would improve the bid taker’s 
utility. Loosely speaking, efficiency ensures that the eventual trade occurs between 
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the ‘right’ trading partners, optimality ensures that the total surplus of that trade is 
maximized.  
Note that in a multidimensional auction, a winning bid can be Pareto optimal, yet 
at the same time not winner efficient and vice versa. An optimal, inefficient 
winning bid can occur when the winning bidder has Pareto-optimized his own bid 
relative to the bid taker’s utility (no Pareto improvements possible, areas I and III 
in fig. 5.1 are not feasible), yet there may be a different bidder that could outbid 
him (winner inefficiency), but that bidder has not made such a bid. A non-Pareto-
optimal, winner efficient winning bid can occur when there are no bidders that 
could outbid the current highest bidder (winner efficient), yet his current bid could 
be Pareto-improved upon by himself (areas I and III in fig. 1 are feasible, yet not 
being bid in). In both cases, the complexity of the bid space and unfamiliarity with 
the bid taker’s preferences lead to performance degradations that could be 
ameliorated by giving proper feedback, i.e. a well-designed information 
architecture. To relate the information architecture to these two performance 
measures, we need to distinguish between two different types of information that 
exist in a market: supply-side information and demand-side information. In a 
reverse auction, information about the supply-side gives the bidder information 
about the other bidders and more precisely: about the state of competition among 
the bidders. The more this type of information is available, the more transparent 
the competition process becomes and the more likely it is that the most efficient 
bidder will actually win the auction (assuming no information manipulation by the 
bid taker). Stated in general terms: 
 
Proposition 5.1: A market with an information architecture that reveals more 
information about the state of competition will have a higher likelihood of 
achieving winner efficiency. 
 
In a reverse auction, information about the demand-side gives the bidder 
information about the bid taker’s preferences and more precisely: about the 
direction in which to improve his bid. The more this type of information is 
available, the more fully known the bid taker’s preferences are and the more likely 
that opportunities for win-win improvements will be exploited. Stated in general 
terms: 
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Proposition 5.2: A market with an information architecture that reveals more 
information about the bid taker’s preferences will have a higher likelihood of 
achieving Pareto optimality.  
 
As an illustration of these propositions, table 5.1 outlines several information 
architectures for a multi-round, reverse, multidimensional auction, describing 
which information is revealed at the end of each round. Based on how much 
information each information architecture reveals about the state of competition 
(supply-side) and the bid taker’s preferences (demand-side), each of them is rated 
on their expected Pareto optimality and winner efficiency. These are only rough 
and qualitative ratings, used merely to give an impression of how various 
information architectures would compare to each other (o = average, - = below 
average, + = above average). In this table, feedback policies dealing with whether 
or not to reveal bidder’s identity are left out, as the effects of that are 
indeterminate to the best of my knowledge. 
 
Table 5.1 Information architectures and their relative effect on Pareto 
optimality and winner efficiency 
Information architecture Optimality Efficiency 
Bid highest? (yes/no) - - 
1 alternative o - 
n alternatives (n relatively large) + o 
Rank of bid - + 
Highest bid o + 
All bids + ranking + + 
Bid score + highest bid score - o 
Bid score + all other bid scores - + 
Bid taker’s utility function + - 
Direction of fastest improvement + - 
 
5.3 A model of multidimensional auctions 
A natural setting for a multidimensional auction is a procurement setting, where 
suppliers bid to satisfy a demand from the buyer (the bid taker). As noted before, 
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the essential feature of the multidimensional auction is that the product to be 
procured is not exhaustively specified in advance, but instead is endogenized into 
the auction process.  
Consider the following simple procurement model, taken from Koppius, Kumar 
and Van Heck (2000) in which there is one buyer (i.e. bid taker) and n suppliers 
(i.e. bidders). The bid taker has K attributes on which the buyer must bid in order 
for a bid to be valid, hence all bids must be K-dimensional vectors. The attributes 
may be any combination of monetary and non-monetary attributes. Possible 
attributes can include a fixed-price component, a variable-price component, 
quantity offered, delivery time, various product quality attributes and issues such 
as warranty policies.  
A bid is denoted by );...;( 1 Kbb=b  with each separate bk denoting the level of 
attribute k. The bid taker has a private utility function U(b) that denotes the utility 
he derives from a bid; this function converts both monetary and non-monetary 
attributes into a utility. The bid taker can choose to reveal his utility function or, as 
doing this may reveal sensitive competitive information, he can keep it secret and 
perhaps reveal other information. 
The bid taker has several constraints βs(b)  (s = 1,…,S) regarding the values of the 
attributes, resulting in a feasible bid region for the bid taker denoted by BR (this is 
somewhat analogous to the reserve price in standard auctions). These constraints 
may be simple minimum or maximum values or more complex functions 
describing some of the tradeoffs between attributes (say for instance the maximum 
price increase for faster delivery, possibly dependent on the quality level). 
Disregarding concerns for future interactions and fairness, the bid taker would like 
to maximize U(b) s.t. b ∈ BR. Similarly, each bidder i faces several constraints 
ci,w(b) (w = 1,…,W) regarding the sets of attributes that he can offer, resulting in a 
feasible bid region for each bidder denoted by BRi. These are constraints that have 
to do with internal production function, minimum price levels etc. They are 
assumed to be private information, but not necessarily independent. Each bidder 
has a utility function πi(b) and tries to maximize πi(b).Prob(b=winning bid) s.t. b 
∈ BRi. 
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5.4 Experimental design 
The experiment took place in the context of a procurement setting in the chemical 
industry, where bidders were suppliers of hydrochloric acid. Although traditionally 
experimental auction research is done as context-free as possible, given the 
cognitive complexity of a multidimensional auction, it was felt to be better to 
include a context (described as neutrally as possible though). The number of 
dimensions was set to K=3, more specifically price p, quality c (the contamination 
percentage) and delivery time t (in days), so b = (c, t, p). The bid taker’s utility 
function changes from auction to auction to represent a new transaction each time. 
U(b) was chosen to have the following general form: 
(1) U(b) = v1e-c + v2e-t – p2 
The parameters v1 and v2 were varied in each auction to model the tradeoffs that 
that particular buyer/bid taker would make between quality, delivery time and 
price. Both v1 and v2 were restricted to negative values, to insure that U(b) would 
be monotonically decreasing in each separate variable, i.e. bids with higher 
contamination (or delivery or price respectively) are ceteris paribus worse for the 
bid taker. The bid taker’s utility functions were kept secret from the bidders 
throughout the experiment, although they were told that it would change from 
auction to auction and would reflect different tradeoffs among the attributes, thus 
resulting in a potentially different optimal bid.  
For simplicity reasons, the constraints regarding feasible bid regions for the bid 
taker and all bidders were identical: 
(2a) 2 ≤ c ≤ 10 
(2b) 1 ≤ t ≤ 5 
(2c) 40 ≤ p ≤ 110 
 
All three variables were discrete, to further narrow down the bid space and thus 
reduce the complexity for the bidders. The profit function for bidder i was: 
(3) πi (c, t, p) =  pi – fi(ci, ti) 
 
In this profit function, pi indicates the price bid by bidder i and fi(ci, ti) indicates 
the production costs for bidder i of supplying the product with attributes ci and ti. 
The production cost function had the general form: 
(4) fi(ci, ti) = a1,i – a2,i ci – a3,i ci2 – a4,i ti – a5,i ti2 
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Each bidder faced different aj,i, to create bidder heterogeneity through different 
cost functions (e.g. the equivalent of private values in standard auctions). The cost 
function parameters were chosen such that each bidder has a comparative 
advantage in a different region of the bid space to partially model a realistic setting 
of bidder heterogeneity. For instance, one bidder had a cost advantage on fast 
delivery, whereas another bidder had a cost advantage on delivering low quality. 
The utility functions used in each auction were subsequently chosen to –in 
combination with the different cost structures- yield a different, unique maximal 
bid in each separate auction. For instance, one bid taker/buyer was willing to pay a 
lot for high quality, but was fairly indifferent to delivery time, whereas another 
was primarily looking for a cheap product with a fast delivery time. This maximal 
bid is the benchmark to assess the efficiency of the auction. 
The multidimensional auction model was implemented in a software prototype, 
designed to be run over the Internet, needing only a browser on the client’s side. 
Figure 5.2 shows a screenshot of the bidding screen. The experiment itself was not 
run over the Internet however, but with subjects located in a dedicated trading 
room (the Eneco Trading Room at the Rotterdam School of Management) to 
maximize control over the experimental settings. A copy of the experiment 
instructions can be found in the appendix to this chapter. Each auction was run as 
a multi-round auction. In each round, subjects entered their bid on three 
dimensions in the browser and submitted it to the auction server. Once all bids 
were received, bidders received on-screen feedback about the current status of the 
auction as dictated by the rules regarding the information architecture, after which 
they could submit a revised bid in the next round. The highest bid was defined as 
the highest bid from all the previous rounds combined, so it was for instance 
possible that at the end of round 3, the highest bid was a bid submitted in round 2 
that simply was not improved upon in round 3. The auction finished after a 
number of rounds and that number of rounds was public knowledge (displayed on-
screen). At that point the highest overall bid won the auction and profits were 
calculated. Then the next auction started with a different utility function for the bid 
taker but the same private cost functions for the bidders. 
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Figure 5.2 Bidding screen 
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The experiments were run with four subjects (a number not uncommon in 
experimental auction research, see Kagel (1995)), following a 2 X 2 design. One 
dimension varied was our experimental variable of information architecture. In 
one treatment (restricted information architecture), bidders only saw the overall 
highest bid and bidder at the end of each round. In the other treatment (unrestricted 
information architecture), bidders saw the overall highest bid and bidder, plus all 
bids submitted in the latest round (and its bidder) as well as the relative score of 
each bid as a percentage of the utility of the overall highest bid so far. See figure 
5.3 for a screenshot of feedback at the end of the round in an unrestricted 
information architecture. Compared to the restricted information architecture, the 
unrestricted case provided more information about the state of competition (such 
as bid ranking) as well as more information about the bid taker’s preferences (such 
as the relative scores). The second experimental dimension varied was the number 
of rounds, to allow bidders to better incorporate the available information as the 
number of rounds increased. One way would be to let the auction itself determine 
the number of rounds, as done in the FCC spectrum auctions (Cramton, 1995), 
based for instance on activity rules or minimum bid score increases. Then the 
experimental condition could be for instance a minimum score increase of 2% 
versus one of 5%. However, since it was not clear in advance what the exact 
influence of a longer auction would be in the first place, particularly regarding the 
effects it might have on how the information is processed, we opted for a simpler 
approach and simply fixed the number of rounds in advance. Half of all auctions 
were run over two rounds, half over four rounds. Bidders were informed by the 
experimenter as well as on the screen before each change in the number of rounds.  
 
The full experiment lasted a little under two hours, including instruction time and 
two practice auctions to familiarize the participants with the system. The first half 
of the auctions were run in the following sequence:  
A. 3 auctions of 2 rounds with a restricted information architecture,  
B. 3 auctions of 2 rounds with an unrestricted information architecture,  
C. 3 auctions of 4 rounds with a restricted information architecture and  
D. 3 auctions of 4 rounds with an unrestricted information architecture.  
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Figure 5.3 Bidder feedback in unrestricted information architecture 
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The second half of the auctions were run in the reverse sequence to control 
partially for within-experiment learning effects (an ABCD-DCBA design 
(Friedman and Sunder, 1993)). The relatively long time needed for each separate 
auction prevented us from running more than 24 auctions in the two hours 
available. At the end of the experiments, subjects were interviewed informally 
about their experiences in the experiment and they were paid their winnings in 
cash. The winnings ranged from approx. € 7 to € 25, on average € 17. 
A replication experiment with the same number of participants was carried out a 
few weeks later. This experiment had a mirrored auction sequence (a DCBA-
ABCD design) to further control for learning effects. Aggregated over the two 
experiments there are 48 observations, 12 in each cell of the experimental design. 
 
 
5.5 Measures and hypotheses 
Market performance is measured by winner efficiency and Pareto optimality. Two 
measures of efficiency are used: EFF, which is a binary variable indicating 
whether or not the winning bid is efficient (1=efficient, 0=not efficient) and 
TOTEFF, which indicates the distance from the winning bid to the efficient bid (a 
lower distance indicating higher efficiency). For Pareto-optimality, the main 
measures are PARETO and NPARETO. PARETO is a binary variable indicating 
whether or not the winning bid is Pareto-optimal (1=optimal, 0=not optimal), i.e. 
whether or not there existed a bid that would have made at least one party better 
off without making the other party worse off. NPARETO is the number of Pareto-
improving bids that existed at the end of the auction. A lower value implies an 
auction that ended close to the optimal bid.  
Two additional measures, PARPLUS and NPARPLUS, were also analyzed. They 
are defined analogous to PARETO and NPARETO respectively, except that the 
requirement is that now both parties have to be strictly better off, i.e. a higher 
profit for the bidder and a higher utility for the bid taker. 
 
Bearing in mind propositions 5.1 and 5.2 and the discussion in the previous section 
about the restricted and unrestricted information architectures, the following 
hypotheses will be tested: 
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Hypothesis 5.1a: The average efficiency will be larger in an unrestricted 
information architecture (EFFunrestricted > EFFrestricted) . 
Hypothesis 5.1b: The distance from the winning bid to the efficient bid will be 
smaller in an unrestricted information architecture )TOTEFFunrestricted < 
TOTEFFrestricted). 
 
Hypothesis 5.2a: Average Pareto optimality will be larger in an unrestricted 
information architecture (PARETOunrestricted > PARETOrestricted) 
Hypothesis 5.2b: The number of Pareto-improving alternatives will be smaller in 
an unrestricted information architecture (NPARETOunrestricted < NPARETOrestricted) 
Hypothesis 5.2c: Average strict Pareto optimality will be larger in an unrestricted 
information architecture (PARPLUSunrestricted > PARPLUSrestricted) 
Hypothesis 5.2d: The number of strict Pareto-improving alternatives will be 
smaller in an unrestricted information architecture (NPARPLUSunrestricted < 
NPARPLUSrestricted) 
 
Changing the number of rounds was primarily manipulated to investigate possible 
interaction effects between the information architecture and the duration of the 
competitive process (i.e. the number of bidding rounds). An interaction effect is 
expected to exist, but no specific hypothesis is formulated a priori regarding 
direction or magnitude of this possible interactive effect. With regards to the main 
effect of the number of rounds, the following hypotheses will be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 5.3a: Average efficiency will be larger in a 4-round auction (EFF4 > 
EFF2) 
Hypothesis 5.3b: The average distance between the winning bid and the efficient 
bid will be smaller in a 4-round auction (TOTEFF4 < TOTEFF2) 
 
Hypothesis 5.4a: Average Pareto optimality will be larger in a 4-round auctions 
(PARETO4 > PARETO2) 
Hypothesis 5.4b: The number of Pareto-improving alternatives will be smaller in a 
4-round auction (NPARETO4 < NPARETO2) 
Hypothesis 5.4c: Average strict Pareto-optimality will be larger in a 4-round 
auction (PARPLUS4 > PARPLUS2) 
Hypothesis 5.4d: The number of strict Pareto-improving alternatives will be 
smaller in a 4-round auction (NPARPLUS4 > NPARPLUS2) 
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5.6 Analysis 
Because of the non-normality of the dependent variables, a non-parametric test is 
used (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001), in this case the Mann-Whitney test to test for 
differences between unrestricted and restricted information architecture.  
 
Table 5.2 Descriptives winner efficiency 
48 .36979 .28709 .000 1.000
48 .21 .41 0 1
TOTEFF
EFF
N Mean
Std.
Deviation Minimum Maximum
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Descriptives Pareto optimality 
48 41.56 158.28 0 1079
48 .31 .47 0 1
48 37.38 155.08 0 1057
48 .38 .49 0 1
NPARETO
PARETO
NPARPLUS
PARPLUS
N Mean
Std.
Deviation Minimum Maximum
 
 
 
Table 5.2 and 5.3 give the descriptives for the dependent variables. For the 
hypothesis tests of H5.1-H5.4, a p-value of 0.05 was used throughout.  
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that hypotheses 5.1a and 5.1b are supported, so an 
unrestricted information architecture improves both efficiency measures.  
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Table 5.4 Rank statistics H5.1a-H5.1b  
24 28.98 695.50
24 20.02 480.50
24 21.50 516.00
24 27.50 660.00
Info.Arch.
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
TOTEFF
EFF
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5 Mann-Whitney test statistics H5.1a-H5.1b 
180.500 216.000
480.500 516.000
-2.244 -2.110
.025 .035
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
TOTEFF EFF
 
 
 
The results in tables 5.6 and 5.7 show that hypotheses 5.2a, 5.2b and 5.2d are 
supported, but hypothesis 5.2c falls just short of being supported. The PARPLUS 
measure is a binary variable, so it is a much cruder optimality measure than the 
NPARPLUS (the number of strictly Pareto-improving alternatives) used in the 
accepted hypothesis 5.2d. The overall conclusion for hypothesis 5.2 is that an 
unrestricted information architecture does improve (strict) Pareto optimality.   
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Table 5.6 Rank statistics H5.2a-H5.2d 
24 29.79 715.00
24 19.21 461.00
24 21.00 504.00
24 28.00 672.00
24 29.40 705.50
24 19.60 470.50
24 21.50 516.00
24 27.50 660.00
Info. Arch.
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
NPARETO
PARETO
NPARPLUS
PARPLUS
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
 
 
 
Table 5.7 Mann-Whitney test statistics H5.2a-H5.2d 
161.000 204.000 170.500 216.000
461.000 504.000 470.500 516.000
-2.661 -2.157 -2.491 -1.770
.008 .031 .013 .077
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
NPARETO PARETO NPARPLUS PARPLUS
 
 
 
Hypotheses 5.3a and 5.3b are both not supported (see tables 5.8 and 5.9), meaning 
that auctioning over more rounds does not significantly improve either measure of 
winner efficiency. This was somewhat surprising and will be further discussed in 
the analysis of the interaction effect. 
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Table 5.8 Rank statistics H5.3a-H5.3b 
24 27.27 654.50
24 21.73 521.50
24 23.50 564.00
24 25.50 612.00
Rounds
2
4
2
4
TOTEFF
EFF
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
 
 
Table 5.9 Mann-Whitney test statistics H5.3a-H5.3b 
221.500 264.000
521.500 564.000
-1.388 -.703
.165 .482
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
TOTEFF EFF
 
 
 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show that the fourth hypothesis is not supported for the 
PARETO and PARPLUS variables (hypotheses 5.4a and 5.4c), but when looking 
at the more refined optimality measure of the number of (strictly) Pareto-
improving bids (NPARETO and NPARPLUS), hypotheses 5.4b and 5.4d are 
supported, meaning that auctioning over more rounds (weakly) increases Pareto 
optimality. As an aside, in conjuction with the rejection of hypotheses 5.3a and 
5.3b, this result shows that the distinction between winner efficiency and Pareto 
optimality is not merely of theoretical importance, but that they are indeed 
empirically distinct as the influence of the number of rounds on both is different. 
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Table 5.10 Rank statistics H5.4a-H5.4d 
24 29.46 707.00
24 19.54 469.00
24 22.00 528.00
24 27.00 648.00
24 29.42 706.00
24 19.58 470.00
24 21.50 516.00
24 27.50 660.00
Rounds
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
NPARETO
PARETO
NPARPLUS
PARPLUS
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
 
 
Table 5.11 Mann-Whitney test statistics H5.4a-H5.4d 
169.000 228.000 170.000 216.000
469.000 528.000 470.000 516.000
-2.493 -1.541 -2.501 -1.770
.013 .123 .012 .077
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
NPARETO PARETO NPARPLUS PARPLUS
 
 
 
When the results are analyzed holding either the number of rounds or the 
information architecture constant, it shows the presence of strong interaction 
effects. Tables 5.12-5.15 show that the unrestricted information architecture 
significantly increases efficiency compared to the restricted information 
architecture only in the 2-round case. In the 4-round case, the two information 
architectures yield similar results for efficiency. The results for Pareto-optimality 
are similar (tables 5.16-5.19): the unrestricted information architecture only 
improves optimality measures in the 2-round case. 
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Table 5.12 Rank statistics info.arch.- efficiency (2 round case) 
12 15.83 190.00
12 9.17 110.00
12 10.50 126.00
12 14.50 174.00
Info. Arch.
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
TOTEFF
EFF
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
 
 
Table 5.13 Mann-Whitney test statistics info.arch.-efficiency (2 round case) 
32.000 48.000
110.000 126.000
-2.341 -2.145
.019 .032
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
TOTEFF EFF
 
 
 
 
Table 5.14 Rank statistics info.arch.-efficiency (4 round case) 
12 13.79 165.50
12 11.21 134.50
12 11.50 138.00
12 13.50 162.00
Info.Arch.
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
TOTEFF
EFF
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
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Table 5.15 Mann-Whitney test statistics info.arch.-efficiency (4 round case) 
56.500 60.000
134.500 138.000
-.910 -.923
.363 .356
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
TOTEFF EFF
 
 
 
 
Table 5.16 Rank statistics info.arch.-optimality (2 round case) 
12 16.38 196.50
12 8.63 103.50
12 10.00 120.00
12 15.00 180.00
12 16.54 198.50
12 8.46 101.50
12 9.50 114.00
12 15.50 186.00
Info. Arch.
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
NPARETO
PARETO
NPARPLUS
PARPLUS
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
 
 
Table 5.17 Mann-Whitney test statistics info.arch.-optimality (2 round case) 
25.500 42.000 23.500 36.000
103.500 120.000 101.500 114.000
-2.698 -2.460 -2.825 -2.769
.007 .014 .005 .006
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
NPARETO PARETO NPARPLUS PARPLUS
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Table 5.18 Rank statistics info.arch.-optimality (4 round case) 
12 13.58 163.00
12 11.42 137.00
12 11.50 138.00
12 13.50 162.00
12 12.83 154.00
12 12.17 146.00
12 12.50 150.00
12 12.50 150.00
Info. Arch.
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
Restricted
Unrestricted
NPARETO
PARETO
NPARPLUS
PARPLUS
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
 
 
Table 5.19 Mann-Whitney test statistics info.arch.-optimality (4 round case) 
59.000 60.000 68.000 72.000
137.000 138.000 146.000 150.000
-.780 -.811 -.247 .000
.435 .418 .805 1.000
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
NPARETO PARETO NPARPLUS PARPLUS
 
 
 
The overall effect on winner efficiency of increasing the number of rounds was not 
significant, but if we hold the information architecture constant, a slightly different 
picture emerges.  
Under a restricted information architecture (see tables 5.20-5.21), auctioning more 
rounds decreases the distance to the overall efficient bid (TOTEFF), although the 
effect on the cruder EFF-measure remains insignificant. Under an unrestricted 
information architecture (see tables 5.22-5.23), auctioning over more rounds has 
no effect on either efficiency measure. Overall, these results imply that the number 
of rounds has an effect on efficiency, but the effect is weak at best. 
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Table 5.20 Rank statistics rounds-efficiency (restricted info.arch. case) 
12 15.42 185.00
12 9.58 115.00
12 11.50 138.00
12 13.50 162.00
Rounds
2
4
2
4
TOTEFF
EFF
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
 
Table 5.21 Mann-Whitney test statistics rounds-efficiency (restricted info.arch. case) 
37.000 60.000
115.000 138.000
-2.040 -1.446
.041 .148
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
TOTEFF EFF
 
 
 
Table 5.22 Rank statistics rounds-efficiency (unrestricted info.arch. case) 
12 12.88 154.50
12 12.13 145.50
12 12.50 150.00
12 12.50 150.00
Rounds
2
4
2
4
TOTEFF
EFF
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
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Table 5.23 Mann-Whitney test statistics rounds-efficiency (unrestricted info.arch. 
case) 
67.500 72.000
145.500 150.000
-.267 .000
.790 1.000
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
TOTEFF EFF
 
 
 
With respect to the influence of the number of rounds on optimality, tables 5.24-
5.27 again show an interaction effect: the increases in optimality are significant 
under a restricted information architecture, but non-significant under an 
unrestricted information architecture. 
 
 
Table 5.24 Rank statistics rounds-optimality (restricted info.arch.) 
12 17.08 205.00
12 7.92 95.00
12 10.50 126.00
12 14.50 174.00
12 17.08 205.00
12 7.92 95.00
12 9.50 114.00
12 15.50 186.00
Rounds
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
NPARETO
PARETO
NPARPLUS
PARPLUS
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
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Table 5.25 Mann-Whitney test statistics rounds-optimality (restricted info.arch.) 
17.000 48.000 17.000 36.000
95.000 126.000 95.000 114.000
-3.185 -2.145 -3.202 -2.769
.001 .032 .001 .006
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
NPARETO PARETO NPARPLUS PARPLUS
 
Table 5.26 Rank statistics rounds-optimality (unrestricted info.arch.) 
12 12.96 155.50
12 12.04 144.50
12 12.00 144.00
12 13.00 156.00
12 12.67 152.00
12 12.33 148.00
12 12.50 150.00
12 12.50 150.00
Rounds
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
NPARETO
PARETO
NPARPLUS
PARPLUS
N
Mean
Rank
Sum of
Ranks
 
 
 
Table 5.27 Mann-Whitney test statistics rounds-optimality (unrestricted info.arch.) 
66.500 66.000 70.000 72.000
144.500 144.000 148.000 150.000
-.334 -.401 -.124 .000
.738 .688 .902 1.000
Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
NPARETO PARETO NPARPLUS PARPLUS
 
 
 
Additional analysis through t-tests for bidder profit under the experimental 
conditions shows that although bidder profit tends to decrease slightly when 
auctioning over more rounds or under an unrestricted information architecture, 
these differences are not significant. This implies that the additional gains to the 
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bid taker (as indicated by lower TOTEFF measures) are not at the expense of the 
bidders. In other words, there is real value being created. 
 
5.7 Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter analyzed a new market institution, the multidimensional auction. It 
highlighted in particular one ICT-related design issue, namely the information 
architecture of the market. Laboratory experiments were carried out to test for the 
effects of information architecture as well as the number of bidding rounds on two 
market performance measures, winner efficiency and optimality. Results show that 
an unrestricted information architecture (i.e. more information revealed about the 
state of competition and the bid taker’s preferences) increases the optimality and 
winner efficiency of the multidimensional auction. Auctioning over 4 rounds 
instead of 2 improves the optimality of the auction, but has no overall effect on 
winner efficiency. These are by and large conform expectations, although a 
stronger effect of the number of rounds was expected, particularly regarding 
winner efficiency. Perhaps the increase from 2 to 4 four rounds was too small to 
yield significant improvements, but this is something that future experiments over 
more rounds will have to resolve.  
What is somewhat surprising however, is that the effects of information 
architecture and auctioning rounds are highly dependent on each other: the 
presence of strong interaction effects shows that an increase of one experimental 
variable only improves market performance if the other experimental variable is 
low. In other words, auctioning more rounds can act as a partial substitute for 
more feedback in a given round and vice versa.  
A possible explanation for this effect may be found in the role of information in 
the decision processes of the individual bidders. As Koppius and van Heck (2001) 
argued, the revision of bids by an individual bidder from round to round seems to 
be consistent with the general belief-adjustment model proposed by Hogarth and 
Einhorn (1992). An important feature of the belief-adjustment model is that the 
degree of adjustment is not just dependent on whether the evidence is positive or 
negative, but also dependent on the previous belief against which it is evaluated. 
For example, information that is negative compared to the held belief will cause 
minor belief-adjustment if that belief is already fairly close to the (negative) 
evidence. If the same negative information is evaluated against a strongly held 
belief, belief-adjustment will be much stronger (‘the harder they come, the harder 
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they fall’). In the negative information case, the adjustment is proportional to the 
current position, whereas in the positive information case, it is inversely 
proportional to the current position (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992).  
Most subjects indicated after the experiment that they primarily thought of the 
bidding process as a search for the bid taker’s optimum, which is quite different 
from a single-dimensional auction where the emphasis is on beating the 
competition. So, if we view the bidding process in a multidimensional auction as a 
search for the bid taker’s optimum, the bidder’s belief corresponds to where he 
thinks the bid taker’s optimum is located and he is assumed to bid accordingly. 
Information at the end of the round can then be interpreted as positive if the 
highest bid is close (in the bid space) to the bidder’s bid in that round and negative 
if the highest bid is located far from the bidder’s bid in that round. Some bidders 
perceived this information role of bids quite well when they commented that it was 
a disadvantage to be the highest bidder in the penultimate round, particularly in the 
restricted information architecture, because then you had less information than the 
other bidders to go on in revising your bid. 
As bids converge during the auction towards where bidders initially think the 
optimum is, the information that those bids reveal at the end of each round 
becomes less informative, because the revealed information is already fairly close 
to the position held. In other words, there will be only minor belief-revision (i.e. 
updating of the assumed bid taker’s optimum) and bidding is likely to remain in 
that region of the bid space, with auction performance remaining stable at a sub-
optimal level. 
 
Although the discussion above pertains to multidimensional auctions, this result 
yields an interesting speculative interpretation of what it takes to make a market in 
general perform well in terms of efficiency and optimality. A less restricted 
information architecture increases the amount of information about competitors’ 
private information and bid taker preferences that is revealed during the market 
process. The same line of reasoning applies to an increase in the number of 
rounds: auctioning more rounds gradually reveals more information about bid 
taker’s preferences and the state of competition. The interaction effect between 
those two implies strongly diminishing returns to revealing additional information, 
either through a less restricted information architecture or through revealing 
information over more rounds. The reason is that the additional information, 
despite being credible and correct, simply is not effective in changing bidding 
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behavior. Bidders’ belief that the current highest bid is correct may simply be too 
strong to be swayed by any further information. This implies that market 
performance will then remain at a sub-optimal level. In other words, there seems 
to be a phenomenon of information saturation at work in the market: beyond a 
certain point, more information does not improve market performance any further. 
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CHAPTER 6 - SYNTHESIS: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF 
ELECTRONIC MARKETS  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize the findings of the previous chapters 
into a model of electronic markets. Such a model, preliminary as it may be, will 
hopefully contribute to a more detailed understanding of market processes and 
their outcomes and how ICT influences them. So in a way, this is a model of 
markets in general, but with an added emphasis on the role of ICT. In order to give 
this chapter the proper context and focus, an important level-of-analysis distinction 
is emphasized between a market theory and a theory of the market (Lie, 1997). A 
market theory uses the concept of the market to theorize about social and 
economic life, such as the transitions to a market economy (Nee, 1989), the 
market-hierarchies debate (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and economic theories about 
marriage and the family (Becker, 1976, 1981). A theory of the market theorizes 
about market processes, i.e. how and why a market functions the way it does. My 
focus is on the latter category of theories. This does not mean that market theories 
are not important or that ICT could not be a relevant factor in such theories (see 
for instance Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) and the subsequent debate 
regarding a shift from electronic hierarchies to electronic markets), but simply that 
it is outside the scope of this dissertation. The goal of the model developed here is 
to look inside the black box of markets, i.e. to explain how and why which 
transactions arise. This differentiates this model from for instance models in neo-
institutional economics, particularly transaction cost economics, which compare 
markets to other governance mechanisms. It is also different from models in 
strategic management and marketing (both usually derived from the industrial 
organization literature) that deal with the definition of a market, which is 
commonly interpreted as the definition of the boundaries of the market. The model 
developed here complements those models, because it assumes that the choice for 
the governance mechanism of the market has been made and that the market 
boundaries have been defined. 
The starting point of the model is that markets are most properly viewed as a 
dynamic social structure. This view emphasizes that markets should be viewed as 
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a process, not just an outcome and that the market process occurs among distinct 
social entities instead of identical, atomized actors (for a more detailed overview 
of how this view differs from the way the market has been viewed in most 
economic theory, sociology and other literatures, please refer to the appendix at 
the end of this chapter).  This emphasis is echoed in the specific definition of a 
market adopted at the beginning of this dissertation: markets are social institutions 
that facilitate exchange by means of competition (Coase, 1988; Weber, 1978 
[1922]; Swedberg, 1994). Although Coase (1988) initially defines markets as 
“…institutions that exist to facilitate exchange” (p.7), i.e. without the adjective 
‘social’, on the next page, he states: “And when economists speak of market 
structure, …, the influence of the social institutions which facilitate exchange [is] 
completely ignored.” (Coase, 1988, p.8). Therefore the definition explicitly adds 
the word ‘social’, to emphasize the fact that all market transactions are embedded 
in a social structure among traders (Baker, 1984; Granovetter, 1985). Social status 
among trading parties influences exchange processes (Podolny, 1993); it matters to 
people who the other party in a transaction is, beyond mere reputation effects 
(DiMaggio and Louch, 1998). 
The addition of “…by means of competition.” is due to Swedberg (1994), based 
on the work of Max Weber (1978 [1922]). This addition is important because not 
only is competition the element that distinguishes markets from other allocation 
mechanisms or processes (Polanyi, 1957), but more importantly it is competition 
that explicitly embodies the dynamic social structure view: competition occurs 
among social entities as they react to each other’s actions. 
 
6.2 A conceptual model of electronic markets 
The conceptual model of electronic markets developed in this section is a 
description of the phases in the exchange process that occur until the trading 
parties agree upon the terms of the trade.  Although the model does not explicitly 
include the phases of the exchange process that occur post-agreement (for instance 
logistics and payment and settlement, see Kambil and van Heck (1998)), implicitly 
they are taken into account in the trader’s decision processes regarding the terms 
of the trade. The model (see Figure 6.1 for an overview) is described starting from 
the market outcome and performance and then work back up the model through 
the information exchange processes and the information architecture of the market, 
eventually arriving at the influence of ICT.  
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Paragraph 1.2 defined market processes as the processes of information exchange 
that occur in the market and market outcome as the set of transactions that arises 
as a result of this market process.  
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates this for a market consisting of 3 buyers (B1 – B3), 4 sellers 
(S1 – S4) and 2 intermediaries (I1 – I2). In line with the focus on the information 
architecture and to prevent clutter, the other market process determinants are 
omitted from fig. 6.1, as is the direct effect of ICT on the information exchange 
processes (see also fig. 1.2). 
 
Market outcome and performance and information exchange processes  
The network of dotted lines indicates the information exchange processes among 
traders, such as the exchange of bids and asks. This process continues until it 
converges on agreement over the terms of the trade, i.e. a transaction, or until a 
trader stops communicating, effectively leaving the market. Based on the market 
rules regarding allocation and transaction validity, the process will eventually 
result in some market outcome, i.e. transactions. Performance criteria regarding 
market outcome and accompanying market process then determine market 
performance (see also paragraph 1.1). We thus have the following two 
propositions: 
 
Proposition 6.1: The information exchange processes among traders determine 
market outcome. 
 
Proposition 6.2: Market process and market outcome together determine market 
performance 
 
Information exchange processes and the market information set 
To see why information exchange determines market outcome, we have to look 
more closely at the decision processes of a trader. It is assumed that each trader 
arrives at the market with an initial willingness-to-pay (WTP) in the case of the 
buyer and an initial willingness-to-accept (WTA) in the case of the seller. These 
reflect each trader’s unique preference to buy or sell a certain product.  
.
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S1 
S3
I2 
B2
B1
I1
S2
B3
Information exchange processes among traders 
Information 
Architecture
S4 
Information and 
Communication 
Technology 
Market Outcome
Market rules (allocation 
and transaction validity) 
Market info. set: 
- Product info. 
- Transaction info. 
- Market state info. 
Market Performance
Performance Criteria 
Figure 6.1 A conceptual model of electronic markets 
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Trade is possible only if a buyer’s WTP exceeds a seller’s WTA. Therefore, the 
first step in trading is finding another trader with which a trade is potentially 
feasible, i.e. the search phase in Kambil and Van Heck (1998). A main function of 
exchanging information in a market is to locate such traders. This search process 
can take many forms, for instance publicly announcing the auction of a product or 
communicating one-on-one with other traders. 
 
This is not the only function of information exchange however. Although traders 
arrive at the market with an initial set of preferences (his WTA or WTP), there is 
usually considerable uncertainty surrounding the trading conditions. This is 
reflected in the possibility that a trader may update his preferences once new 
information arrives that reduces this uncertainty. For instance, a buyer (seller) may 
find out during the market process that the product he wants to buy (sell) is much 
more in demand than he initially thought. This implies that the buyer may need to 
adjust his initial WTP upwards if he wants to acquire the product (which could 
lead to the winners’ curse (Capen, Clapp and Campbell, 1971; Kagel and Levin, 
1986) or that the seller may adjust his WTA upwards to maximize his profit.  
A different example involves a buyer that finds out that the product he was 
initially looking for is unavailable. Assuming the buyer does not want to leave the 
market empty-handed, he will have to settle for a different product that is 
available. If he has not exhaustively specified his WTP for all (combinations of) 
alternatives in advance, he may need to construct his WTP on the spot if a 
satisfying product is offered for trade. More generally, the initial WTA and WTP 
of a trader are not fixed, but may be updated during the market process based on 
the information revealed. Other factors may play a role in this updating process as 
well. For instance, Malhotra and Murnighan (2000) show that substantial 
overbidding in the Chicago cow auctions cannot be explained by a rational choice 
model, but can by processes of escalation of commitment and competitive arousal 
among bidders. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to fully discuss how 
trader’s individual WTA or WTP change based on new information9, but it will 
look more closely at what type of information may cause belief updating.  
                                                           
9 However, the empirical validity of the belief-adjustment model (Hogarth and Einhorn, 
1992) in a wide variety of contexts suggests that this is a good starting point for an 
investigation of such WTA/WTP-updating. 
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This dissertation distinguishes between at least three types of information that are 
exchanged among traders and therefore can cause belief updating. These three 
categories combined are called the market information set, and it consists of 
product information, market process information and market state information. 
Product information (the focus of chapter 3 and also playing a role in chapter 4) 
consists of descriptive information about the product that is to be traded. It helps 
traders to reduce uncertainty regarding the quality of the product. Market process 
information (the focus of chapter 5) is transaction-specific information and can 
include information items such as the highest bid, rejected bids or trader identity. 
Although information items such as seller identity can be used to reduce product 
quality uncertainty by functioning as a substitute (e.g. reputation) for missing 
product information, the main function of this category of market information is to 
influence the competition process and the resulting WTA/WTP updating. The third 
category is market state information (see chapter 4), which is defined as public, 
non-transaction signals that influence trading behavior. Such signals give 
information about the overall state of the market, regardless of the conditions 
surrounding any individual transaction. Examples are the number of traders 
present in the market or the sound level in an open outcry market (Coval and 
Shumway, 2000). This category of information again influences the competition 
process, possibly resulting in WTA/WTP updating by traders.  
It is important to note that these different categories of the market information set 
serve different purposes and are therefore likely to have different effects on 
trading behavior (as the KOA study in chapter 4 showed). Aggregating 
information into a single dimension obscures the fact that information itself is a 
multidimensional construct10 and therefore should be treated as such. One cannot 
speak of the effects of ‘more’ information on market performance if such effects 
depend on which category of information is provided more. In short, we have the 
following proposition: 
 
                                                           
10 Milgrom and Weber (1982), in their seminal work on auction theory, were aware of this 
too: “To represent a bidder’s information by a single, real-valued signal is to make two 
substantive assumptions. Not only must his signal be a sufficient statistic for all of the 
information he possesses concerning the value of the object to him, it must also adequately 
summarize his information concerning the signals received by the other bidders.” 
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982, p.1097, footnote 14). They go on to note: “The derivation of 
such a statistic from several separate pieces of information is in general a difficult task…”. 
I therefore think that disaggregating a bidder’s information may be a fruitful approach. 
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Proposition 6.3: Traders exchange information from the market information set, 
which consists of at least three distinct categories of information: product 
information, market process information and market state information. Each 
category affects trading behavior differently. 
 
The market information set and information architecture 
 The market information set describes the information that potentially could be 
exchanged. In practice, there is imperfect information: certain types of information 
are simply unavailable, either by default (such as smell in an electronic market) or 
by choice of the market designer. Informally stated, the information architecture of 
the market describes which information is actually available to which traders in 
the market under investigation. It consists of general rules and specific rules. 
General rules are descriptive of certain groups of traders overall and are therefore 
invariant across trades. The fact that the external KOA-buyers in chapter 4 lack 
information regarding the market state that auction hall buyers do have is an 
example of a general rule. Specific rules are related to specific trades. They can 
specify that, like in the experiments in chapter 5, for some trades only the highest 
bid will be revealed, whereas for other trades all bids will be revealed. These two 
types of rules govern the actual processes of information exchange among traders: 
  
Proposition 6.4: The information architecture of the market influences the 
information exchange processes among traders by specifying which elements of 
the market information set are, or when and how they become available, to whom 
during the market process. 
 
Information architecture and ICT 
Having thus defined the role of the information exchange processes and 
information architecture in determining market outcome, we can now turn to the 
role of ICT. ICT is defined as “The infrastructure that makes it possible to store, 
search, retrieve, copy, filter, manipulate, view, transmit and receive information.” 
(Shapiro and Varian 1999, p.8). One important aspect of this definition is that it is 
much broader than just electronic forms of communication. Put in a different way, 
the definition says that as soon as information is actively involved, there is some 
form of ICT associated with it (the infrastructure). The implication is that it is not 
correct to talk about markets in terms of with or without ICT, but rather that the 
proper view is that of a market before and after a change in ICT. This leads to a 
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focus on what the change in ICT involves, i.e. which features of the ICT do 
actually change? (Griffith and Northcraft, 1994). A partial list of features that are 
involved in an ICT (adapted from Daft and Lengel (1986), Culnan and Markus 
(1987), Huber (1990) and Nass and Mason (1990)) is: media richness, location 
specificity (the need to be in a specific place in order to communicate), 
synchronicity of communication, speed of communication, addressing, data 
storage and archival functions, access control, anonymity and cost.  
This features-based approach (Griffith, 1999) is illustrated with a few simple 
examples. A regular phone and a mobile phone differ primarily in location 
specificity, whereas the main difference between email and a letter is in the speed 
of communication and in cost. Likewise, the difference between an extranet and 
the regular Internet is only in access control, since they both use the same 
underlying TCP/IP technology. Most electronic ICTs allow for addressing 
communication to a certain space (such as a bulletin board) for all to see, instead 
of addressing it to a person. The chief difference between email and chat-type 
ICTs such as IRC (Internet Relay Chat), ICQ and AOL Messenger is in the 
synchronicity of the communication. 
Just as information is a multidimensional concept, in which the different 
dimensions can have different effects, the discussion above illustrates that a 
similar case can be made for ICT: different features are likely to cause different 
effects. With respect to the research in this dissertation, changes in the following 
ICT features are distinguished:  
• location specificity 
• media richness 
• data storage and archival functions  
• access control.  
 
In the electronic markets literature, the effect of ICT has been mainly 
conceptualized as a reduction in transaction costs (Bakos, 1991, 1997) or 
somewhat broader, a reduction in coordination costs (Butler at al., 1997). In a 
more abstract sense, this reduction mainly occurs because ICT reduces the location 
specificity of market processes: in an electronic market one does not need to 
assemble in the same physical space to conduct market transactions. This in turn 
reduces travel costs and entry barriers to markets and makes it easier to search 
across markets (augmented by improved archival functions that make retrieving 
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market information easier), thus resulting in reduced transaction/coordination 
costs. The effects of reduced location specificity were one of the main drivers 
behind the results in chapter 4. 
A change in ICT also entails a change in the media richness of the communication 
channel. Media richness is the capacity of a medium for processing equivocal 
information, as determined by its capability for instant feedback, transmitting 
multiple cues, use of natural language and personal focus (Daft and Lengel, 1986). 
The results in chapter 3 can essentially be attributed to the reduced media richness 
of the electronic communication channel: compared to the physical 
‘communication’ of the flowers, bidders now lacked cues regarding color and 
freshness. This increased the equivocality of the message, thereby increasing the 
uncertainty over its interpretation, resulting in the price drop that was observed.  
Changes in ICT also entail changes in data storage and archival functions. The 
KOA-system in chapter 4 stored data for all 10 auction-clocks, thus allowing 
buyers to switch effortlessly from one auction to another. The auction software 
used for the experiments in chapter 5 kept track of each bidder’s bids in previous 
rounds, thus facilitating their decision processes. 
Certain ICTs also allow for various forms of access control: who gets access to 
what information. An unintended example of this occurred in the KOA-study, 
where internal KOA-buyers used the video security cameras to gain additional 
information about the auction process. The restrictions placed on the information 
revealed to bidders during the experiments in chapter 5 are also a form of access 
control: although full information on all received bids was available for all 
auctions throughout the whole experiment, only for half of the auctions did bidders 
have access to that information. In those experiments all bidders had the same 
access, but access control could also be manipulated such that for instance only 
one bidder has access to all submitted bids (an ‘insider’), whereas the other 
bidders only see the highest bid. 
The discussion above, while certainly not exhaustive, shows that reduced location 
specificity (and the resulting lower transaction costs) is only a small part of the 
total effect that ICT can have on market processes. Several other effects exist and 
they all deal with the different types of information that are becoming more (or 
less) available in an electronic market. In other words, they deal with changes in 
the information architecture of the market. This leads to the final proposition: 
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Proposition 6.5: ICT changes the information architecture of the market through 
changes in media richness, data storage and archival functions and access 
control. 
 
Viewing the model in a different way, ICT and market performance are linked 
through the following five steps: 
1. A change in ICT changes the information architecture of the market. 
(P6.5) 
2. The information architecture determines which elements of the market 
information set are (or become) available to traders during the market 
process. (P6.4) 
3. The market information set, as determined by the information 
architecture, affects the information exchange processes among traders 
(P6.3) 
4. The information exchange processes among traders result in a set of 
transactions, i.e. market outcome, based on the market rules regarding 
allocation and transaction validity. (P6.2) 
5. Market process and market outcome determine market performance, 
based on the specific performance criteria. (P6.1) 
 
6.3 The first validity check on the model 
The conceptual model in the previous paragraph was developed inductively by 
analytically generalizing from the causal relationships found in the individual 
studies to the more abstract level of electronic markets in general. Results were 
generalized over a number of dimensions: 
• from Dutch auctions to markets 
• from multidimensional auctions to markets 
• from two specific information architectures to information architecture in 
general 
• from screen auctioning to ICT 
• from KOA to ICT 
• from Anthurium flowers to generic products 
• from a lab setting to a general setting 
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Such a list raises questions about the validity of the model. This paragraph 
performs the first validity check by briefly reframing the three empirical studies of 
chapters 3-5 in terms of the five steps at the end of the previous paragraph. This 
should yield some provisional evidence of the internal validity of the model, i.e. 
that the causal inferences are correct. It should also demonstrate that the model, 
despite its generality, can indeed be fruitfully used to analyze specific electronic 
markets, as the first step towards establishing external validity.  
 
Screen auctioning 
1. There was a change in ICT, with the new ICT (screen auctioning) being 
lower in media richness due to electronic product representation instead of 
physical product representation. 
2. This reduced media richness of the electronic product representation 
entailed that certain cues regarding product quality such as stiffness of the 
stem and color (i.e. both elements of the market information set) are no 
longer available to bidders. 
3. As a consequence, bidders faced greater uncertainty regarding flower 
quality in their bidding. 
4. Bidders accounted for this increased uncertainty by bidding lower prices 
on average. 
5. Market performance in terms of market transparency decreased. Because 
of this, most likely not all the available information was reflected in 
prices, implying a decrease in informational efficiency. 
 
KOA 
1. There was a change in ICT, with the new ICT (KOA) entailing changes in 
data storage and archival functions (KOA-buyers vs. hall-buyers) as well 
as access control (hall-buyers and internal KOA-buyers vs. external KOA) 
and media richness. The direct ICT effects of reduced transaction costs are 
omitted in this paragraph. 
2. Both internal and external KOA-buyers faced lower search costs than hall-
buyers, due to improved data storage and retrieval, making it easier to 
switch among clocks. All bidders were faced with electronic product 
representation because the Anthuriums analyzed were already being 
screen-auctioned. However, the external KOA-bidders faced lower media 
richness than internal KOA-buyers and hall-buyers because they did not 
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have the option to go through the warehouse in the morning to inspect the 
flowers, thus potentially missing product cues such as color and stem 
stiffness (product quality information). The external KOA-buyers did not 
know the number of bidders present in the auction hall (market state 
information), something which the hall-buyers knew, as did the internal 
KOA-buyers because of the security camera system (a type of access 
control, albeit an unforeseen effect). 
3. External KOA-buyers faced greater uncertainty than other bidders 
regarding flower quality as well as regarding the number of bidders 
present. Both internal and external KOA-buyers had lower switching costs 
than hall-buyers due to increased market transparency.  
4. The lower switching costs/increased market transparency for internal 
KOA-buyers led them to bid lower prices on average than external KOA-
buyers and hall-buyers. The combined effect of increased quality 
uncertainty, increased market state uncertainty and lower switching costs 
for the external KOA-buyers was neutral: they paid the same prices as 
hall-buyers. 
5. Market performance in terms of market transparency increased. Because 
of this, most likely more of the available information was reflected in 
prices, leading to increased informational efficiency. 
 
Multidimensional auctions 
1. A change in the access control aspects of ICT changed the information 
architecture of the auction from restricted to unrestricted in the 
experiment. 
2. Instead of seeing only the highest bid at the end of each round (the 
restricted information architecture), in the unrestricted information 
architecture, bidders now saw all the bids that were submitted, ranked, and 
including the relative score based on the auctioneer’s scoring rule. 
3. Through the increased information about both the state of competition as 
well as bid taker’s preferences, bidders had more information about the 
direction in which to improve their bid in order to win the auction. 
4. This led to the winning bids in the unrestricted information architecture 
being significantly different from winning bids in identical auctions under 
a restricted information architecture. 
 107
5. Market performance improved significantly in the unrestricted information 
architecture, as measured by winner efficiency and Pareto optimality.  
 
Although by no means a complete and thorough test of the validity of the model, 
the analysis above suggests that the model passes some basic criteria for 
usefulness: the proposed causal inferences in the model concur with those in the 
three empirical studies and the model is general enough to encompass markets in 
both a field and a lab setting, yet the steps in the model are specific enough to 
highlight the ‘differences that make a difference’. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter developed a conceptual model of electronic markets, integrating 
various concepts from the previous chapter, centered on the notion of the 
information architecture of the market. It outlined how the information exchange 
processes lead to a market outcome and how these processes are affected by the 
information architecture. It then discussed how a change in ICT can affect market 
processes and in particular how many of these effects can be viewed as a change in 
the information architecture of the market. As the first check on the validity of the 
model, the three empirical studies were reframed in terms of the general model. 
This analysis suggests that the model has a degree of usefulness and parsimony 
that warrants further application in future studies, which should establish the 
degree of external validity of the model. 
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CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
This chapter concludes my thesis by summarizing in the first paragraph the main 
findings from my studies. Paragraph 2 describes the limitations of the research, 
and in the third paragraph some implications and areas for future research are 
outlined. 
 
7.1 Thesis findings and contribution 
As this thesis comprises of three separate studies within the methodological 
framework of multi-method research, this paragraph first discusses the findings for 
each detailed research question from paragraph 1.2 that motivated the respective 
study, before discussing the overall findings.  
 
The first study dealt the effects of one category of market information, product 
quality information, in the form of the following research question: 
 
(DRQ1): How does reduced product quality information affect market process, 
market outcome and market performance in an auction? 
 
This question was investigated in a case study at a large Dutch flower auction. The 
auction had introduced a new auction system in which participants lacked certain 
informational cues for product quality, such as flower color and flower freshness, 
which led to greater product quality uncertainty. Statistical analysis of transaction 
data before and after the introduction of this new auction system revealed that the 
increased product quality uncertainty led bidders to bid about 2% lower on 
average. Screen auctioning as such is not a fully electronic market as bidders still 
physically gather in the auction hall. However, it does represent an intermediate 
step towards such an electronic market as in both cases electronic product 
representation is involved. This study shows that one of the consequences of 
switching to an electronic market may be reduced availability of product quality 
information, which in turn has a negative impact on prices. 
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The second study dealt with the effects of another category of market information, 
market state information, as well as the consequences of reduced search and 
switching costs, by investigating the following research question: 
 
(DRQ2): How do reduced search and switching costs and reduced market state 
information affect market process, market outcome and market performance in an 
auction? 
 
This was studied in another case study at the same flower auction as the first 
research question. The auction allowed bidders to bid electronically from their 
home or office instead of being physically present in the auction hall (the KOA 
system). The electronic bidders bid in the exact same auctions at the same time as 
the bidders in the auction hall, so this allows for a detailed comparison between 
online bidders and offline bidders. While still not being a fully electronic market, 
KOA is a step beyond screen auctioning towards a fully electronic market, because 
now (in addition to electronic product representation) there are also electronic 
bidders present in the market.  
Electronic bidding brings a reduction in search and switching costs for the 
electronic bidders, but at the same time they lacked information about the state of 
the market such as the number of bidders present in the auction hall. A statistical 
comparison of electronic bidders and bidders in the auction hall revealed that 
electronic bidders paid lower prices on average, as predicted by Bakos (1991). 
Subsequent investigation showed that this reduced price hypothesis only held for 
the electronic bidders who had their offices on the auction hall complex (internal 
bidders). Electronic bidders that had their offices elsewhere (external bidders) paid 
the same prices as the bidders in the auction hall. One explanation for this 
somewhat surprising finding is that there is a selection bias at work that cannot be 
controlled for: internal and external bidders may differ in their bidding strategies 
or their general purchasing strategies (orderbook buyers vs. cherry-pickers). 
Another explanation is that the internal bidders, through the security camera 
system that they had access to, had non-transaction information about the state of 
the market that the external bidders lacked. In particular, the external bidders 
lacked accurate information about the number of bidders present, which increased 
uncertainty may have led them to pay a premium in their bids compared to the 
internal bidders. More generally speaking, reduced market state information 
increases bidder uncertainty regarding the optimal bid level, given his preferences. 
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This type of uncertainty may cause bidders to make conservative assumptions 
regarding these unknown variables, with conservative in the sense that it 
minimizes their chance of not receiving the product they want to acquire. This 
results in higher prices. In addition to showing that reduced transaction costs in 
electronic markets do indeed lead to lower prices, this second study highlighted 
the importance of market state information. A change in ICT may change the 
market state information available to participants in an electronic market and a 
preliminary hypothesis is that a reduction of market state information leads to 
higher prices. 
 
When moving from a market towards a fully electronic market, the physical 
components of the market processes gradually disappear as they are substituted by 
informational components. This implies that especially for electronic markets, the 
emphasis on the information exchange processes in the market becomes stronger 
and stronger, simply because that is all there is in an electronic market. This focus 
on information exchange processes in the first two studies led to the introduction 
of the concept information architecture of the market in the third study: the 
information architecture describes what type of information is, or when and how it 
becomes available, to whom during the market process.  
Whereas the first two studies dealt with the role of ICT in automating existing 
market processes, in the third study a new type of ICT-enabled auction mechanism 
was developed, called the multidimensional auction. In a multidimensional 
auctions, bidders bid not only on price, but on multiple dimensions such as quality, 
delivery time and warranty. This is particularly relevant in a procurement setting 
in which the specifics of the traded object are not as fixed as in a traditional sales 
auction. Coupled with the concept of information architecture, this led to the third 
research question that investigated a third category of market information, market 
process information: 
 
(DRQ3): What is the influence of a change in the information architecture of 
market process information on market process, outcome and performance in an 
electronic multidimensional auction? 
 
This question was investigated in two laboratory experiments in which student 
subjects bid in a series of Web-based, multi-round multidimensional auctions 
under different information architectures (restricted and unrestricted) as well as 
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varying numbers of rounds (2 and 4 rounds). The results from the experiments 
showed that both market performance measures, winner efficiency and Pareto 
optimality, increased if a less restrictive information architecture was employed or 
if the auction last more rounds. Both of these findings are in line with the 
hypothesized effects. A somewhat surprising finding was that there was a strong 
interaction effect between the two experimental manipulations: the unrestricted 
information architecture significantly increases efficiency and optimality only in 
the 2-round case. Similarly, increasing the number of rounds yields only 
significant efficiency and optimality improvements under a restricted information 
architecture. It seems to be that there are strongly diminishing marginal returns to 
information. A tentative explanation for this could be that individual bidding 
behavior follows the belief-adjustment model (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). The 
consequence is that information, despite being credible and correct, may not 
always be effective in changing bidding behavior. Bidders’ belief that the current 
highest bid is correct may simply be too strong to be swayed by any information. 
This implies that market performance will then remain at a sub-optimal level 
(Koppius and van Heck, 2001). In other words, there is a phenomenon of 
information saturation at work in the market: beyond a certain point, more 
information does not improve market performance any further. 
 
A more general point of this particular study is that it emphasizes the process 
nature of markets. For instance, in much of the auction literature the length of the 
auction process is treated as irrelevant (but see Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1988) for an 
example of how it could be incorporated) and the information available to bidders 
is exogenous to the auction process itself (see Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001) 
for a recent exception though). The experiments reported here show that, contrary 
to current theory, both these process-related factors have a significant influence on 
the auction outcome. 
 
The synthesis of the three studies is provided in the overall research question of 
this dissertation, which was: 
 
(ORQ) How does ICT influence the information architecture of the market and 
how does this affect electronic market process, electronic market outcome and 
electronic market performance? 
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As described above, the three empirical studies each highlight different aspects of 
the answer to this question. A more general and comprehensive answer to the 
overall research question is given in chapter 6, where the results in chapters 3-5 
are theoretically generalized into a conceptual model of electronic markets. 
Focusing on the information exchange processes among traders in a market, a 
model is constructed that incorporates ICT, information architecture, market 
processes and market outcome. The constructs are linked through several 
propositions, eventually relating ICT and market outcome through the following 
five steps: 
1. A change in ICT changes the information architecture of the market. 
(P6.5) 
2. The information architecture determines which elements of the market 
information set are (or become) available to traders during the market 
process. (P6.4) 
3. The market information set, as determined by the information architecture, 
affects the information exchange processes among traders (P6.3) 
4. The information exchange processes among traders result in a set of 
transactions, i.e. market outcome, based on the market rules regarding 
allocation and transaction validity. (P6.2) 
5. Market process and market outcome determine market performance, based 
on the specific performance criteria. (P6.1) 
 
Although the model as a whole would need a comprehensive empirical test before 
we can accept it, each of the links among the constructs in the model has been 
empirically established in one or more of the studies. Furthermore, as the first 
check on the validity of the model, the three empirical studies were reframed in 
terms of the general model. That analysis suggests that the model has a degree of 
usefulness and parsimony that warrants further application in future studies, which 
lends initial credence to the model as a theory of electronic markets.  
 
7.2 Limitations of the research 
The main goal of the dissertation was: “…to show that focusing on the information 
exchange processes in the market and in particular the concept of information 
architecture is a fruitful way to analyze markets, especially when dealing with the 
effects that ICT has on markets.” (paragraph 1.2). To achieve this goal, a multi-
 114
method approach was followed (Brewer and Hunter 1989), combining case studies 
followed by a laboratory experiment. Such sequential triangulation allows the 
findings of one study to inform the following, thus refining the research. The 
combination of case studies and experiments combines the main strengths of both 
methods: high external validity for the case study and high internal validity for the 
experiments. This should ensure that the concept of information architecture has 
greater validity than when investigated with a single method. Despite that, there 
are some limitations to the research. 
The case studies at the flower auction were primarily quantitative, dealing with 
transaction data on prices. Although discussions with auction personnel and 
several bidders partially informed the studies, it is possible that other factors 
influenced bidding behavior, which could distort the results. In particular, the 
general purchasing strategy that bidders follow could have an influence on bidding 
behavior, as the discussion at the end of chapter 4 showed. Since no data was 
available to control for that factor, there remains a possibility of selection bias if 
KOA-buyers follow different purchasing strategies than the buyers in the auction 
hall or are different on other aspects that could influence their bidding behavior. 
Furthermore, the hypotheses in both studies were tested using data from a single 
type of flower, the Anthurium. On one hand, this is a strength of the research, 
because this flower was the only one for which the screen auctioning technology 
in chapter 3 was introduced before the KOA technology of chapter 4, which 
allowed me to separate methodologically the effects of product quality information 
from the combined effects of reduced transaction costs and reduced market state 
information. On the other hand, it represents a limitation, because it is possible 
that the results that were found are specific for Anthuriums only. Each flower has 
different characteristics that are important to buyers, so it is possible that my 
results do not generalize to other flowers or non-flower products. However, 
framing the results in generalized theoretical terms such as product quality 
information and market state information suggests that they could be relevant in 
other cases as well. Whether or not they are is subject to further empirical testing.  
The experiments conducted in chapter 5 yielded conclusive evidence that 
information architecture matters in multidimensional auctions, but at the same 
time it is only a small step towards establishing the general validity of that 
construct as it was only tested for a specific variant of a multidimensional auction. 
Therefore, how much of the effect of information architecture is due to the specific 
nature of this multidimensional auction is open to question. In particular, the 
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cognitive complexity of multidimensional bidding places greater emphasis on the 
availability of certain information and it is possible that in simpler, single-
dimensional auctions, information architecture might play a smaller role. A 
limitation with regards to the multidimensional auction itself is that it was tested 
only in a particular laboratory environment, which may limit the generalizability 
to the variety of (multidimensional) auctions that occur in practice. 
 
7.3 Implications and further research 
The first main contribution of this dissertation is establishing information 
architecture as a significant factor shaping market performance. Information 
architecture to a large extent shapes the information exchange processes that occur 
in a market. Such processes are more than just descriptive labels of what happens 
in a market, this dissertation showed that they are in fact crucial to understanding 
why markets behave the way they do. Therefore an important implication of this 
dissertation, both for researchers and market designers, is that any analysis or 
design of a market will be incomplete without a thorough analysis of the 
information exchange processes. The concept of information architecture can 
provide a useful framework for such an analysis. A particularly interesting finding 
is the information saturation phenomenon that seems to be at work in the markets 
in chapter 5, which could have important implications for regulations regarding 
market transparency. If markets do indeed become saturated with information at a 
certain point, so revealing more information beyond the information saturation 
point does not improve market performance any further, it suggests that maximum 
market transparency may not be as necessary for good market performance as 
perhaps sometimes thought. 
 
A second main contribution of this dissertation is to provide a more detailed look 
at how ICT influences markets. Most work to date on electronic markets has been 
done from a transaction cost perspective. This dissertation shows that ICT can 
have a variety of effects in addition to reduced transaction costs. Many of these 
other effects are related to changes in the various types of information that are 
available to participants in an electronic market, in other words: a change in 
information architecture. Therefore future work on electronic markets should 
augment a transaction cost analysis with an information architecture analysis.  
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The third main contribution of this dissertation is to provide one of the first 
comprehensive conceptual models of electronic markets by relating ICT, 
information architecture and market processes and outcome. Previous authors have 
looked at one or more isolated variables without relating them to an overall model 
of electronic markets, but additional theorizing is necessary to arrive at a coherent 
theory of electronic markets. The model presented in this dissertation is the first 
step in that direction. 
 
Despite these contributions, much more work remains to be done. Different types 
of auctions need to be researched to establish more broadly the validity of the 
information architecture construct. Different types of information architectures 
need to be investigated to check their influence on winner efficiency and Pareto 
optimality, as well as other market performance measures such as speed of 
convergence or perceived fairness of the market.  
More attention needs to be paid to individual bidding behavior as well. Degeratu, 
Rangaswamy and Wu (2000) showed that shopping behavior online is 
qualitatively different from traditional shopping behavior, particularly in terms of 
how different types of information were incorporated into the shopping decision, 
so it is quite likely that online bidding behavior will be different from traditional 
bidding behavior. The studies in chapter 3 and 4 only scratch the surface of this 
topic. A particularly fruitful approach would be to incorporate more results from 
behavioral decision theory (e.g. Anderson, 1981; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Hogarth, 
1987). A better understanding of the decision processes of traders in a market is 
likely to lead to a better understanding of their behavior at the aggregate level of 
the market. 
Last, but by no means least, the concept of multidimensional auctions merits much 
further research. As organizations become more customer-oriented (Vervest and 
Dunn, 2000) and customer preferences instead of producer capabilities become the 
starting point for a transaction, the traditional supply chain gets turned on its head 
and becomes a demand web where organizations compete to fulfill the demand of 
the customer. Coordinating this process through a win-lose mechanism such as a 
one-dimensional auction is only a stopgap measure. Consumer demand is 
multidimensional, as should the auction be. 
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APPENDIX I: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Note: the experiment was carried out in Dutch. This is the translated version of the 
instructions. 
 
In this experiment, you are the owner of a company that produces hydrochloric 
acid. Your customers are other chemical companies (the buyers) who need 
hydrochloric acid regularly for their production process. You play the role of 
supplier, i.e. the seller. Transactions occur through an auction mechanism, where 
you as seller play the role of the bidder. 
 
Your bid consists of three elements: delivery time (t), contamination (c) and price 
(p), that you can enter later on the input screen. There you will also find a 
‘PROFIT’ button. If you press that, it calculates how much profit you would make 
if you were to place that particular bid. Bidding itself is done by pressing the 
‘BID’ button. 
 
Your profit is being calculated based on the price and your internal production 
costs. You have in front of you a table with your own internal production costs for 
several combinations of delivery time and contamination (as well as the general 
formula that is being used for it). As you will see, for each bidder the costs rise the 
faster the delivery time and/or the less contamination, however, the exact costs are 
different for each bidder and you should keep those secret. 
 
The auction occurs in rounds. In every round you have to place a bid. At the end of 
each round, you receive information about the highest bid so far and perhaps some 
other information, after which you can place a new bid. The winner is the one who 
at the end of the last round has the highest bid overall. This is the highest bid from 
all rounds so far, so not necessarily the highest bid in the last round. 
 
The highest bid is determined by the scoring rule of the auctioneer (the buyer) that 
trades price, contaminations and delivery time off against each other. In each 
auction, the buyer/auctioneer makes a different tradeoff, which causes the optimal 
bid to be at a different combination of variables each time. The exact scoring rule 
that is being used, is kept secret. Each auction represents a new buyer with a new 
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scoring rule, which changes from auction to auction, but remains the same for each 
round within a specific auction. 
 
When the auction ends, the winner earns the profit he made on his bid (the losing 
bidders earn nothing). At the end of the experiment, each participant will receive 
double his total earnings in guilders, in addition to a participation fee of 10 
guilders (approx. US$ 4.00). 
 
Good luck! 
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APPENDIX II: DATASET EXPERIMENTS 
 
The table on the next page lists the results dataset for the two experiments. The 
variables in the columns have the following meaning: 
• ExpNo = the experiment number, (I) original, (II) replication 
• Rounds = the number of rounds in the auction 
• I.A. = information architecture, 1 = restricted, 11 = unrestricted 
• UserID = ID of the winning bidder 
• Round = the round in which the winning bid was made 
• Profit = the profit that the wining bidder made 
• Score = the absolute score of the winning bid (all scores were negative due 
to the –p2 factor in the scoring rule; bidders only saw the relative score in 
percentages) 
• VarA = contamination dimension of the winning bid 
• OptA = contamination dimension of the bid with the maximum possible 
score 
• VarB = delivery time dimension of the winning bid 
• OptB = delivery time dimension of the bid with the maximum possible 
score 
• VarC = price dimension of the winning bid 
• OptC = price dimension of the bid with the maximum possible score (and 
a positive margin for the bidder) 
• TotEff, Eff, NPareto, Pareto, NParPlus, ParPlus = dependent variables 
(see paragraph 5.5 for definitions) 
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ExpN
o 
R
ounds 
I.A. 
U
serID
 
R
ound 
Profit 
Score 
VarA 
O
ptA 
VarB 
O
ptB 
VarC
 
O
ptC
 
TotEff 
Eff 
N
Pareto 
Pareto 
N
par-
plus 
Parplus 
I 2 1 3 2 1 -921 4 2 2 5 82 71 1 0 22 0 16 0 
II 2 1 3 2 3 -958 5 2 3 5 75 71 0.875 0 250 0 237 0 
I 2 11 5 2 2 -902 2 2 2 5 85 71 0.75 0 0 1 0 1 
II 2 11 2 2 3 -933 3 2 4 5 74 71 0.375 0 78 0 69 0 
I 4 1 5 4 3 -904 2 2 2 5 86 71 0.75 0 0 1 0 1 
II 4 1 2 4 4 -912 3 2 3 5 80 71 0.625 0 2 0 0 1 
I 4 11 5 4 3 -904 2 2 2 5 86 71 0.75 0 0 1 0 1 
II 4 11 2 4 2 -909 3 2 2 5 85 71 0.875 0 3 0 1 0 
I 2 1 5 2 3 -903 2 4 1 3 90 75 0.75 0 49 0 37 0 
II 2 1 2 2 3 -891 5 4 3 3 74 75 0.125 0 3 0 1 0 
I 2 11 5 2 2 -889 4 4 3 3 77 75 0 1 0 1 0 1 
II 2 11 5 2 3 -891 4 4 3 3 78 75 0 1 0 1 0 1 
I 4 1 2 4 2 -886 4 4 3 3 76 75 0 1 0 1 0 1 
II 4 1 2 4 2 -887 3 4 3 3 78 75 0.125 0 1 0 0 1 
I 4 11 2 4 2 -886 4 4 3 3 76 75 0 1 0 1 0 1 
II 4 11 2 4 2 -886 4 4 3 3 76 75 0 1 0 1 0 1 
I 2 1 3 2 5 -897 6 8 1 1 84 75 0.25 0 11 0 7 0 
II 2 1 3 2 4 -897 9 8 2 1 71 75 0.375 0 18 0 12 0 
I 2 11 5 2 2 -885 8 8 1 1 77 75 0 1 0 1 0 1 
II 2 11 5 2 3 -890 9 8 1 1 76 75 0.125 0 3 0 1 0 
I 4 1 5 4 2 -895 5 8 1 1 83 75 0.375 0 17 0 12 0 
II 4 1 3 3 3 -885 8 8 1 1 77 75 0 1 0 1 0 1 
I 4 11 3 4 1 -888 6 8 1 1 80 75 0.25 0 9 0 6 0 
II 4 11 3 3 3 -893 6 8 1 1 82 75 0.25 0 11 0 7 0 
I 2 1 3 2 1 -848 7 10 3 4 67 53 0.625 0 24 0 17 0 
II 2 1 2 2 2 -850 7 10 3 4 68 53 0.625 0 27 0 20 0 
I 2 11 3 2 2 -842 9 10 3 4 64 53 0.375 0 4 0 1 0 
II 2 11 3 2 3 -859 8 10 2 4 72 53 0.75 0 51 0 37 0 
I 4 1 3 4 2 -846 7 10 4 4 63 53 0.375 0 11 0 5 0 
II 4 1 4 4 3 -845 9 10 3 4 65 53 0.375 0 11 0 7 0 
I 4 11 2 4 2 -837 10 10 4 4 56 53 0 1 0 1 0 1 
II 4 11 5 4 1 -855 9 10 2 4 70 53 0.625 0 21 0 13 0 
I 2 1 3 2 4 -869 7 8 2 4 75 60 0.625 0 32 0 22 0 
II 2 1 4 2 2 -862 7 8 3 4 71 60 0.375 0 15 0 10 0 
I 2 11 2 2 3 -864 5 8 4 4 69 60 0.375 0 23 0 15 0 
II 2 11 3 2 6 -864 8 8 3 4 70 60 0.25 0 4 0 2 0 
I 4 1 4 4 4 -864 8 8 3 4 70 60 0.25 0 8 0 5 0 
II 4 1 5 4 4 -870 6 8 3 4 75 60 0.5 0 9 0 4 0 
I 4 11 3 3 2 -851 7 8 4 4 63 60 0.125 0 0 1 0 1 
II 4 11 4 3 2 -859 8 8 3 4 68 60 0.25 0 7 0 4 0 
I 2 1 3 2 3 -1014 6 2 3 2 72 84 0.75 0 1079 0 
105
7 0 
II 2 1 5 2 4 -935 2 2 4 2 79 84 0.5 0 108 0 99 0 
I 2 11 5 2 2 -902 2 2 2 2 85 84 0 1 0 1 0 1 
II 2 11 2 2 3 -910 3 2 3 2 79 84 0.375 0 2 0 0 1 
I 4 1 2 4 2 -908 2 2 3 2 81 84 0.25 0 0 1 0 1 
II 4 1 2 3 5 -935 2 2 4 2 79 84 0.5 0 73 0 65 0 
I 4 11 5 4 3 -904 2 2 2 2 86 84 0 1 0 1 0 1 
II 4 11 5 2 1 -906 2 2 3 2 80 84 0.25 0 9 0 5 0 
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APPENDIX III: AN OVERVIEW OF THEORIES OF THE MARKET 
 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to give an overview of the various theories of the 
market that exist in the literature, in order to identify relevant factors that should 
be included in a theory of electronic markets. 
 
Theories of the market can be distinguished along two separate dimensions: 
whether a market is viewed as a state or as a process and whether markets are 
primarily viewed as allocation mechanisms or as social structures. The 
state/allocation mechanism view has traditionally been the province of 
neoclassical economics, industrial organization and the economics of information, 
the state/social structure view that of (economic) sociology and new institutional 
economics and parts of the marketing literature. Process/allocation mechanism 
views are particularly associated with Austrian economics, but the emergent 
literature on market microstructure tends to take a process perspective as well. The 
process/social structure view does not have a specific body of theory associated 
with it, but the articles that espouse such a view can be found mainly in the 
marketing and management literature (see Table A.III.1). Please note that this 
classification only intends to show where the main body of knowledge regarding a 
particular market view resides and it should not be interpreted the other way 
round. It is intended as the first step towards making sense of the wide variety of 
literature on markets by showing the main underlying dimensions on which the 
views differ. The next sections each describe one of the cells in this table, after 
which the final section summarizes.  
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Table A.III.0.1 Classification of theories of markets and their main literature 
counterparts 
 
Dynamic 
Austrian Economics 
Market Microstructure 
Various/scattered 
(Management, Marketing) 
N
at
ur
e 
of
 th
eo
ry
 
Static 
Neoclassical Economics 
Industrial Organization 
Economics of Information 
Economic Sociology 
New Institutional Economics 
Marketing 
Allocation mechanism Social structure 
 
View of market 
 
 
Markets as a static allocation mechanism 
The canonical market model is that of neoclassical economics, which is rooted in 
the definitions originally set forth by Cournot and Marshall: 
 
“Economists understand by the term Market, not any particular market 
place in which things are bought and sold, but the whole region in which 
buyers and sellers are in such free intercourse with one another that the 
prices of the same goods tend to equality easily and quickly.” (Cournot, 
1927 [1838]) 
 
“The more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the tendency for the 
same price to be paid for the same thing at the same time in all the parts of 
the market.” (Marshall, 1961 [1920]) 
 
Two cornerstones of these definitions (although not explicit in the quotes cited 
above) are the assumptions of perfect information and perfect competition. Perfect 
information means that all actors in the market automatically and costlessly have 
all the relevant information necessary to determine their market processes. Perfect 
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competition means that buyers and sellers are so small, relative to the size of the 
market, that none of them can affect the market price. Without these, the ‘law of 
one price’ as described in Cournot and Marshall’s definitions cannot hold. This 
model is of course an ideal type and is not particularly likely to occur in the real 
world and even in markets that closely approximate this ideal type, price behavior 
is found that is inconsistent with the neoclassical predictions (Baker, 1984; 
Graddy, 1995).  
 
Therefore, economists started to relax the assumptions of perfect competition and 
perfect information, resulting in the fields of Industrial Organization (IO, mainly 
focusing on imperfect competition) and economics of information (mainly 
focusing on imperfect information). While much progress has been made in both 
fields in analyzing specific situations, there is a lack of general results, as 
illustrated by the following two quotes: 
 
“…the status of the theory of oligopoly is that of exemplifying theory. We 
know that a lot of things can happen. We do not have a full, coherent 
theory of what must happen or a theory that tells us how what happens 
depends on well-defined, measurable variables. […] We need a 
generalizing theory as to how that context influences the outcome.” (Fisher, 
1989, p. 118, emphasis in original) 
 
“Since results often seem to depend, so sensitively, on the particular 
information assumptions employed, how are we to know what is the 
correct model?” (Stiglitz, 2000, p.1470) 
 
Therefore, a full survey of all the results obtained in the IO and economics of 
information literature is beyond the scope of this chapter, especially since several 
textbooks in IO, economics of information and game theory exist, in particular 
Tirole (1988) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).  
 
A third implicit assumption of the perfect market is that traders act as maximizing 
their (expected) utility. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) later formalized 
this notion. This assumption of ‘rationality’ of economic man has been intensely 
debated, particularly from a psychological point of view, and the three most 
prominent criticisms are described below.  
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Simon (1955) argued that in reality, humans have limited information-processing 
capacity and thus are subject to bounded rationality, which leads to satisficing 
behavior instead of maximizing behavior. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
demonstrated a wide variety of cognitive phenomena that underlie human choice 
behavior (such as the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953)) that are inconsistent with 
expected utility maximizing behavior. They formulated their famous prospect 
theory as an alternative, descriptive theory of human choice under risk. Another 
criticism centered on the ambiguity (or uncertainty11) involved in many economic 
decisions (Ellsberg, 1961). Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) proposed a model of 
ambiguity aversion to deal with such situations.  
All three models above have found widespread empirical support as an improved 
model of individual choice behavior (Camerer and Weber, 1992). While many 
economists acknowledge the superior descriptive validity of those models, they 
maintain that at the market level, i.e. the aggregation of a set of individual choices, 
expected utility does predict well (Plott, 1986).  
A few experimental tests of this aggregate rationality hypothesis have been 
conducted, that have produced mixed, but generally supportive evidence. Camerer 
(1987) studied individual probability judgments and found that their accuracy in 
market settings (compared to individual settings) improved, particularly as 
subjects became more experienced, although it did not disappear completely. Gode 
and Sunder (1993) conducted a fascinating computer simulation study to 
investigate aggregate rationality in double auctions (the canonical market 
prototype used in laboratory experiments). In principle, their software agents 
submitted random bids or asks. They then imposed a budget constraint, i.e. agents 
were not allowed to sell below their cost or buy above their value, but no further 
restrictions regarding profit maximization or learning (such are expected to lay a 
role in human trading behavior) were imposed. The results of the markets with 
these ‘zero-intelligence traders’ were virtually indistinguishable from the results 
with human traders and they conclude that markets “…may generate aggregate 
rationality not only from individual rationality, but also from individual 
                                                           
11 One way of relating risk, uncertainty and ambiguity is the following: when the 
probabilities of each outcome are known, there is risk, but when they are unknown, there is 
uncertainty or ambiguity (the two are often used interchangeably). From a subjective 
expected utility perspective, a distinction between known and unknown probabilities is 
meaningless, because subjective probabilities are always known to the decision-maker, but 
empirical evidence suggests that the distinction is meaningful (Camerer, 1995).   
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irrationality.” (Gode and Sunder, 1993, p. 136, emphasis added). Put differently, 
their results suggest that the allocation mechanism itself (in their case, the double 
auction), when coupled with a simple budget constraint, can be an important 
determinant of performance, relatively independent of the participants in that 
mechanism. Evans (1997) studied violations of the betweenness axiom of expected 
utility in markets and found that fewer and also less severe violations occurred in a 
market setting. However, she argued that this may be not so much due to induced 
rationality by competition, but rather to the statistical role of markets as 
aggregating price to a single statistic such as the winning bid, which lends further 
support to Gode and Sunder’s conclusion. In this regard, compare also recent work 
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who show that in a setting where both competitive 
and cooperative players exist, the microeconomic mechanism can determine which 
type of behavior will prevail in equilibrium. 
Myagkov and Plott (1997) tested a slightly modified version of prospect theory in 
a market setting and they found considerable support for the occurrence of risk-
seeking behavior when faced with losses, which is a central element of prospect 
theory. However, they also found that prices did eventually converge to the 
equilibrium predicted by expected utility models, thus lending additional support 
to the aggregate rationality hypothesis. Finally, Sarin and Weber (1994) tested the 
Einhorn-Hogarth (1986) ambiguity model in a market setting and found support 
for the hypothesis of ambiguity aversion in markets, i.e. subjects paid less for 
ambiguous assets. 
 
The discussion on aggregate rationality is also echoed in the debate on the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), (Fama, 1970). The EMH states that at any 
given point in time, markets incorporate all relevant information in prices, thus 
resulting in an (informationally) efficient market that yields equilibrium prices. If 
‘all relevant information’ is interpreted as reflecting all private information, a 
market is strong-form efficient, if it is interpreted as reflecting all publicly 
available information, a market is semi-strong-form efficient (the common 
interpretation of the EMH). In response to criticism from behavioral finance 
researchers, who for instance argue that the stock market overreacts (DeBondt and 
Thaler, 1985) and therefore can not be efficient, Fama argued that such 
overreactions are chance results and that on aggregate, markets are efficient 
(Fama, 1998). 
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Markets as a dynamic allocation process 
The view of markets as a state depends crucially on the fact that markets are 
presumed to be in equilibrium. Austrian economics, particularly through the 
writings of Hayek (1945, 1978), Mises (1949) and Kirzner (1973, 1997), takes 
issue with this static description of markets and emphasizes the dynamic, process 
nature of a market. In the Austrian view, or market-process-theory as it has 
become known recently, markets are never in equilibrium, even though they may 
be moving towards an equilibrium (some Austrian economists are even more 
radical and dispute this teleological point, see for instance Buchanan and Vanberg 
(1992) and Lachmann (1986)). In the Austrian view, a theory of markets should 
not focus on the properties of equilibria, but instead on market behavior in 
disequilibrium, in other words: on the market process.  
Crucial to the market-process-theory is what Hayek termed ‘the knowledge 
problem’: 
 
“The economic problem of society […] is a problem of the utilization of 
knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.” (Hayek, 1945, p. 
520) 
 
Hayek then argued that the price system is perfectly suited to communicating this 
widely dispersed knowledge, as prices convey all the relevant knowledge to the 
decision makers. This statement has subsequently become known as the ‘Hayek 
Hypothesis’ and has received considerable experimental support (Smith, 1982). 
Although both stress the sufficiency of prices in communicating information, the 
distinction with the Efficient Market Hypothesis is worth noting. In the EMH, the 
market is perceived to be in equilibrium and as all relevant information is 
incorporated in that equilibrium, there is no telling what the price will do next and 
it will tend to follow a random walk. In the Hayekian view however, price still 
communicates all the relevant information, but it communicates it to the decision-
maker, who then must decide how to act upon this information. Because of a 
change in the economic system, prices change and local decision-makers must 
adapt their behavior. This emphasizes the process nature of the market.  
A second crucial aspect market-process theory, particularly through the works of 
Kirzner (1973, 1997) is that of the interrelated concepts ‘ignorance’ and 
‘entrepreneurial discovery’, which will be described below. As a market is in 
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disequilibrium, this means that some of the knowledge necessary for utility 
maximization (which would restore market equilibrium) is unavailable. This 
unavailability is of a different kind than that in the search models of information 
economics (such as Stigler (1961)), where decision-makers can specify the set of 
possible outcomes in advance and attach consistent probabilities to them. Rather, 
this unavailability refers to the fact that the decision-maker is unaware that 
knowledge relevant to his decision even exists, which is what is meant by 
ignorance (Kirzner, 1973; Ikeda, 1990). In market-process theory, it is the 
entrepreneur who discovers such previously unknown information and it is this 
entrepreneurial discovery that is the driving force behind price adjustments in the 
market. Entrepreneurship in this sense can be thought of as alertness to perceived 
profit opportunities. And even though an entrepreneur does not know what new 
information to expect (or even if he should expect new information at all!), he is 
aware of the possibility of being surprised by new information and thus is alert for 
such discoveries. Note that the concept of ignorance implies that, since not all the 
relevant information is available, discovered information may point away from the 
equilibrium, thus leading to entrepreneurial mistakes. 
Market-process theory has long resisted formalization, partly due to a very critical 
stance of market-process theorists towards mathematical modelling in general (see 
Foss (2000) for a signal that this may change) and partly because the mathematical 
tools for dealing with ignorance and discovery were lacking. However, recently 
Yates (2000) has constructed a formal model of the market process, outlined the 
conditions under which the market process converges to equilibrium and showed 
that this equilibrium has quite different welfare properties compared to the static 
Walrasian equilibrium.  
 
In the last two decades, a different stream of literature (coming mainly from 
finance researchers) has also emphasized this process aspect under the heading of 
market microstructure. Not satisfied with the elegant but simple model of 
neoclassical economics, particularly when confronted with the wide variety of 
financial markets and trading mechanisms that exist, they developed an alternative 
process view of markets based around the tenet that: 
 
“If trading involves more than simply matching supplies and demand in 
equilibrium, then the trading mechanism may have an importance of its 
own.” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 4-5) 
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Of particular interest in market microstructure are two different roles of 
information in determining the market process. The first role is information that 
traders may or may not have a priori, i.e. heterogeneously informed traders 
(Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Important questions in this regard are how much 
profit informed traders can make from their superior information and how quickly 
(if at all) their information is indirectly revealed to the uninformed traders through 
the trades of the informed traders. A second important role of information is the 
information that is directly revealed by the trading mechanism, i.e. the issue of 
market transparency. Central questions are how revealing trading information such 
as order flow information (Madhavan, 1992), quotes (Biais, 1993) and trader 
identity (Forster and George, 1992) influences trading behavior and market 
performance.  
In general, market microstructure research has succeeded in highlighting the 
conundrum “the devil is in the details”. Seemingly innocuous assumptions in the 
analytical models about the details of trading mechanisms and what information 
traders (can) have, turn out to matter a great deal in determining market process. 
However, the other side of this coin is that (much like the case in the IO and 
economics of information literature cited above) as a consequence general results 
do not seem to exist: 
 
“…the complexity of many performance issues defies easy 
characterization, and the simplifications needed to ensure tractable 
analyses limit the generality of the resulting policy recommendations.” 
(O’Hara, 1995, p. 252) 
 
Recent work in experimental finance (Flood, Huisman, Koedijk and Mahieu, 
2000; Bloomfield and O’Hara, 2000) looks to shed some light on which analytical 
models correspond to actual market processes. 
 
Markets as a static social structure 
One critique on the economic theories of markets came from New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), particularly through the works of Coase, Williamson and North, 
who looked at the market as a special kind of (social) institution. Institutions are 
defined as “…the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic 
and social interaction.” (North, 1991). At the basis of New Institutional Economics 
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are the observations that humans are boundedly rational and that at least some 
humans are inclined towards opportunism (Williamson, 1975, 1985). The former 
gives rise to search costs, i.e. locating potential buyers and sellers (see Stigler, 
1961) and measurement costs, i.e. verifying that the product to be acquired has the 
desired qualities (see Barzel, 1982). The latter gives rise to enforcement costs, i.e. 
ensuring that the contract is executed honestly (Williamson, 1985). Without proper 
institutional arrangements to at least partially alleviate such costs, market 
processes cannot function, which results in a view of the market as an institution in 
its own right (Coase, 1988). Some of the institutional arrangements necessary are 
the establishment of property rights, law and law enforcement, reputation 
mechanisms and product description standards. The main goal of these institutions 
is to reduce the amount and imperfection of information necessary for a 
transaction to take place (thus ameliorating problems of bounded rationality) and 
to provide incentives for honest behavior and/or deterrents for dishonest behavior 
(thus ameliorating problems of opportunism). Although institutional change is a 
central theme in NIE (North, 1991), in the actual literature most institutions are 
presumed to be fairly stable and tend to be analyzed in terms of the economic 
problem it solved, giving rise to a rather static view of institutions. 
 
Another important criticism of viewing markets solely as allocation mechanisms is 
that the atomized conception of hyperrational market actors in that view is 
unrealistic.  Not just incorrect from a psychological perspective (see the discussion 
above about individual and aggregate rationality), but particularly incomplete from 
a sociological perspective. Markets are populated by humans, who have not only 
preferences, but also values and norms and most importantly, social relations to 
other market actors (Baker, 1984; Granovetter, 1985; and for auctions in 
particular, Smith (1989)). To put it succinctly, markets do not exist in a vacuum. 
As Granovetter has pointed out, even though social concepts such as customs, 
habits and norms certainly influence economic processes, it is not enough to 
postulate them as simple determinants of economic action. For doing so would 
also decouple individuals from their social context and hence introduce an 
oversocialized form of atomization:  
 
“In the undersocialized account, atomization results from narrow pursuit 
of self-interest; in the oversocialized one, from the fact that behavioral 
patterns have been internalized […]. That the internalized rules of 
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behavior are social in origin does not differentiate this argument 
decisively from a utilitarian one […]. Under- and oversocialized 
resolutions of the problem of order thus merge in their atomization of 
actors from their immediate social context.” (Granovetter 1985, p.485) 
 
The main contribution from (economic) sociologists is that market processes is 
closely embedded in networks of interpersonal or interfirm relations, i.e. a market 
is a social structure. Around the same time, both White (1981) and Baker (1984) 
showed empirically that introducing a social structural perspective (in the form of 
networks) can explain certain aspects of market processes (particularly the 
occurrence of certain trading patterns) that traditional economic analysis cannot. 
White focused on the provocative, yet rarely addressed question “Where do 
markets come from?” (the title of his 1981 paper) and the related questions of why 
certain markets persist or fail. His key insight was that: 
 
“Markets are not defined by a set of buyers […] nor are the producers 
obsessed with speculations on an amorphous demand. I insist that what a 
firm does in a market is to watch the competition in terms of observables.” 
(White, 1981, p. 518) 
 
The observables that are signaled or communicated consist of the revenue that a 
certain firm received for volume shipped. The set of these observables (one for 
each firm in the market) collectively define a ‘market schedule’, which can be 
viewed as a generalization of price. Based on this market schedule, heterogeneous 
firms try to find market niches (‘roles’) for their differentiated products such that 
these roles are sustainable, i.e. the market schedule is reproduced by their actions. 
Based on the parameters of producer cost schedules and buyer valuation schedules 
(both dependent on volume and quality), White showed that it is only a restricted 
set of parameters that can lead to sustainable market schedules and illustrated it 
using data from a number of US industries. Supply equalling demand is an 
outcome of his model, not the defining characteristic it is in most economic 
models. Thus casting markets in terms of relations among producers, he opened 
the door for a social structural analysis of markets. 
The second important contribution came from Baker (1984), who investigated 
floor trading on a major securities exchange. Although securities market most 
closely approximate the ideal type of atomized, rational actors in economic theory, 
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Baker showed that that market could be characterized as a social structure, because 
(at least) two very different types of networks among traders could be 
distinguished, a sparse and a dense one. Moreover, he showed that these distinct 
social structural patterns “…dramatically influenced the direction and magnitude 
of price volatility.” (Baker, 1984, p. 803), with the dense network having a much 
lower price volatility than the sparse network. 
Burt (1992) later extended the social structural view to an analysis of competition 
in a wide variety of contexts, when he showed that actors occupying a network 
position that is rich in structural holes, i.e. fulfilling a bridging function between 
distinct parts of the network, have significant competitive advantages. All these 
models share the precept that social structure is a determinant of market processes 
that had been neglected in economic theory, not just for businesses, but also for 
individual consumers (DiMaggio and Louch, 1998).  
 
Although not phrased as a critique of the economic models of markets or drawing 
on the sociological models described above, recent research in marketing 
(although it can be traced back to the early work of Bagozzi (1974, 1975)) has 
been developing along the same lines. Emphasizing in particular the relationship 
aspect of the exchanges that occur among traders in markets, research has focused 
on non-economic determinants of particular types of exchange relationships. For 
instance, in high-speed environments, buyers are more likely to stick to existing 
suppliers (Heide and Weiss, 1995). Podolny (1993, 1994) showed that status was 
an important determinant of which tiers existed among investment banks. In 
consumer markets, social capital of the seller and information flows among 
consumers were found to significantly influence purchases (Frenzen and Davis, 
1990; Frenzen and Nakamoto, 1993).  
 
Markets as a dynamic social structure 
The studies cited in the last paragraph, although primarily taking the social 
structure of the market as a given, could also be seen as the first step towards a 
process theory of markets as social structures. They focus on the first step in such 
a process, namely the initiation of an exchange relationship. A full theory would 
also take into account how such relationships subsequently are maintained as part 
of the market process. Such a theory is not yet present, but there are some studies 
that point in that direction. Porac and coauthors highlighted the way in which 
market boundaries and market actions are created by the joint actions from 
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producers and consumers, i.e. the social construction of the market (Porac et al., 
1995; Rosa et al., 1999). Abolafia and Kilduff (1988) showed that the crisis in the 
1980 silver market was not a simple economic phenomenon, but a complex set of 
interactions among the traders that both created and resolved the market bubble. 
Smith emphasizes similar points as Porac, Abolafia and Kilduff in an extensive 
investigation of auctions (Smith, 1989). Uzzi (1996, 1997) discussed how market 
relationships and social relationships in the New York knitwear industry 
overlapped and how they mutually created and sustained one another. A central 
theme in his work was that the open climate, created particularly through 
information exchange, resulted in a trusting climate between the various 
organizations. This is despite the (in principle) adversarial nature of the 
competition, which would seem rife with possibilities for opportunistic behavior 
and exploitation of bargaining power. Cannon and Perreault (1999) also 
highlighted the importance of information exchange for maintaining successful 
buyer-seller relationships. 
 
Summary  
A theory of the market has come a long way from the original neoclassical models 
of markets as static allocation mechanisms. Critics of the descriptively unrealistic 
nature of that model have focused on two aspects: the nature of the market as a 
process instead of an equilibrium state and the necessity of viewing market 
processes in the social and institutional context in which they are situated. 
Although both views by themselves contribute to a more realistic model of market 
processes, a comprehensive model would need to take both aspects into account. 
Despite this, the model developed in this chapter only touches briefly upon the 
social structure issues, and the main focus is on market process issues. 
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SAMENVATTING (IN DUTCH) 
 
De opkomst van het Internet de afgelopen jaren is zo snel gegaan, dat het moeilijk 
is om voor te stellen dat nog maar tien jaar geleden het World Wide Web volledig 
in de kinderschoenen stond en ook email alleen voorbehouden was aan een zeer 
select groepje mensen. Ook voor bedrijven heeft het Internet grote gevolgen 
gehad: hoewel nog lang niet zo grootschalig als sommigen hadden voorspeld, 
vormt het kopen en verkopen van goederen en diensten via het Internet inmiddels 
een vast onderdeel van veel bedrijven. Met name de opkomst van elektronische 
markten en veilingen in het bijzonder is in dit opzicht opmerkelijk. Het bedrijf 
eBay, dat zich met name richt op verzamelaars en de markt voor tweedehands 
goederen, verzorgt nu 4 miljoen veilingen per dag en is een van de weinige 
Internetbedrijven die structureel winst maken. Ook wanneer het gaat om in- en 
verkoop tussen bedrijven, spelen elektronische markten een steeds belangrijkere 
rol. Nieuwe Internetbedrijven als Covisint in de automobielindustrie, Transora in 
de voedselindustrie, ChemConnect in de chemische sector of FreeMarkets voor 
industriële goederen halen vele miljoenen omzet per jaar, alsmede vele andere 
organisaties die zelf veilingen opzetten voor eigen gebruik met behulp van de vele 
veilingtechnologie-leveranciers.  
Dergelijke ontwikkelingen roepen dan ook de vraag op hoe succesvol dergelijke 
markten nou daadwerkelijk zijn en hoe je de prestatie van een elektronische markt 
kunt verbeteren. Een manier om zulke vragen te beantwoorden is door succesvolle 
en niet-succesvolle elektronische markten te vergelijken en hieruit kritische 
succes- en faalfactoren af te leiden. Een andere manier is om factoren te zoeken 
die de prestatie van een elektronische markt kunnen beïnvloeden en vervolgens te 
onderzoeken wat het effect is van die factoren. Deze laatste aanpak wordt gevolgd 
in deze dissertatie. 
 
Een belangrijk uitgangspunt in deze dissertatie is dat wat de kern van wat er in 
markten gebeurt, niet zozeer het uitwisselen van vraag en aanbod zelf is, maar het 
uitwisselen van informatie over vraag en aanbod. Handelaren wisselen informatie 
uit met elkaar over waar ze naar op zoek zijn of wat ze te verkopen hebben en wat 
ze hiervoor willen betalen of ontvangen. Dit soort informatie-
uitwisselingsprocessen (oftewel marktprocessen) bepalen wat de uitkomst van de 
markt is (de transacties die tot stand komen) en daarmee de prestatie van de markt. 
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Deze focus op het uitwisselen van informatie betekent dat het belangrijk is om te 
kijken naar “welk type informatie bij wie beschikbaar is, of wanneer het op welke 
manier aan wie beschikbaar gemaakt wordt gedurende het marktproces”. Dit 
laatste is wat in deze dissertatie geïntroduceerd wordt als zijnde de informatie-
architectuur van de markt. Hierbij worden drie categoriëen informatie 
onderscheiden: informatie over het product zelf, informatie over de toestand van 
de markt en informatie over het marktproces zelf, d.w.z. gekoppeld aan een 
specifieke transactie. Tezamen vormen deze drie categoriëen de marktinformatie-
verzameling. 
Het begrip van informatie-architectuur wordt extra relevant in de context van 
elektronische markten, omdat informatie- en communicatietechnologie (ICT) grote 
invloed kan hebben op welke informatie beschikbaar is en hoe deze gepresenteerd 
wordt. In een elektronische markt kan bijvoorbeeld het vergelijken van verkopers 
bijvoorbeeld veel makkelijker zijn (‘de concurrentie is een muisklik verwijderd’), 
maar omdat het produkt niet meer fysiek aanwezig is in een elektronische markt, 
moeten er ook keuzes gemaakt worden of produkten weergegeven worden door 
middel tekst, foto’s, video, geluid of een combinatie hiervan. Dit alles leidt dan 
ook tot de centrale onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift, namelijk: “Hoe 
beïnvloedt ICT de informatie-architectuur van de markt en hoe beïnvloedt dit de 
marktprocessen, de marktuitkomst en de marktprestaties?”. 
Deze vraag wordt als volgt beantwoord. Als eerste worden er in hoofdstukken 3, 4 
en 5 drie aparte empirische studies uitgevoerd waarin telkens de invloed van een 
specifieke vorm van ICT op een van de drie informatie-categoriëen van de 
informatie-architectuur in een specifieke markt wordt geanalyseerd. Als tweede 
wordt in hoofdstuk 6 een synthese van deze studies gepresenteerd in de vorm van 
een algemeen theoretisch model van elektronische markten. 
 
De eerste studie behandelt de invloed van informatie over de kwaliteit van het 
product. Zoals hierboven al opgemerkt, zijn er in een elektronische markt 
verschillende manieren om informatie over een product te presenteren. Hierdoor 
hebben kopers meer of minder (of simpelweg andere) informatie tot hun 
beschikking om de kwaliteit van het produkt te beoordelen en dit kan invloed 
hebben op de prijs die ze willen betalen. Dit is onderzocht bij een grote 
bloemenveiling. Normaal gesproken worden de bloemen op een kar de veilingzaal 
in gereden, waar ze getoond worden aan de bieders en er vervolgens op geboden 
wordt door middel van de bekende veilingklok. Dit systeem met veilingkarren 
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brengt de nodige logistieke complexiteit met zich mee en om deze te reduceren 
werd voor de bloem Anthurium een nieuwe veilvorm ingevoerd, het zogenaamde 
beeldveilen. Hierbij bleven de bloemen in het magazijn, maar kregen de bieders in 
de veilingzaal een standaardfoto van de bloem te zien, samen met de overige 
produktgegevens (zoals wie de kweker was en wat diameter en steellengte van de 
bloem waren). In de nieuwe situatie misten bieders echter wel bepaalde informatie 
over de kwaliteit van de bloem, met name de stijfheid van de bloemsteel, wat een 
belangrijke indicator is van de versheid van de bloem. Door het ontbreken van 
zulke productkwaliteitsinformatie zullen bieders de kwaliteit behoudend inschatten 
en dus gemiddeld lagere prijzen betalen. Statistisch onderzoek van de 
bloemenprijzen van Anthuriums voor en na de invoering van beeldveilen 
bevestigde dit: de prijzen bij beeldveilen lagen ongeveer 2% lager dan daarvoor. 
Informatie over produktkwaliteit is dus een belangrijke categorie van informatie 
die kan veranderen onder invloed van ICT, wat weer gevolgen heeft voor de 
prijzen in een elektronische markt. 
 
De tweede studie keek onder andere naar een tweede categorie informatie die van 
belang werd geacht: informatie over de toestand van de markt, zoals bijvoorbeeld 
het aantal aanwezige handelaren. Dergelijke informatie staat weliswaar los van een 
specifieke transactie, maar is wel een indicator over de algehele toestand van de 
markt en kan daardoor dus van belang zijn voor handelaren. Dit werd onderzocht 
bij dezelfde bloemenveiling als de studie naar beeldveilen. De veiling bood 
bieders de mogelijkheid van het Kopen Op Afstand (KOA). Hierbij hoefden 
bieders niet meer in de veilingzaal aanwezig te zijn, maar in plaats daarvan boden 
ze via de computer die verbonden was met de centrale computer van de 
bloemenveiling. Dergelijke KOA-kopers zagen de bloem dus niet meer fysiek, ook 
geen plaatje, in tegenstelling tot de bieders in de veilingzaal, die de bloem nog wel 
gewoon zagen. Doordat beide groepen tegelijkertijd op dezelfde bloemen boden, is 
een gedetailleerde vergelijking van biedgedrag mogelijk tussen online (KOA) en 
offline (veilingzaal) kopers. Een belangrijk verschil tussen de KOA-kopers en de 
veilingzaal-kopers was dat de KOA-kopers door middel van het computersysteem 
lagere zoekkosten hadden: ze hadden een volledig overzicht over alle 13 
veilklokken en konden met een toetsdruk wisselen van klok, in plaats van daarvoor 
fysiek naar een andere plek te moeten lopen. Bovendien waren KOA-kopers ook 
nogal eens aangesloten op de KOA-systemen van concurrerende veilingen, 
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waardoor voor hen de transparantie van de markt nog groter werd. Dit alles zou 
moeten leiden tot lagere prijzen voor de KOA-kopers. 
Binnen de KOA-kopers zelf was er onderscheid te maken tussen twee groepen: de 
interne en externe KOA-kopers. De interne KOA-kopers hadden hun kantoor op 
het complex van de veiling zelf, terwijl de externe KOA-kopers vanuit hun 
kantoor in andere plaatsen boden. Het feit dat de interne KOA-kopers hun kantoor 
op het veilingcomplex hadden, bracht twee voordelen met zich mee ten opzichte 
van de externe KOA-kopers. Ten eerste hadden ze de mogelijkheid om ’s ochtends 
de bloemen in het magazijn te inspecteren, waardoor ze productkwaliteit beter 
konden inschatten dan de externe KOA-kopers, die niet de mogelijkheid van de 
magazijninspectie hadden. Daarnaast konden interne KOA-kopers de beelden zien 
van de beveiligingscamera’s die in elke veilingzaal hingen. Hierdoor konden ze 
bijvoorbeeld zien wat de oorzaak was van eventuele vertragingen in het 
veilproces, maar ook konden ze zien hoeveel bieders er in de veilingzaal aanwezig 
waren. Externe KOA-kopers misten deze informatie over de toestand van de 
markt.  
Een statistische vergelijking van het biedgedrag tussen interne KOA-kopers, 
externe KOA-kopers en veilingzaal-kopers bracht interessante verschillen aan het 
licht. KOA-kopers als geheel boden inderdaad gemiddeld lager dan de veilingzaal-
kopers, zoals verwacht op grond van de lagere zoekkosten en grotere 
markttransparantie. Wanneer de KOA-kopers gesplitst werden in de interne en 
externe KOA-kopers, bleek dat dit verschil echter volledig toe te schrijven viel aan 
het biedgedrag van de interne KOA-kopers. De externe KOA-kopers betaalden 
gemiddeld dezelfde prijzen als de kopers in de veilingzaal, terwijl de interne 
KOA-kopers structureel lagere prijzen voor de bloemen betaalden dan de externe 
KOA-kopers en de bieders in de veilingzaal. Het effect van de lagere zoekkosten 
voor externe KOA-bieders ten opzicht van veilingzaal-kopers werd dus 
genivelleerd door het ontbreken van informatie over de productkwaliteit (middels 
de magazijninspectie) en informatie over de toestand van de markt. Interne KOA-
kopers lijken in dit opzicht het beste van twee werelden te hebben, omdat ze zowel 
de lagere zoekkosten van het KOA-systeem hebben, alsook voldoende informatie 
over productkwaliteit en de toestand van de markt. 
 
Deze twee studies gingen met name over het effect van een ICT-verandering op 
een bestaande markt. ICT kan echter ook nieuwe marktmechanismen mogelijk 
maken die daarvoor praktisch gezien moeilijk uitvoerbaar waren. Een voorbeeld 
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hiervan is de elektronische multidimensionale veiling. Traditioneel gaat het in een 
veiling, naast het vinden van een koper, om het vaststellen van de prijs. Wanneer 
het gaat om een vast produkt dat verkocht moet worden, is dit voor de hand 
liggend. Echter, wanneer we niet kijken naar een dergelijke verkoopveiling, maar 
een inkoopveiling, wordt de zaak anders. In een inkoopveiling zijn de bieders de 
verkopers/leveranciers en de veilingmeester is de koper. We spreken dan ook wel 
van een vraaggestuurde veiling, omdat de vraag van de koper het uitgangspunt is 
van de veiling. In veel gevallen zijn dan behalve prijs ook factoren als kwaliteit, 
levertijd, garantie-bepalingen en dergelijke van groot belang. In plaats van deze 
extra dimensies van te voren vast te stellen en vervolgens een veiling op prijs te 
houden, worden deze dimensies een integraal onderdeel van het veilproces. 
Bieders doen dus nu een bod op meerdere dimensies, dat door de veilingmeester 
beoordeeld wordt totdat uiteindelijk de beste (en dus niet per se de goedkoopste!) 
bieder wint. In een dergelijke markt kan beter ingespeeld worden op de 
voorkeuren van de koper en de relatieve sterktes van de verkopers, zodat er win-
win situaties kunnen ontstaan. Bovendien vindt voor de verkopers concurrentie nu 
plaats op een zuiverder manier dan alleen maar op prijs.  
Bij het opzetten van dit soort nieuwe veilmechanismen moeten ten eerste de regels 
van het veilmechanisme ontworpen moeten worden, zoals wanneer de veiling 
eindigt en wie dan de veiling wint tegen welk bod. Tegelijkertijd moet echter ook 
de informatie-architectuur van de markt ontworpen worden. Dit vormt een -vaak 
onderschatte- complicatie, omdat de keuzes die gemaakt worden ten aanzien van 
welke informatie de bieders krijgen tijdens het veilproces over alle biedingen die 
gedaan zijn (m.a.w. de derde informatiecategorie van de informatie-architectuur: 
marktproces-informatie), de resultaten van het veilingmechanisme wel eens flink 
zouden kunnen beïnvloeden.  
De derde studie heeft dit laatste nader onderzocht. Er is een prototype gebouwd 
van een elektronische multidimensionale veiling en hiermee zijn 
laboratoriumexperimenten uitgevoerd. In deze experimenten bieden studenten in 
een multidimensionale veiling over meerdere ronden en onder verschillende 
informatie-architecturen. In het ene geval kregen ze aan het eind van de ronde 
alleen het hoogste bod te zien, waarna een nieuw bod kon worde geplaatst in de 
volgende ronde. In het andere geval kregen ze alle biedingen te zien die in die 
ronde gedaan waren, alsmede de score van elk bod volgens de afwegingen van de 
veilingmeester. Deze laatste informatiearchitectuur bleek een duidelijke 
verbetering op te leveren van de efficientie en optimaliteit van de markt. Hierbij 
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moet wel aangetekend worden dat deze voordelen vooral optraden wanneer de 
veiling kort (2 ronden) duurde. Wanneer de veiling langer duurde (4 ronden), was 
de toegevoegde waarde van de extra informatie beduidend kleiner. Dit zou erop 
kunnen wijzen dat er een proces van informatie-verzadiging optreedt in de markt: 
voorbij een bepaald punt heeft het transparanter maken van de markt nog 
nauwelijks positieve gevolgen voor de prestatie van de markt. 
 
Tot slot is in hoofdstuk 6 een algemeen antwoord gegeven op de onderzoeksvraag 
door een synthese van de drie voorgaande studies, tezamen met additionele 
literatuur. Dit heeft geleid tot een theorie van elektronische markten die de relatie 
tussen ICT en de prestatie van elektronische markten. Kort gezegd verloopt deze 
relatie langs vijf stappen: 
1. Een verandering in ICT verandert de informatie-architectuur van de markt. 
2. De informatie-architectuur bepaalt welke informatie beschikbaar is voor 
de handelaren in de markt (de marktinformatie-verzameling). 
3. De marktinformatie-verzameling bepaalt (mede) hoe de informatie-
uitwisselingsprocessen tussen handelaren verlopen. 
4. De informatie-uitwisseling (het marktproces) leidt uiteindelijk tot een 
uitkomst van de markt, te weten een verzameling transacties. 
5. Het marktproces en de uitkomst van de markt bepalen de prestatie van de 
markt, afhankelijk van de gehanteerde prestatie-criteria. 
 
De hoofdbijdrage van dit proefschrift is gelegen in het empirisch aantonen dat de 
informatie-architectuur van de markt een belangrijke factor is die de prestatie van 
elektronische markten verklaart. Dit betekent voor ontwerpers van markten, 
handelaren en onderzoekers, dat veel aandacht gegeven moet worden aan de 
processen van informatie-uitwisseling bij het ontwerpen en onderzoeken van 
markten. Een andere belangrijke bijdrage is de ontwikkeling van een model van 
elektronische markten dat breder is dat het transactiekosten-perspectief dat tot 
dusverre vooral gehanteerd werd. Tot slot is de ontwikkeling van de elektronische 
multidimensionale veiling zowel vanuit theoretisch als praktisch oogpunt zeer 
interessant. Dit is bij uitstek een onderwerp waarin wetenschappelijk onderzoek en 
praktijk elkaar prima kunnen versterken, opdat elektronische markten ook 
daadwerkelijk waarde creëren voor alle partijen. 
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Information Architecture and
Electronic Market Performance
Electronic markets are one of the most prominent business appli-
cations of the Internet, so determining the factors that drive their
performance is of great value. This thesis shows that an important
driver of electronic market performance is the information archi-
tecture of the market, which describes what type of information is
available to whom during the market process. Two studies of
electronic market initiatives at a large Dutch flower auction high-
light how information and communication technology (ICT) affects
the information architecture of the market and the consequences
for market behavior. ICT not only affects existing markets, but also
offers opportunities to design innovative new market mechanisms.
One of these is a multidimensional auction, in which bidders bid not
only on price, but also on dimensions such as quality and delivery
time. The effects of different information architectures of multi-
dimensional auctions are explored in laboratory experiments.
The findings of the three studies are synthesized into a theory of
electronic markets that has important implications for market
designers, traders and researchers.
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